Can Lebanon and Syria truly reconcile?

For decades, relations between Lebanon and Syria have been shaped by political disputes, military intervention, competing national narratives, and persistent public mistrust. While recent political developments in Damascus have generated cautious optimism about opening a new chapter between the two neighbors, lasting normalization requires far more than diplomatic exchanges or political declarations. Sustainable relations must be built upon a broader process of reconciliation capable of addressing historical grievances while establishing principles for future cooperation.

This perspective was reflected in a recent statement by Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, who argued that solutions between Lebanon and Syria

should emerge from points of convergence, not points of divergence.

The aforementioned remark highlights that countries emerging from prolonged periods of tension and conflict cannot simply disregard their past experiences, yet neither can they allow themselves to remain trapped in historical disputes which would ultimately determine their future. Successful rapprochement depends on identifying common interests while honestly confronting unresolved issues through comprehensive reconciliation.

Reconciliation, however, is often misunderstood as a single political agreement or symbolic gesture. In fact, it is a long-term process through which trust is gradually restored after conflict, coercion, or sustained hostility. It encompasses political, legal, institutional, and societal dimensions, all of which contribute to transforming adversarial relationships into cooperative ones. This process is not merely limited to societies within a given country, but extends to incorporate interstate relations as well.

Learning from the Franco-German experience

Few bilateral relationships have undergone a transformation as remarkable as that between France and Germany. Today, the two countries stand at the heart of European political and economic integration. Yet for centuries, they were among the continent’s fiercest adversaries. Their rivalry became so deeply embedded in European history that Germans referred to it as Erbfeindschaft, or “hereditary enmity,” reflecting the widespread belief that conflict between the two nations was virtually inevitable.

The origins of this antagonism trace back to the 17th century during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). Guided by the concept of raison d’État (a French phrase meaning “reason of state”), former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France Cardinal Richelieu prioritized his country’s strategic interests by supporting Protestant powers against the Catholic Habsburg Empire; despite the religious contradictions such a policy entailed. The rivalry between Paris and Berlin continued through successive conflicts, including the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), World War I (1914-1918), and World War II (1939-1945).

Nevertheless, the utter devastation brought by the latter two conflicts fundamentally altered the calculations and approaches of both governments toward one another. After two catastrophic world wars, the French and German leaders concluded that continued rivalry would only perpetuate instability in their own nations as well as across Europe. Thus, they pursued cooperation through gradual confidence-building measures that transformed them from former enemies into strategic partners.

This process did not emerge overnight, but rather through a combination of political will and a shared vision. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 initiated economic cooperation by proposing joint management of coal and steel production, while the Élysée Treaty of 1963 further institutionalized bilateral coordination. Efforts to enhance economic and political integration continued, culminating in the establishment of the European Union (E.U.) under the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993.

Equally important, however, was the effort to rebuild relations beyond government institutions. France and Germany invested heavily in grassroots initiatives by encouraging municipal partnerships (twinning towns and regions), educational exchanges, and youth cooperation (by establishing the French-German Youth Office in 1963). Such initiatives helped reshape public perceptions over time, ensuring that reconciliation became rooted not only in official agreements but also in society itself.

Therefore, the Franco-German experience demonstrates that sustainable reconciliation depends not only on governmental initiatives, but demands similar efforts at the societal level as well.

Advancing interstate reconciliation

Although the historical background and contemporary context governing Lebanese-Syrian relations differ substantially, several lessons from the Franco-German experience can be drawn.

Respecting and upholding the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity:

First and foremost, Lebanon and Syria must mutually ensure that the principles of sovereignty, particularity, and territorial integrity are upheld. No reconciliation process can succeed unless both parties recognize each other as independent states whose territorial integrity and political autonomy are equally respected.

This issue has long complicated Lebanese-Syrian relations. Since Lebanon achieved independence in 1943, successive governments in Damascus frequently questioned the status of Lebanon as a sovereign nation, while simultaneously promoting regional hegemonic projects such as “Greater Syria” or “Natural Syria.” Former Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Fouad Boutros, indicated in his memoires that Syrian representatives even objected to Lebanon’s participation as a founding member of the League of Arab States (L.A.S.), arguing that the country was not an independent state.

It will not be for long before the people of Lebanon demand to join their brother, the Syrian people.

Although the position held by Damascus failed to materialize, it reflected a political outlook toward Beirut that would continue to influence bilateral relations for decades. Following the rise of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, and particularly during the Assad regime (1971-2024), Syrian policy increasingly treated Lebanon through an asymmetric lens.

However, recent statements issued by Syria’s new leadership suggest the possibility of a different foreign policy approach towards neighboring Lebanon, based on an equal footing. President Ahmad al-Sharaa has repeatedly affirmed that Damascus seeks relations with Lebanon based upon full respect for its sovereignty, territorial unity, independent decision-making, and non-interference in domestic affairs. Indeed, on 24 August 2025, he asserted that “Damascus wants a state-to-state relationship with Lebanon.” Such statements represent an encouraging departure from earlier policies as they reveal a promising start for a healthy relationship, grounded in mutual recognition and respect for Lebanese sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. Nevertheless, their significance will ultimately depend upon implementation in order to ensure they do not remain mere rhetorical commitments and symbolic assurances.

