Can a radioactive mineral loosen China's rare-earth grip?

The race to secure rare earths, essential to everything from electric vehicles and wind turbines to advanced military equipment, is exposing a costly weakness in global supply chains. While many countries possess substantial mineral reserves, they lack the industrial capacity to turn them into usable materials.

China has built its dominance around precisely this capability. n 2024, it accounted for 60% of global mining output of rare earths used in powerful magnets, but 91% of their refined production and 94% of permanent magnet manufacturing, according to the International Energy Agency's (IEA) April 2026 Rare Earth Elements report. Beijing's advantage lies not simply in extracting these minerals, but in controlling the industrial processes that turn them into essential components, leaving other countries dependent on Chinese facilities even when their minerals are mined elsewhere.

Monazite, a rare-earth-bearing mineral found across several continents, offers one potential alternative, but its radioactive content makes extraction expensive and waste management difficult. As demand for rare-earth magnets rises, these costs could complicate efforts to diversify supplies beyond China.

A mineral with a radioactive complication

Monazite contains valuable rare-earth elements, including neodymium, used in powerful permanent magnets, and cerium and lanthanum, used in products such as glass. Its composition presents two processing challenges.

First, its rare earths are bound within a phosphate compound that requires intensive chemical or thermal treatment to extract. Second, it is radioactive. An October 2026 review published in the Journal of Sustainable Metallurgy found that monazite commonly contains 4% to 12% thorium by weight, alongside traces of uranium, requiring facilities to manage radioactive materials with limited commercial demand.

According to the review, conventional processing requires concentrated acids or alkaline chemicals, substantial energy, and careful waste management. Radioactive materials left behind during extraction require regulated handling, storage, and disposal, adding costs for countries with limited waste-management infrastructure. The review also examines alternative techniques to improve recovery and reduce chemical consumption, but identifies significant obstacles to making them commercially viable.

Resources without processing power

The geographical distribution of rare-earth resources differs considerably from the distribution of industrial capacity.

Brazil holds an estimated 11 million metric tons of rare-earth reserves, compared with 6.3 million in Australia and 1.9 million in the United States, according to the U.S. Geological Survey's (USGS) May 2026 Mineral Commodity Summaries. Yet their estimated 2025 mine production amounted to just 2,000, 29,000 and 51,000 metric tons of rare-earth oxide equivalent, respectively. China, meanwhile, produced approximately 270,000 metric tons out of a global total of 390,000.

The distinction between reserves and production is particularly relevant to monazite. India possesses substantial deposits, but its processing activities have historically concentrated on recovering thorium and uranium rather than producing commercially significant quantities of refined rare-earth materials.

China also imports monazite, with the USGS identifying Nigeria, Madagascar, Thailand, and Indonesia as its leading suppliers. Their raw materials enter China's refining industry, where much of the associated industrial value remains concentrated.

For mineral-producing countries, the disparity between reserves and processing capacity has significant economic consequences. Brazil's estimated rare-earth reserves are nearly six times those of the United States, yet its annual production remains a fraction of American output.

The economics of independence

New processing facilities must compete against Chinese producers with established infrastructure, specialized expertise, and extensive relationships with companies that manufacture finished products using rare earths.

A May 2026 report from Resources for the Future, a Washington-based environmental and natural resource economics research organization, updated in September, identifies high capital requirements, workforce shortages, infrastructure constraints, and uncertain market conditions as major obstacles to expanding domestic critical-mineral production.

These challenges are especially pronounced for monazite, where chemical processing and radioactive waste management introduce additional costs.

Government support can reduce investment risks through financing, purchase commitments, and other industrial incentives. But policies intended to secure mineral supplies do not necessarily produce industries capable of competing without continuing assistance.

Rather than concentrating production domestically, the Resources for the Future analysis examines international partnerships that distribute mining, refining, and manufacturing among countries, reducing dependence on individual suppliers. For monazite-producing countries in Africa and Asia, these partnerships could help retain more of their mineral resources' economic value. However, the report identifies financing, infrastructure, and technological barriers to developing local processing industries.

The limits of diversification

The urgency of developing alternative supplies became evident in 2025, when Chinese export restrictions disrupted rare-earth shipments and affected manufacturers internationally.

The IEA estimates that if China's expanded export restrictions were fully implemented, they could jeopardize $6.5 trillion worth of annual economic activity outside China, particularly in the automotive, electronics, transport and defense industries. The restrictions were suspended for one year in November 2025, but the potential economic exposure remains substantial.

Future demand will compound the challenge. The agency projects that demand for magnet rare earths outside China will rise by 50% by 2035 under existing policy settings. Yet existing and planned capacity outside China is expected to satisfy only approximately 25% of projected refining demand and less than 20% of magnet demand by that year.

Monazite could help narrow these gaps, particularly where deposits can be recovered alongside other minerals. But its radioactive content requires countries seeking alternatives to China to develop commercially viable refining facilities, specialized workforces, and affordable waste-management systems. Without those investments, additional mineral supplies will do little to reduce dependence on Chinese industry.