A new era of Lebanese-Syrian coordination

The signing of the agreement establishing the Joint Lebanese-Syrian Higher Committee during Syrian Foreign Minister (F.M.) Assaad al-Shaibani’s visit to Beirut represents one of the most consequential developments in Lebanese-Syrian relations in more than 3 decades.

While the agreement formally replaces the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council created under the 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, its significance marks more than a mere institutional change. It reflects a shared attempt by Beirut and Damascus to redefine a relationship long shaped by political imbalance, security dominance, and competing narratives over sovereignty; ever since the founding of the Lebanese state in 1920, including the economic and customs break with Syria in March 1950 (as the union was terminated by Syrian Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm).

The 1991 Treaty as the architecture of Syrian tutelage in Lebanon

The foundations of post-war Lebanese-Syrian relations were laid on 22 May 1991, when Lebanon and Syria signed the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination following the end of the Lebanese War (1975-1990). Presented as a mechanism to strengthen political, economic, security, and cultural cooperation, the treaty established the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council as the highest institutional body responsible for coordinating policies between the two countries.

Officially, the council sought to deepen cooperation between two neighboring states bound by geography, history, and extensive social and economic ties. In reality, however, it operated during a period when Syria’s Assad effectively controlled and occupied Lebanon, playing a decisive role against the will of the majority of the Lebanese, in political appointments security affairs, and major state decisions, the principle of “coordination” often translated into a deeply unequal relationship.

Over time, the Supreme Council became one of the most controversial symbols of the Assad era in Lebanon. Indeed, it effectively bypassed traditional diplomatic channels, allowing key bilateral issues to be managed through an institution whose decisions reflected Syria’s dominant position. Successive agreements covering defense, security cooperation, trade, transportation, and economic coordination reinforced this imbalance, with many Lebanese viewing them as legal instruments that institutionalized Syrian influence rather than genuine bilateral partnership.

Although Syria withdrew its military forces from Lebanon in 2005 following widespread international and domestic pressure, namely the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1559 (2004), and the “Cedar Revolution” in 14 March 2005, the institutional framework created in 1991 remained largely intact. More than 40 bilateral agreements continued to govern various aspects of Lebanese-Syrian relations, even as many Lebanese increasingly questioned their relevance and legitimacy.

Why the 1991 framework became unsustainable

The decline of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Lebanon and the wider Middle East since 2023, as well as the subsequent fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024 fundamentally altered the political landscape governing relations between Beirut and Damascus. The emergence of a new Syrian leadership under President Ahmad al-Sharaa created an opportunity for both countries to reassess agreements that had been negotiated under entirely different political circumstances.

In Lebanon, there was growing consensus that many of the bilateral agreements signed during the 1990s reflected an imbalance of power rather than an equal partnership between sovereign states. Political leaders argued that institutions such as the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council belonged to an era marked by Syrian tutelage and no longer corresponded to the principles guiding relations between independent neighboring countries.

This reassessment gained momentum in October 2025, when both governments agreed to suspend the activities of the Supreme Council during F.M. Shaibaini’s first visit to Beirut, pending a comprehensive review of bilateral cooperation. The move was widely interpreted as a symbolic break from the legacy of the Assad era and the beginning of a broader effort to establish a more balanced framework for future cooperation.

The Joint Lebanese-Syrian Higher Committee: A new attempt to rebuild bilateral relations

Within this evolving context, the recent agreement signed in Beirut, consisting of 13 provisions, establishes the Joint Lebanese-Syrian Higher Committee as the new highest institutional framework governing bilateral relations. This historic milestone was made possible through the various trust-building and cooperative initiatives that both nations have undertaken since late 2024; most notably being the judicial cooperation agreement signed in February 2026. Indeed, Lebanese Prime Minister (P.M.) Nawaf Salam stated in a joint press conference with Shaibani:

The achievement we made today with His Excellency the Minister is the signing of the agreement to establish a Joint Lebanese-Syrian Higher Committee, similar to the existing joint high committees between Lebanon and a number of sister Arab countries.

Unlike the 1991 treaty, the new agreement explicitly places sovereignty at the center of cooperation. It highlights mutual respect for the independence, territorial integrity, and political equality of both states, while reaffirming non-interference in internal affairs, adherence to international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and consultation.

The committee will be jointly chaired by the Lebanese Prime Minister and the Syrian counterpart and will include ministers and senior officials responsible for relevant policy sectors. A permanent joint secretariat will also be formed to coordinate meetings, prepare agendas, monitor implementation, and facilitate communication between the respective government institutions.

The committee’s mandate extends across a broad range of sectors, including political and diplomatic affairs, security coordination, judicial cooperation, trade, investment, transportation, energy, water resources, infrastructure, healthcare, education, scientific research, telecommunications, and digital transformation. Specialized technical committees may also be established to address specific issues and submit recommendations to the Higher Committee.

Equally important is the committee’s decision-making process. Unlike perceptions surrounding the former Supreme Council, all decisions must be reached through mutual consensus, reflecting the agreement’s stated commitment to equality between both governments. The framework also provides mechanisms for regular annual meetings, extraordinary sessions when necessary, and procedures for amending or terminating the agreement through established diplomatic channels.

Collectively, these provisions aim to institutionalize cooperation without recreating the political asymmetry that characterized the previous framework; something that the Syrian F.M. Shaibani reiterated by stating:

We aim to open a new and prosperous relationship that will benefit future generations and both peoples in a healthy way, a relationship that will contribute to the prosperity of both countries.

Can the new agreement overcome decades of distrust?

The establishment of the Joint Higher Committee reflects a much broader transformation taking place since the fall of the Assad regime and the emergence of Syria’s new political leadership. Despite its symbolic importance, the new agreement does not automatically resolve decades of accumulated mistrust; meaning that significant challenges remain.

Several contentious issues remain unresolved and require careful negotiation, including border demarcation, combating cross-border security and smuggling, managing Syrian refugee returns, water resources, and economic integration. Addressing these complex files will necessitate sustained political commitment and institutional coordination beyond symbolic declarations.

Public perception also remains a significant challenge. Many Lebanese continue to view any formal institutional relationship with Syria through the lens of past experience, making confidence-building an essential component of the new framework’s success. Likewise, the Syrian leadership must demonstrate through consistent actions that its commitment to respecting Lebanese sovereignty extends beyond diplomatic declarations. This matter requires a combination of both interstate and intrastate reconciliation.

If both sides uphold the principles outlined in the agreement (respect for sovereignty, equality, and non-interference), the Joint Lebanese-Syrian Higher Committee could gradually evolve into a platform for healthy and constructive cooperation rather than political dominance. Failure to do so, however, would risk reviving past fears and reducing the agreement to another diplomatic document unable to overcome the burdens of history.

Hence, while the establishment of the Joint Lebanese-Syrian Higher Committee formally closes a chapter associated with Syrian tutelage, its ultimate significance and success will depend not on the language of the agreement but on its implementation and the will to undergo a process of sincere reconciliation. Nevertheless, the agreement marks an important attempt to reset relations between two neighboring countries and will be remembered as the moment when Lebanon and Syria began testing whether cooperation based on equality can finally replace a relationship long defined by imbalance and mistrust.