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Alliances as the new power play

Alliances as the new power play

How the Gulf's search for military protection is redrawing the Middle East's political map through alliance competition?

By Peter Chouayfati | April 30, 2026
Reading time: 5 min
Alliances as the new power play

For decades, the Middle East's political landscape was defined by states competing against one another for regional dominance. The cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran set the tone, with each power assembling a constellation of allies, proxies, and client states to extend its influence and contain the other. But that framework is rapidly becoming obsolete. What is emerging in its place is not competition between individual powers, but between rival alliance blocs, with the Gulf states' growing appetite for military protection sitting at the very center of this transformation.

 

The old order and its fractures

To understand where the region is heading, it helps to understand where it has been. When the Arab uprisings of 2011 reshaped the political map of the region, the only formal alignment bloc in existence was the Gulf Cooperation Council, established back in 1981. The GCC was never truly a military alliance in the conventional sense but functioned more as an economic arrangement, frequently dismissed in regional circles as a wealthy states' club, than a credible collective defense mechanism. It was underpinned by American strategic support, but its member states largely pursued independent foreign policies, and the fault lines within it were never far from the surface.

Those fault lines cracked wide open in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain launched a blockade against fellow GCC member Qatar. The blockade failed, and its most lasting consequence was arguably the deepening of the Qatar-Turkey bilateral relationship, with Ankara's robust support for Doha during the crisis cementing a durable partnership that would go on to shape regional dynamics in meaningful ways.

Meanwhile, the broader regional contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran continued to define the post-2011 order. During Syria's civil war, Iran’s axis members delivered tangible military support to the Assad regime and in late 2023, the Houthi movement in Yemen began launching strikes against Red Sea shipping lanes in a show of solidarity with Hamas.

On the other side, Saudi Arabia pursued its own counter-alignment strategy, championing the U.S.-backed Middle East Strategic Alliance and edging toward normalization with Israel under American pressure. The Abraham Accords of 2020, which brought Israel into formal diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, represented the most concrete expression of this realignment, built explicitly around the shared goal of containing Iranian influence.

 

October 2023 and the acceleration of change

The events that followed October 7, 2023 did not create the shift toward alliance competition, but they dramatically accelerated it. The intensification of military threats across the region exposed how fragile existing arrangements truly were. Iran's military capacities suffered serious depletion, sending ripple effects through its entire network of proxies. Israel's military campaign and Iran's retaliatory strikes forced the Gulf states that had normalized relations with Tel Aviv to reassess the benefits of those agreements. Turkey, characteristically, chose to sideline itself from the most volatile dynamics, demonstrating that even a regional power of its stature was not immune to the disruptive forces at play.

Perhaps most telling of all was Saudi Arabia's position: caught between the political imperative of maintaining solidarity with the Palestinian cause and the strategic imperative of countering Iranian influence, Riyadh found itself paralyzed between two equally uncomfortable options. For a kingdom that had long sought to position itself as the undisputed leader of the Arab world, the inability to act decisively in either direction was deeply revealing.

 

The Gulf's search for protection and the new alliance architecture

The Gulf states, acutely aware of the limits of their own military capabilities and increasingly uncertain about the depth of American security guarantees, are actively constructing new bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements. The clearest and most recent example of this is Pakistan's defense agreement with Qatar, which mirrors a nearly identical pact Islamabad had previously signed with Saudi Arabia. Under these agreements, Pakistani military units are to be stationed at Gulf bases. That nuclear-armed Pakistan is now expanding its military presence across two of the wealthiest Gulf states simultaneously reflects a deliberate Gulf strategy of anchoring external military partners as a substitute for the collective defense architecture the GCC was never truly able to provide. Significantly, Turkey played a facilitating role in brokering the Qatar-Pakistan deal, with the matter reportedly discussed among the three countries' leaders at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

This alliance fits into a broader pattern in which smaller, purpose-built alliances are replacing the grand blocs of the previous era. The Abraham Accords created a security and trade alignment between Israel and several Arab states. The Arab Quartet of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt coalesced around specific shared concerns. The Qatar-Turkey axis deepened through shared adversity. A Jordanian-Egyptian-Iraqi bloc emerged around energy cooperation and mutual diplomatic support. Each of these groupings is distinct in its membership and goals, yet together they sketch the outline of a new regional order.

 

Toward a new regional order

What this amounts to is a fundamental transformation in the nature of the region’s geopolitics. The old contest, Iran versus Saudi Arabia, resistance versus normalization, Islamism versus Arab nationalism, has not disappeared, but it is increasingly being channeled through alliance structures rather than individual state behavior. The question is no longer simply which state is more powerful, but which coalition is more cohesive, more militarily capable, and more able to attract partners willing to provide genuine security guarantees.

The Iranian Axis, once the most powerful force the region had seen, now faces existential questions about its continued viability as each of its proxies are weakened and eroded. The Gulf states, for their part, are rewriting the rules of regional order, no longer content to rely on a single patron or a single framework. They are recalibrating, by forming new alliances and redesigning their security strategies. The result has been a deliberate effort to diversify their security arrangements, with the Pakistan-Qatar and Pakistan-Saudi defense pacts being emblematic of this shift. Whether the alliances they are building prove more durable than the ones they are replacing remains to be seen.

A new regional order is taking shape, more fluid, more transactional, and less predictable. 

    • Peter Chouayfati
      Political Analyst and Researcher