China prepares its economy for war

China has long possessed extensive powers to draw civilian resources into a war. A sweeping revision of its National Defense Mobilization Law now gives that system a more explicit objective: turning the country's economic and social capacity into military power as quickly as possible.

Passed Aug. 28 and taking effect Oct. 1, the revised law contains 82 articles, up from 72 in the version enacted in 2010. It updates rules governing strategic reserves, military production, civilian requisition, transportation, personnel and other resources that could support the People's Liberation Army during a crisis. It also creates new systems for data collection and readiness assessments while bringing advanced technologies and what the law calls "emerging fields" more firmly into mobilization planning.

The overhaul does not suddenly give Beijing control over China's civilian economy during wartime. Many of those powers already existed. Instead, it points to a different priority. China is trying to reduce the time required to turn the world's second-largest economy into a wartime economy, preparing and testing parts of that conversion before a conflict begins.

A system built before the war

China's original 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law already gave the state extensive powers to draw on civilian resources. 

Adopted Feb. 26, 2010, and effective that July, China's 72-article National Defense Mobilization Law consolidated existing mobilization rules into a national legal framework.

Under the law, citizens and organizations were required to undertake mobilization preparations during peacetime. Once mobilization was ordered, authorities could requisition civilian property, summon citizens for defense services and require enterprises to convert or expand military production. The government could also impose controls on sectors including finance, transportation, telecommunications, information networks, energy, food and commerce.

The 2026 revision retains much of that framework but, for the first time, defines national defense mobilization as measures designed to ensure a “rapid transition” between peacetime and wartime and convert economic and social strength into national defense strength.

A June 2026 China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based research institute focused on China and Eurasia, noted that Beijing has used “development interests” to encompass economic security, resource access, overseas assets and technological development. The revised law also explicitly places national defense mobilization under Communist Party leadership, replacing the 2010 law's emphasis on joint leadership by the State Council and Central Military Commission and bringing the statute in line with the greater centralization of Party authority under President Xi Jinping.

Measuring what China can mobilize

The 2026 law puts greater emphasis on ensuring China knows what resources it could mobilize before a crisis begins.

It establishes a national system for testing and evaluating mobilization capabilities and introduces a target-responsibility system, assigning preparedness objectives to government and military bodies and assessing their implementation. It also strengthens surveys of China's mobilization potential by incorporating them into government statistics and requiring the underlying data to be regularly updated and analyzed.

The requirements give authorities a more current picture of which factories could alter production, where strategic materials were stored, what transportation capacity was available and which personnel possessed useful technical expertise.

Strategic reserves receive similar treatment. The 2010 law already provided for strategic material reserves, while the new legislation explicitly promotes technical and production-capacity reserves alongside physical stockpiles.

The change addresses one of the central demands of a sustained conflict. Stored fuel, components or matériel can meet immediate needs, while reserved production capacity allows an economy to replenish what the military consumes over time. The revised system therefore focuses not only on identifying available resources but also on determining whether institutions and companies are prepared to deliver them when required.

Updating mobilization for a high-tech war

The most striking additions concern an economy where military power depends on data, software, and civilian supply chains alongside factories and raw materials.

Article 8 directs China to promote advanced technologies in national defense mobilization and develop capabilities in "emerging fields," without identifying specific technologies. A September 2026 China-Taiwan Update from the Institute for the Study of War identified civilian AI and drone industries among the capabilities that could fall within this framework during a conflict.

The law is more specific about how civilian technology could support military production. 

Companies maintaining military-production capacity can be required to prepare technology, equipment, materials, data and software and conduct exercises. During mobilization, suppliers of technology, data and software required for military production must give those needs priority. The law also requires assessments of military industrial chains and supply chains and measures to improve their security, while cybersecurity is now included among civilian sectors required to maintain national defense support capabilities.

From civilian capacity to military power

A high-intensity conflict over Taiwan would put China's ability to convert civilian capacity into military support under extraordinary pressure.

An invasion or blockade could require civilian support for transportation, communications, fuel, industrial production, repairs and technical services. Civilian ships and logistics networks could supplement military capacity while factories increased production.

The September 2026 Institute for the Study of War analysis argues that the revised framework could improve China's ability to mobilize civilian transportation and sealift in such a contingency. The law itself, however, is not Taiwan-specific, and its adoption does not establish that Beijing has decided to fight a war over the island.

The 2010 framework already gave the state access to enormous civilian resources. The 2026 revision focuses more heavily on ensuring they can be identified, evaluated, coordinated and converted when required. Factories, transportation networks and workers remain central to national mobilization. Software, data, technical expertise and resilient supply chains are now becoming more prominent alongside them.

Beijing is not waiting for a conflict to determine how the civilian economy could support one. It is building more of that answer into the economy during peacetime.