Can the Middle East finally become a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone?

The article's cover image features "Good Defeats Evil," a sculpture depicting St. George slaying the dragon. Created from fragments of Soviet SS-20 and United States (U.S.) Pershing nuclear missiles, the artwork was presented by the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) to the United Nations (U.N.) in 1990. It stands in the garden of the U.N. Headquarters in New York City as a symbol of world peace, reconciliation, and nuclear disarmament.

Achieving global nuclear disarmament has long remained one of the highest priorities of the United Nations (U.N.). The organization’s General Assembly (U.N.G.A.) established the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in its resolution 68/32 on 5 December 2013, observed annually on 26 September, to enhance public awareness and education regarding the catastrophic threat of nuclear arms and to mobilize global action toward achieving a nuclear-free world.

In light of the recent tensions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, and the Middle East’s never-ending security dilemma, today’s occasion raises a fundamental question: How can a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (N.W.F.Z.) in the Middle East enhance the region’s peace, security, and stability?

N.W.F.Z. proposal in the Middle East: An enduring aspiration since 1974

The establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (M.E.N.W.F.Z.) is not a new proposal but rather an objective that has been pursued since the 1970s. Co-sponsored by Iran and Egypt, the U.N.G.A. adopted resolution 3263 (XXIX) entitled “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East” on 9 December 1974. This marked the beginning of the international effort to promote nuclear disarmament and establish such a zone in the Middle East.

In 1995, the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (N.P.T.) adopted a resolution calling upon States to take the necessary measures to establish an M.E.N.W.F.Z. Interestingly, since 1980, the U.N.G.A. has annually adopted, without a vote, a resolution reflecting the consensus of U.N. member states in support of establishing such a zone, thereby demonstrating broad international agreement on the issue. However, in 2018, the 38-year consensus behind this annual resolution was broken when both the United States (U.S.) and Israel opposed it.

Mordechai Vanunu, Israel’s nuclear whistleblower, published photographs of Israel’s nuclear bomb factory at Dimona and revealed its nuclear program to the world in 1986.

Why has an N.W.F.Z. remained out of reach in the Middle East?

Despite widespread international support, the objective of establishing an M.E.N.W.F.Z. has yet to be realized due to several interrelated and complex factors.

Israel’s nuclear program: Israel has possessed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, with its nuclear program dating back to the 1950s with the establishment of the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona under Prime Minister (P.M.) David Ben-Gurion. Although Avner Cohen, an Israeli-American historian and professor, is considered as one of the most prominent researchers on Israel’s nuclear history and has written extensively on the subject, Tel Aviv’s nuclear program hit the headlines in October 1986, when former nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu revealed its details to the Sunday Times. It is worth noting that Israel is not a party to the 1968 N.P.T. and continues to maintain a policy of nuclear ambiguity, whereby it neither publicly confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons.

Moreover, Israel’s continued refusal to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards, inspections, and monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) remains a major point of contention with other states in the region, particularly Arab countries. These states have consistently called on Israel to subject its nuclear program to comprehensive I.A.E.A. safeguards and to comply with international resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In 1981, the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) adopted Resolution 487, which called upon Israel “urgently to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” More than 40 years later, Israel has yet to implement this resolution. Consequently, the unresolved status of Israel’s nuclear program continues to constitute one of the principal obstacles to the establishment of a N.W.F.Z. in the Zone Middle East.

Iran’s nuclear program: Alongside Israel’s nuclear capabilities, Iran’s nuclear program has also generated significant concern regarding nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and, consequently, the feasibility of establishing an N.W.F.Z. Although the country has had a civilian nuclear energy program for over 50 years, its secret nuclear sites and research have raised alarms in the early 2000s, as regional and international doubts increased regarding its long-term intentions and possible pursuit of a nuclear weapon, particularly in light of its destabilizing regional policies in the Middle East. These concerns have led to the adoption of a series of international sanctions (including by the U.N.S.C.) between 2006 and 2010, targeting Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation activities.

The culmination of these efforts was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.), concluded in 2015, temporarily constraining Iran’s nuclear program. However, its gradual collapse following the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 renewed regional tensions and further intensified concerns over nuclear proliferation, especially as Iran’s enriched uranium capacity expanded to include significant stockpiles of 10% and 60% enriched uranium, according to the I.A.E.A. (exceeding the levels intended for civilian and peaceful purposes). These developments prompted the I.A.E.A.’s Board of Governors to pass a resolution in June 2025 which affirmed Tehran’s noncompliance with its N.P.T.-required safeguards agreement. They have also driven the entire Middle East into a devastating regional war involving the U.S., Israel, and Iran, first in June 2025 and the second most recent and ongoing one as of February 2026.

