A strategic pause in the U.S.-Iran conflict

The understanding between the United States (U.S.) and Iran is best interpreted not as a comprehensive peace settlement, but as a tactical de-escalation designed to halt direct hostilities. That is the central argument of writer and historian specializing in Iranian affairs, Dr Arash Azizi, in an exclusive interview with The Beiruter.

The most important achievement of the agreement is that it has put an end to the war and opened a path for negotiations

While the agreement falls short of resolving decades of strategic rivalry, Azizi views it as a shift away from open confrontation and toward structured diplomacy. Yet, as he stresses, the end of military escalation may mark only the beginning of more complex political bargaining.

A tactical pause rather than a final settlement

According to Azizi, the most immediate value of the agreement lies in its ability to halt active conflict between U.S. and Iran. Core provisions reportedly include the continued openness of the Strait of Hormuz, partial unfreezing of Iranian financial assets, and the easing of oil-related sanctions through renewed waivers.

In practical terms, he argues, these measures largely restore a pre-crisis status quo rather than introduce a transformative framework. The arrangement stabilizes immediate tensions but leaves intact the deeper structural disputes that have defined U.S.-Iran relations for decades.

Chief among these unresolved issues are Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the broader regional balance of power, particularly involving the U.S. and Israel. These questions, Azizi suggests, are now being deferred to a new round of negotiations rather than resolved.

From “military leverage” to strategic limits

A key element in Azizi’s analysis is what he describes as a fundamental shift in U.S. strategy. During the previous 2 rounds of negotiations, particularly under the Trump administration, Washington operated under the assumption that military pressure could achieve what diplomacy could not.

The United States believed that if it could not get what it wanted through negotiations, it could obtain it through war.

That assumption, he argues, has now been tested and found wanting. Despite a sustained campaign that included strikes against senior Iranian figures and elements of Iran’s military command structure, the U.S. did not achieve the broader political transformation it sought.

This failure has altered the strategic calculus on both sides. Rather than demonstrating the effectiveness of coercion, the confrontation exposed its limitations. As a result, Azizi believes both Washington and Tehran are now entering negotiations from a position shaped by constraint rather than confidence.

Iran’s calculated choice ahead

The next phase, in Azizi’s view, will largely depend on decision-making within Tehran. The Islamic Republic now faces a strategic fork: either pursue a negotiated settlement that includes partial constraints on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, or revert to prolonged confrontation with both Washington and Israel.

Azizi suggests that the logic of economic necessity may outweigh ideological rigidity. The potential benefits (sanctions relief, investment inflows, and economic stabilization) could incentivize Iran’s leadership to pursue de-escalation.

He therefore considers it more likely that Tehran will opt for a pragmatic arrangement that prioritizes economic recovery over strategic escalation, even if such a choice requires difficult compromises.

I think it is very likely that Iran will choose the first path.

Lebanon: A fragile balance in a wider equation

While the agreement may reduce the risk of direct U.S.-Iran confrontation, Azizi warns that it does not eliminate instability in Lebanon. The regional theatre remains highly volatile, shaped by the interplay between Israeli strategy, Iranian influence, and the evolving position of Lebanese actors.

He notes that Israel has shown little willingness to fully adhere to existing ceasefire arrangements and continues to maintain positions in parts of Lebanese territory. At the same time, Hezbollah has been weakened after months of sustained conflict, but not neutralized.

Azizi raises the possibility that dissatisfaction with the U.S.-Iran understanding could push Israel toward more assertive actions in Lebanon, potentially testing the durability of the broader diplomatic framework. In such a scenario, Iran could reconsider its commitments if it perceives a collapse in regional deterrence.

If Israel undertakes extensive enough actions in Lebanon, Iran could conclude that it has no choice but to withdraw from the agreement.

Still, he considers a full-scale war less likely than a prolonged pattern of intermittent clashes. Low-intensity confrontation, he argues, has become the region’s default equilibrium.

Toward a Lebanese political recalibration

Beyond immediate security concerns, Azizi points to a more structural issue facing Lebanon: the possibility of a long-term political arrangement that effectively freezes the conflict with Israel.

Such a scenario would require internal consensus within Lebanon, including a potential non-confrontational posture from Hezbollah and diplomatic facilitation by figures such as Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. A redeployment of Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River and a gradual Israeli withdrawal from disputed areas could form part of such an understanding.

“I think it is entirely possible,” he said, while acknowledging that such a process would take time, highlighting that any such arrangement would be gradual, politically sensitive, and dependent on shifting domestic and regional dynamics.

He also notes that political change in Israel, particularly following the upcoming Israeli election in October, may lead Tel Aviv to adopt a different approach toward Arab states, even if its position on Iran remains largely unchanged.

A region capable of change

Despite decades of entrenched conflict, Azizi rejects the idea that the Middle East is condemned to perpetual instability.

“We live in a region filled with broken agreements and broken peace,” he said. “But there is no reason this deal must fail.”

He points to several recent developments that would once have seemed improbable: improved relations between regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, as well as the winding down of major phases of the Syrian conflict.

These shifts, he argues, demonstrate that regional alignments are more fluid than commonly assumed. Even states with deep ideological or strategic rivalries have shown an ability to recalibrate when interests converge.

At the same time, Azizi acknowledges Iran’s own controversial regional legacy, particularly its involvement in conflicts in Syria and Lebanon. Yet he cautions against assuming continuity as inevitability, especially as Iran approaches a potential generational leadership transition.

The future direction of the Islamic Republic, he notes, will depend not only on institutions but also on the worldview of a new political and security elite that has yet to fully emerge. “We do not yet know who will succeed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, nor do we fully understand the shape of the new security establishment,” Azizi said.

Hence, the real test will be whether Tehran and Washington can translate a fragile de-escalation into a durable political framework, and whether regional actors, from Israel to Lebanon, can adapt to the shifting balance that follows.