Confronting the past through truth and accountability:

Second, durable reconciliation requires sincere engagement with the past, particularly through mechanisms that acknowledge, document, and address the violations committed over decades by both parties.

Truth-telling constitutes one of the central pillars of genuine reconciliation, aiming to establish an accurate and shared understanding of historical events. By recognizing the experiences of victims, acknowledging responsibility where appropriate, and documenting past abuses, this process contributes to restoring trust while creating safeguards against the repetition of similar violations.

The violence that has affected both societies cannot be reduced to the actions of a single actor or confined to a particular period. The abuses and violations committed under the Assad regime, the al-Nusra Front (A.N.F.) against the Lebanese Armed Forces (L.A.F.) and Lebanese civilians (namely in Arsal), and Hezbollah’s military involvement in the Syrian Civil War (2011-2024) have all left profound political and societal consequences on both sides of the border.

A credible reconciliation process should thus acknowledge these experiences without sideling or selectively overlooking uncomfortable aspects. This should be undergone through a conciliatory and constructive spirit rather than a vindicative one, as reconciliation differs fundamentally from vengeance. Therefore, without such a process, unresolved trauma is likely to continue shaping attitudes and political discourse; among both countries’ elite and grassroot levels alike.

Managing public skepticism and offensive rhetoric:

Decades of conflict and political intervention have fostered mutual suspicion within both Lebanese and Syrian societies, creating psychological barriers that cannot be eliminated through diplomatic agreements alone.

In Lebanon, attitudes toward Syria continue to be heavily influenced by memories of the Assad era and the prolonged Syrian military occupation (1990-2005). For many Lebanese, these experiences remain central to their understanding of bilateral relations, continuing to shape their perceptions of Damascus till this very day; despite the political changes that have occurred since the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024. It is worth noting, however, that while Syria’s current leadership bears no responsibility for many of the policies and actions of the former regime, the Syrian state itself remains legally bound by the principle of state continuity under international law.

Conversely, many Syrians continue to associate Lebanon with Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian Civil War, which caused significant resentment among notable segments of Syrian society; this often evolved into a sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites. Moreover, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (H.T.S.) historical roots in political Islam (including its previous engagement in armed jihad and affiliation with al-Qaeda) have fostered skepticism within Lebanon, particularly amongst non-Sunni communities, concerning the genuine and durability of the current Syrian leadership’s ideological transformation. Indeed, this transformation has remained largely implicit since it has not been publicly articulated. In addition, while the movement’s top leadership may have undergone what could be described as a “silent revolution,” this might not necessarily be the case with regards to the grassroots level affiliated with H.T.S. This is evident in the various violent incidents involving personnel serving within state military and security institutions or merely supporters or former members of H.T.S.

From here, properly addressing these perceptions requires sustained interaction beyond formal state-to-state approaches, focusing equally on grassroots involvement (meaning through a bottom-up approach). Meaningful dialogue and trust-building initiatives, by both public officials and civil society actors, can contribute to rebuilding confidence by encouraging direct engagement and enabling individuals to encounter one another. Such efforts would be particularly valuable and constructive for younger generations, many of whom did not personally experience the conflicts that shaped the outlook of their parents and caused the animosity and traumas held by previous generations.

Intrastate reconciliation as the cornerstone of healthy interstate relations

Despite the importance of interstate reconciliation, another kind remains equally significant: an intrastate reconciliation. In the field of International Relations (I.R.), interstate relations are inevitably influenced by domestic sociopolitical realities, due to the latter’s impact on both the local populations and decision-makers alike.

Neither Lebanon nor Syria has fully resolved the internal divisions that continue to shape national decision-making. Both remain affected by sectarian polarization, institutional fragility, and competing visions regarding the country’s identity, governance, and foreign policy orientation. These domestic challenges impact bilateral relations, as governments facing unresolved internal crises often struggle to pursue unified, consistent, and sustainable foreign policies.

Furthermore, progress in either interstate or intrastate reconciliation strengthens the prospects for advancement in the other, which signals the mutually reinforcing relationship between the two. A more politically cohesive, stable, and internally reconciled Lebanon would naturally be better positioned to formulate a unified, cooperative approach toward Syria, and vice versa. However, unresolved domestic tensions in either country risk undermining diplomatic progress, as internal sociopolitical and security conflicts may spill over into the neighboring state, while the latter may in turn be tempted to exploit such decision and instability to advance its own strategic interests.

To conclude, only by advancing the aforementioned interconnected reconciliations (both interstate and intrastate) can Beirut and Damascus move beyond the burdens of their shared history, characterized by asymmetric and even conflicting experiences, and thus establish a relationship grounded in respect, equality, cooperation, and mutual trust. For as the founder of the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford, once noted:

Coming together is the beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success