Can the Mullahs survive without an enemy?

Every time a diplomatic window opens between Washington and Tehran, the same question returns: does the Iranian regime truly want to move beyond the logic of confrontation that has shaped the region for more than forty years?

Nothing is less certain.

The Islamic Republic was built on a revolution whose core pillars include opposition to the United States. The “American enemy” is not merely a geopolitical adversary; it is part of the regime’s ideological DNA. This permanent confrontation has allowed Iran’s leaders to justify the militarization of the system, the expansion of their regional influence, and the sacrifices demanded of their population in the name of resistance.

Within this equation, Hezbollah occupies a special place.

For Tehran, the Lebanese Shiite movement is not simply an ally. It represents one of the greatest successes of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East. Since the 1980s, billions of dollars, substantial military resources, and sustained political investment have been devoted to its development.

It is therefore difficult to imagine Iran accepting without resistance the weakening of what it considers its principal lever on Israel’s northern border.

This is why the question of Hezbollah’s disarmament is not solely a Lebanese issue. It directly affects Iran’s strategic interests.

Because if Hezbollah were to lose its military raison d’être, the entire narrative of the “Axis of Resistance” would be weakened. Yet this narrative has become essential to the Iranian regime’s regional legitimacy.

Peace can sometimes represent a greater danger than conflict.

A lasting normalization between Iran and the United States would force Iran’s leaders to respond more directly to the economic and social expectations of their population. It would also diminish the relevance of the revolutionary discourse that has accompanied the regime since 1979.

In this context, maintaining a controlled level of tension may appear to be a political necessity. Enough confrontation to preserve the narrative of resistance, but not necessarily to the point of provoking an existential conflict.

Lebanon now finds itself at the heart of this contradiction.

A growing segment of the Lebanese population hopes to turn the page on regional wars and rebuild a state capable of independently determining its own defense policy. Yet this ambition collides with a broader reality: for Tehran, the issue of Hezbollah extends far beyond Lebanon’s borders.

Perhaps this is where the true heart of the problem lies. The debate is not simply between supporters and opponents of Hezbollah. It is between two visions of Lebanon: one of a country integrated into a regional axis of permanent confrontation, and another of a state whose priorities would finally be defined solely by its own national interests.