Could Washington strike Tehran?

Ever since United States (US) President Donald Trump warned Iran’s authorities against killing peaceful protesters, as Washington “will come to their rescue,” anticipation for a potential American strike on Tehran has ever increased.

The prospects of US intervention have significantly risen as the demonstrations in Iran intensified, reaching unprecedented levels; from demanding limited systematic and social reforms to calling for the overthrow of the entire regime).

From here, fundamental and pressing questions must be raised: would the US actually resort to force? Would such a move achieve its objectives? Is Israel’s intervention on the table?

The Witkoff-Araghchi diplomatic channel

Recent reports that US envoy Steve Witkoff received a call from Iranian Foreign Minister (FM) Abbas Araghchi have added a new layer of complexity to an already volatile moment in US-Iran relations. The exchange came as President Donald Trump declared that Iran had “crossed red lines,” warning that Washington was weighing “very strong options,” including military action.

The Witkoff-Araghchi contact appears to reflect Tehran’s attempt to defuse tensions or buy time amid mounting pressure. While the two sides have maintained intermittent communication since earlier nuclear talks, the current context is markedly different. Iran is facing sustained domestic protests and growing international scrutiny, while Washington is signaling resolve (not only in its Western Hemisphere, but across the entire globe). This mix of dialogue and deterrence suggests that neither side is eager to lose control of escalation, even as rhetoric hardens.

The spectrum of US options

The White House is reportedly reviewing numerous responses, ranging from non-military measures to all-out strikes. Non-military options include tighter sanctions and support for Iranian protesters through communications access and information channels. These tools can maintain pressure without immediate bloodshed, but their impact is incremental and unlikely to alter the balance of power quickly.

Cyber operations offer a middle ground, potentially disrupting security or surveillance systems. Yet their effects are often temporary and invite retaliation in kind, risking a widening cyber conflict with limited strategic gain.

On the other hand, military action remains the most dramatic option. This scenario has notably increased as the protests in Iran intensified; exceeding all expectations (in terms of its numbers, scope and demands). US officials stress that any strike would likely be limited, targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) assets or sensitive facilities, rather than a full-blown ground invasion. Proponents argue that a calibrated strike could reestablish deterrence. Critics counter that even limited attacks could trigger regional retaliation, rally Iranian public opinion around the regime and destabilize energy markets, without guaranteeing lasting results.

Within the United States, skepticism is growing on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers warn that military action could strengthen hardliners in Tehran and undermine protesters by validating claims of foreign interference. Strategically, the absence of a clear political endgame complicates the use of force, turning it into a gamble rather than a decisive solution; similar to what happened in Iraq in 2003 (which left a massive and consequential political vacuum, ultimately contributing to Iran’s enhanced influence and role in Baghdad and the region as a whole).

Is Israel included in a potential military escalation?

Israel looms large in this equation. Reports that Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu has restricted media coverage of military preparations underscore heightened readiness. Yet Israeli assessments suggest the US military may not be poised for immediate action, with preparations potentially taking weeks.

Although several analysts suggest that Israel could follow Washington’s lead or even act unilaterally, it seems unlikely given the risks of a broader confrontation. The 12-day war between Tel Aviv and Tehran (13 June 2025 – 24 June 2025) witnessed notable losses and destruction on both sides (with Iran taking the heaviest and hardest blows by far).

Additionally, despite Iranian protesters’ goal to overthrow their regime, they share similar animosity towards Israel as well. Any Israeli involvement could split the demonstrations, leading some to back down and retreat due to their objections to such intervention.

Therefore, while Israel retains the capabilities and driving forces to strike Iran, such scenario seems unlikely (especially without US consent).

In conclusion, the current standoff reflects a delicate balance between signaling strength and avoiding uncontrolled escalation. While military action remains on the table, it is far from inevitable and carries significant risks with uncertain rewards. Diplomatic channels, however strained, continue to operate in parallel with coercive measures. Whether Washington ultimately chooses force or restraint will shape not only its relationship with Tehran but also the stability of a region already on edge.