After the Gaza first phase agreement… What’s next for Hezbollah?

Two years after the deadly war between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East has entered a new chapter. Following constructive and intense negotiations in Egypt, the contending parties finally agreed on the first phase of Trump’s Peace Deal, signaling promising prospects for a lasting and enduring ceasefire.

The aforementioned agreement, however, aimed at ending the Gaza war and launching reconstruction in the devastated Strip, raises critical questions regarding its regional implications, particularly for Lebanon and Hezbollah.

With Israel’s impending withdrawal from Gaza and the decline of Iranian influence, Beirut may face renewed pressure on Hezbollah to disarm, placing the group before direct challenges and making the coming phase both sensitive and decisive.

Lebanon After the Gaza Agreement

While negotiations continue in Sharm el-Sheikh, a Lebanese political source told The Beiruter “the Hamas–Netanyahu agreement will sooner or later translate into increased pressure on Hezbollah, following Iran’s removal from the Gaza equation, the fall of the Syrian regime, Hamas’s handover of its weapons, and the disarmament of Palestinian camps in Lebanon.”

He added that “the coming phase will present Hezbollah with a major internal test: can it maintain its weapons in an Arab and regional political environment that has completely changed?”

Political writer and analyst Ibrahim Al-Amin believes the repercussions of the Gaza agreement on Hezbollah depend on “the balance of power within Lebanon and the regional scene after the decline of Iranian influence.”

He says the party “declared its support for Hamas despite reservations about the U.S. proposal, in line with its approach since the Al-Aqsa Flood, supporting Palestinian resistance without direct involvement.” But within Hezbollah’s own circles, there is division: some believe pressure will increase as Iran’s role recedes, while others think a war-weary Israel will not dare to open a new front in Lebanon.

Al-Amin considers that the period following the Gaza agreement and the Lebanese government’s decisions to assert its authority over all national territory mark a new political stage for both Hezbollah and Iran. Despite the formal withdrawal of legitimacy from Hezbollah’s weapons, this does not mean disarmament is imminent. Al-Amin says the party “views the current situation as a transitional phase in which it has weathered the peak of pressure and does not see itself obligated to hand over its weapons in the foreseeable future.”

According to Al-Amin, Hezbollah “will not voluntarily surrender its weapons, but it is likely to face gradual restrictions, either by the army or through political and economic pressure,” within a plan implemented quietly, without direct confrontation.

The coming phase, he predicts, will be marked by political escalation, international pressure, and perhaps partial implementation of the August 5 Plan, “but without breaking the fragile balance.”

He concludes by saying that “Hezbollah’s weapons today have lost their political legitimacy domestically, but their handover is not currently on the table. Lebanon is living in a delicate balance between pressure and containment, awaiting the outcomes of major regional settlements.”

Hezbollah Under Unprecedented Pressure

For his part, political analyst Nabil Bou Monsef believes that the Gaza agreement, if firmly implemented and subjected to effective U.S. supervision as planned, will represent a historic turning point in the Middle East, one with direct repercussions on Lebanon.

Bou Monsef says: “If both parties (Israel and Hamas) commit to serious implementation under U.S. administration oversight, we’ll be witnessing a major and irreversible development. This will strengthen the process of confining weapons to the Lebanese state, and Hezbollah will come under unprecedented pressure to hand over its arms, having lost both political cover and internal legitimacy.”

He adds that the regional and international circumstances surrounding the agreement are very strong, noting that “all indicators suggest this time is entirely different from previous phases when Hezbollah procrastinated in rejection, because the political environment has changed, and Iran itself is now forced to recalculate.”

Bou Monsef continues: “What’s happening now weakens Iran indirectly and limits its regional influence. Today, it faces two choices: either join the new course led by Washington and Arab capitals or risk a return to conflict.”

He sees that the chances of a new war with Israel are gradually diminishing. However, “the coming phase will see increased external and internal pressure on Hezbollah to push it toward voluntarily surrendering its weapons, or to impose disarmament by force if it refuses.”

Bou Monsef concludes: “After Hamas handed over its weapons, it’s hard to imagine Hezbollah being able to keep its arsenal in a new political cycle taking shape from Gaza to Beirut.”