Can former enemies become partners?

Reconciliation after war is neither automatic nor inevitable. It is a long, contested, and fragile process that unfolds across multiple domains. Post-war reconciliation requires more than the absence of violence; it demands the rebuilding of trust and the creation of shared frameworks that make renewed conflict less likely. Few cases illustrate this process more clearly than the reconciliation between France and Germany after World War II. Having fought three devastating wars between 1870 and 1945, the two states moved from entrenched rivalry to partnership within a single generation.

The means of reconciliation after war

Reconciliation operates simultaneously at multiple levels. It involves political leadership, institutional frameworks, economic interdependence, and sustained engagement at the level of civil society. Crucially, it is a process rather than a one-time event.

First, political commitment and leadership are essential. Without deliberate choices by political elites to prioritize reconciliation, historical grievances tend to persist. Leadership actions, such as public gestures, treaties, and symbolic acts, help redefine former enemies as legitimate partners. However, elite-level reconciliation alone is insufficient.

Second, institutionalization plays a decisive role. Regularized cooperation mechanisms reduce uncertainty and ensure continuity beyond individual leaders. Institutions transform reconciliation from a moral aspiration into a practical routine. They also help manage disagreements, preventing disputes from escalating into existential crises.

Third, economic cooperation and interdependence create material incentives for peace. Shared economic interests raise the cost of conflict and encourage pragmatic collaboration. Economic integration, when combined with political oversight, can anchor reconciliation in everyday governance.

Fourth, civil society engagement is indispensable. Reconciliation that does not reach ordinary citizens remains shallow. Exchanges between youth, professionals, municipalities, and cultural institutions humanize former adversaries and dismantle stereotypes inherited from wartime propaganda.

Finally, reconciliation requires time, patience, and adaptability. It is not linear and is often marked by setbacks. Differences in political culture, economic structures, and historical memory continue to generate friction. Successful reconciliation does not eliminate conflict but provides mechanisms to manage it peacefully.

The Franco-German context: From rivalry to rapprochement

Between 1870 and 1945, France and Germany fought three wars that inflicted immense human, material, and moral damage. By the end of the Second World War, Germany lay defeated, occupied, and morally discredited, while France, though victorious, was economically weakened and deeply suspicious of its former enemy. Reconciliation was far from inevitable.

In the immediate post-war period, neither society prioritized rapprochement. German society was focused on survival and reconstruction, while French authorities remained wary of a population they believed had been deeply shaped by Nazi ideology. Yet it was precisely those who had suffered most, former resistance members, prisoners of war, and concentration camp deportees, who often became early advocates of reconciliation. Having experienced the catastrophic consequences of conflict firsthand, they recognized that renewed war would be mutually ruinous.

Youth, society, and the bottom-up dimension

One of the most important early means of reconciliation was engagement with younger generations. French authorities placed greater trust in German youth than in adults, viewing them as less ideologically compromised and more receptive to democratic values. As early as 1946, Franco-German youth encounters began, laying the groundwork for a new relationship grounded in personal contact rather than inherited hostility.

This bottom-up dimension expanded throughout the 1950s and gained institutional form with the creation of the Franco-German Youth Office (OFAJ) in 1963. Well-funded and politically supported, the OFAJ facilitated exchanges among students, teachers, young professionals, and athletes. Over time, these encounters normalized cooperation and embedded reconciliation into everyday social experience.

Town and regional twinning further reinforced this process. From modest beginnings in the 1950s, twinning arrangements expanded rapidly after 1963. Today, France and Germany maintain approximately 2,500 twinnings, more than any other bilateral pairing. These networks connected municipalities, schools, associations, and border regions, fostering a lived sense of European citizenship.

By bringing together ordinary citizens and the youth, twinning initiatives humanized the former enemy and replaced images shaped by wartime propaganda with personal encounters. Sustained exchanges helped dismantle stereotypes by fostering trust and mutual recognition over time. Importantly, these partnerships created durable cross-border social networks that often survived political tensions and policy disagreements at the national level. In doing so, twinning anchored reconciliation in everyday life rather than confining it to elite diplomacy, ensuring that rapprochement was not only a governmental project but also a societal one, rooted in shared experiences and long-term interpersonal ties.

Political leadership and the Élysée treaty

Elite-level reconciliation reached a decisive moment with the partnership between Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, Franco-German relations had already improved through European cooperation, particularly via the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaties of Rome.

Despite differing visions of Europe, de Gaulle and Adenauer shared a conviction that reconciliation was a historical necessity. Their cooperation culminated in the Élysée Treaty, signed on 22 January 1963. The Treaty provided a durable political and legal framework for cooperation that no longer depended solely on personal rapport.

The Treaty defined four guiding objectives: reconciliation, cooperation, solidarity, and friendship. It institutionalized regular meetings between heads of state and government, ministers, and senior officials. Its programmatic focus covered foreign affairs, defense, and education and youth, while remaining flexible enough to evolve over time. The Élysée Treaty established itself as the cornerstone of Franco-German relations. Subsequent leadership pairings, from Brandt and Pompidou to Merkel and Sarkozy, built upon this foundation, ensuring continuity despite political change.

Furthermore, the European Union is crucial to both France and Germany because it institutionalizes their post–Second World War reconciliation and transforms it into a permanent framework of mutual dependence. France and Germany have become the Union’s central economic and political pillars. The Union amplifies their collective power through the single market and currency, common policies such as the Green Deal, shared institutions, while also delivering tangible everyday benefits, from free movement and Erasmus exchanges to monetary stability. This interdependence sustains the so-called Franco-German engine, which sets the EU’s strategic direction. In essence, the EU allows both countries to project influence far beyond their individual capacities, manage shared challenges, and secure continental stability.

As Tim Marshall captures vividly, “What is now the EU was set up so that France and Germany could hug each other so tightly in a loving embrace that neither would be able to get an arm free with which to punch the other.”

The Franco-German reconciliation illustrates that even the most entrenched rivalries can be transformed. It also shows that reconciliation is never complete; it must be constantly maintained and adapted to new challenges. As a model, it provides valuable lessons on how former enemies can move from hostility to partnership, and, ultimately, to a shared future.