Lack of trust and persistent regional conflicts: The Middle East continues to experience chronic political tensions and military conflicts. Such an environment leaves regional states reluctant to abandon deterrence options, whether nuclear or conventional, in the absence of mutual trust. Moreover, the fundamentally divergent threat perceptions and security priorities of regional states impede the development of a common understanding of regional threats or a unified regional security agenda. Many states continue to prioritize independent national security policies that do not necessarily align with the objectives of collective regional security envisioned by an N.W.F.Z. Israel views Iran as an existential threat, whereas Iran regards the U.S. military presence and Israeli military capabilities and policies as major threats to its security, regime, and regional interests. Meanwhile, the Gulf States remain concerned about the influence and capabilities of both Israel and Iran, and to some extent Türkiye as well, particularly regarding its role in Syria and its support for political Islam, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, across the region. Collectively, these factors hinder confidence-building among regional states and contribute to a continuing regional arms race, directly contradicting the objective of establishing the proposed N.W.F.Z.

What would an N.W.F.Z. mean for the Middle East?

The Middle East could reap several notable benefits from achieving an N.W.F.Z. in the region, provided that it is supported by all regional states and accompanied by credible verification and implementation mechanisms.

First, an N.W.F.Z. would reinforce the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the N.P.T. Article VII of the N.P.T. explicitly affirms the right of

any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Consistent with existing N.W.F.Z. treaties, participating countries would be required to not only accede to the provisions of the treaties governing the aforementioned regime, but are called as well to adopt comprehensive safeguards administered and verified by the I.A.E.A. This effectively obliges countries in the Middle East to refrain from pursuing a weaponized nuclear program, thus substantially reducing the risk of a regional nuclear arms race. It is worth noting that prohibiting nuclear proliferation and establishing an N.W.F.Z. does not prevent the inalienable right of states to develop and use nuclear energy for civilian and peaceful purposes such as electricity generation, scientific research, and medicine (similar to what the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently pursuing); enshrined in Article IV of the N.P.T.

Second, any given treaty establishing an N.W.F.Z. in the Middle East would enhance the security of its member states through a legally-binding protocol for the 5 nuclear-weapon states recognized under the N.P.T. to sign and ratify it; the latter are referred to as the “Permanent 5” or P5 (U.S., Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom). As in other existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, this protocol would call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states parties to the treaty; referred to as “negative security assurances.”

Third, an N.W.F.Z. in the Middle East can contribute to greater regional and international peace, security, and stability. It would increase transparency, significantly reduce mistrust and suspicions surrounding nuclear intentions, as well as lower the incentives for nuclear competition between regional countries. Should existing nuclear programs, capabilities, and ambitions be effectively addressed and abandoned, regional actors would no longer possess the same security concerns as they do today. This would be particularly important in relation to Israel’s undeclared nuclear capabilities and Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Current demarcation of nuclear-weapons-free-zones, nuclear-weapons-free status, and nuclear-weapons-free geographical regions. (Map: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs)

The Middle East: The missing piece of the global N.W.F.Z. map

An N.W.F.Z. is an official legally-binding agreement in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, possess, or deploy nuclear weapons in geographically designated region. It was actually Poland that led the initial efforts to establish such a zone in Central Europe through the 1957 Rapacki Plan. Speaking before the U.N.G.A. on 2 October 1957, Polish Foreign Minister (F.M.) Adam Rapacki proposed the denuclearization of his own country Poland, East Germany, West Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

If one takes a brief look at today’s world map, it seems apparent that only 5 such zones exist; 4 of which cover much of the Southern Hemisphere. They include: Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk). In addition to nuclear-weapon-free zones, there are other treaties and declarations banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in Antarctica, Mongolia, on the seabed, and in outer space.

Meanwhile, the Middle East remains one of the few regions that has yet to establish such a vital agreement. Nevertheless, while the establishment of an M.E.N.W.F.Z. remains a highly desirable goal, especially nowadays amid persistent regional tensions, mistrust, and arms race, its realization is also an exceptionally complex one. Achieving such a zone ultimately requires a fundamental transformation of regional dynamics, characterized by sincere political will, greater trust and cooperation among neighboring states bona fide (in good faith), the emergence of shared regional interests that would transcend narrow disagreements and conflicts, universal adherence to international non-proliferation norms, and a reduction in counterproductive political interference by major powers in the region.