Armenia between Moscow and the West

Armenia's recent parliamentary vote has drawn the kind of international scrutiny that has become familiar in the South Caucasus and its neighboring region, following similar dynamics in Georgia's 2024 election and Moldova's vote in 2025. In each case, outside observers have tended to flatten the contest into a simple East-versus-West storyline. Applying that same template to Armenia, however, misses much of what actually matters for the country's long-term stability.

The governing Civil Contract party, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, took just under half the vote, enough to retain control of parliament but not enough to unilaterally rewrite the constitution. Its leading rival, an alliance called Strong Armenia and fronted by businessman Samvel Karapetyan, came in at roughly 23 percent, built largely on a promise to preserve Armenia's longstanding closeness with Russia. Since first taking office in 2018, Pashinyan's government has steadily expanded its outreach to Western capitals, and this result keeps that process moving rather than halting it.

What's less obvious is what this continuity actually implies for Armenia's relationship with Moscow. Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center analyst Alexander Atasuntsev has argued that while Pashinyan's win keeps Armenia moving gradually toward Europe, a full rupture with Russia remains improbable, since the economic ties binding the two countries still serve both sides' interests.

To grasp why this election carried such weight, it's worth revisiting the events that brought Armenia to this point. The loss in the 2020 conflict, followed by Azerbaijan’s toakeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, forced a fundamental rethink of the country's foreign policy. Pashinyan's response has rested on three pillars: making peace with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, weaning the country off its dependence on Moscow, and forging closer links with the EU, the US, and a wider set of global partners.

Artin DerSimonian, writing for Responsible Statecraft, has traced how the military setbacks Armenia endured from 2020 through 2023 pushed Pashinyan toward an unambiguous tilt westward. Over that same stretch, both Azerbaijan and Turkey have steadily gained ground in the South Caucasus, eroding the influence once held by Russia and, to a smaller extent, Iran. Washington and Brussels now appear keen to build on that shift and push it further.

A concrete marker of that push came last August, when a Washington summit brought Pashinyan together with Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev under President Trump's auspices. While much of what emerged was symbolic groundwork toward an eventual peace deal, one tangible result was an agreement on a transit corridor — branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity — meant to boost regional trade links.

Russia and the elections

Moscow, meanwhile, was far from passive in the run-up to the vote. Its pressure campaign worked on two fronts. The first targeted ordinary voters economically: by restricting certain Armenian imports, particularly farm products, Russia seemed to be reminding rural communities of what they stood to lose. This group tends to favor pro-Russian parties more than urban voters do, making it a logical target for a campaign designed to dent Pashinyan's support base.

The second front aimed squarely at the government itself. Reports suggest Russia threatened to halt the gas supply arrangement underpinning much of Armenia's energy needs if Yerevan kept pursuing EU membership, while the broader Eurasian Economic Union bloc publicly pressed Armenia to put EU accession to a national referendum, an attempt to force the issue onto Pashinyan's domestic agenda on Moscow's terms.

Heavy-handed pressure from Russia could end up driving Armenia closer not just to Europe, but also to Turkey, a country with its own ambitions to expand influence in the region at Moscow's expense. Tellingly, even as Russia was issuing trade bans and threats in early June, Pashinyan was holding parallel conversations with both EU officials and Turkish President Erdoğan, reportedly exploring direct trade routes and border openings contingent on a finalized peace deal with Baku.

Meanwhile, since 2022, Armenia has emerged as a key conduit for Western goods barred from direct sale to Russia under sanctions. The trade volumes involved have exploded: Armenian exports to Russia climbed from around $840 million in 2021 to nearly $3 billion by the end of 2025, a near-fourfold increase driven largely by re-exported Western products. Electronics shipments alone went from a negligible $12 million to close to $1 billion over that same period.

Armenia’s cards

Armenia isn't without bargaining chips of its own. Pashinyan retains the option of pulling Armenia out of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, a move that would carry symbolic significance even though Russia had already largely stopped supplying Armenia with weapons years before.

One area to watch going forward is the Turkish-Armenian border. Richard Giragosian, who heads the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, points out that Pashinyan's thin parliamentary margin and the unresolved question of constitutional reform give Turkey an opening to play a more significant role in cementing a lasting peace. He describes Ankara's approach as patient and incremental, an attempt to rebuild its own relationship with Armenia somewhat independent of Azerbaijan. Even so, Turkey is moving carefully, aware that Azerbaijan remains a vital economic partner and that, according to sources in Ankara, Baku has so far offered only cautious acceptance rather than enthusiastic backing for the idea. A reopened border would likely be welcomed in both Washington and Brussels, but its timeline remains tethered to how the broader Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process unfolds.

Taken as a whole, this election doesn't point toward Armenia abruptly cutting ties with Russia or fully embracing the West without reservation. Instead, it reflects a continuation of the careful balancing act Pashinyan has pursued since 2018, now bolstered by a renewed, if imperfect, electoral mandate.