David Schenker on Trump’s Syria delisting move

In a move that has already sent ripples across the Middle East and Washington alike, President Donald Trump has begun the process to rescind Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). The July 8, 2026, announcement by Secretary of State Marco Rubio heralds a 45-day Congressional review period before the delisting becomes official, a step that could reshape Syria’s economic fortunes, recalibrate U.S. leverage in the region, and redefine how America approaches post-conflict states that once hosted terrorist networks.

To unpack the logic, stakes, and possible fallout of this historic decision, I sat down with David Schenker, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and now Director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Schenker, known for his clear-eyed analyses of Levantine politics, has followed Syria’s tumultuous trajectory from Bashar al-Assad’s brutal rule to the rise of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and now to the prospect of U.S.-Syria rapprochement.

Rationale: Why Now?

Schenker begins by situating the SST designation’s origins: “Syria was an inaugural member of the State Department's state sponsor of terrorism list. They were put on in 1979, largely in response to the Assad regime's support for Palestinian terrorist organizations.” Over the decades, the Assad regime’s support for groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) entrenched Syria’s pariah status. But, Schenker notes, “these sanctions were imposed because of the Assad regime—and the Assad regime is no longer there.”

With the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in 2024 and the ascent of President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the question for U.S. policymakers became whether the new government maintained those malign behaviors. “If the al-Sharaa government was sponsoring terrorism, the designation could remain in place,” Schenker explains. “But this government is not like the Assad regime supporting terrorist organizations or providing them with haven. They’re taking steps to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah, have no apparent relationship with Hamas, and aren’t providing safe haven to the PKK.”

That said, Schenker is careful not to paint a picture of sudden transformation. U.S. intelligence and military sources remain wary of the presence of former foreign fighters and alleged former jihadis in key military positions. “There are concerns about who holds power in the new military, and whether this will be a tolerant government going forward. But the administration has seen enough movement to justify this step.”

From Symbolism to Substance 

Is this move a calculated signal, or does it reflect a deeper shift in U.S. policy? “No, I think it has substantial, substantive implications,” Schenker asserts. “Countries and companies can start more freely doing business with Damascus without concern for violating U.S. sanctions and being in violation of U.S. law. This is a significant change, not merely symbolic.”

He points to the sequential rollback of sanctions as part of a broader strategy: “Early on, the administration lifted a whole host of other sanctions against Syria to give the government a chance to develop economically and stabilize post-conflict. The state sponsorship of terrorism sanctions are particularly onerous—they prevent investment and economic life from resuming, which is a key element of stabilizing the country.”

Congressional voices have echoed this logic. In a bipartisan letter, U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Elizabeth Warren, and U.S. Representative Joe Wilson argued that the legal basis for Syria’s designation no longer applies, and that continued isolation undermines U.S. interests by blocking economic recovery, impeding counterterrorism cooperation, and ceding ground to adversaries like Russia, Iran, and China.

Leverage and Conditionality: What Does the U.S. Still Hold?

If the SST designation is lifted, does Washington lose its main source of leverage? Schenker is nuanced: “There are always other sanctions. The administration would say that new sanctions can be levied against the government or individuals for human rights abuses, for example. So yes, it’s harder, but there’s a balancing act. The administration is really invested in Syria’s success and stabilization, and that requires the resumption of economic life. But the U.S. retains the ability to reimpose or target individuals if necessary.”

On whether delisting should be explicitly conditioned on further Syrian reforms like counterterrorism, chemical weapons, detainees, or humanitarian access, Schenker sees a kind of implicit conditionality at work. “The Syrians are already doing much of this. The Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons is on the ground. The new government has been open, not committed to retaining the capabilities of the Assad regime. There’s been some judicial process on past atrocities. And U.S. intelligence assesses that Syria is cooperating on counterterrorism.”

He sees the 45-day Congressional review as a critical period: “There’s an implicit understanding that the U.S. will stand by Syria if it is a responsible state that doesn’t destabilize its neighbors. No one expects Syria to become a Jeffersonian democracy overnight, but the bar is higher than just renouncing terrorism.”

Still, some in Congress have called for explicit reporting requirements, benchmarks, or written conditions before the delisting becomes final. The concern is that premature relief could permit backsliding or impunity. “Even after delisting, the U.S. retains tools to target human rights abusers and malign actors,” Schenker notes. “But the SST designation itself had become more of a blunt instrument than a precise lever.”

Regional Reverberations: Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Beyond

Syria is not an island. Schenker underscores the regional dimensions of the move. “Turkey is pleased. They want Syria to succeed; they have significant interests and influence there. Under Assad, Syria was an adversary to Turkey, providing sanctuary and support to the PKK. Lifting sanctions helps stabilize Syria, which is in Turkey’s interest.”

On Iran, Schenker observes that “Syria considers Iran to be a destabilizing force in the region. There are no direct flights between Damascus and Tehran, and relations are chilly, and rightfully so after the role Iran played in helping Assad. Part of the expectation is that Syria will cooperate with Iraq on a pipeline to the Mediterranean, reducing reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.”

Senator Lindsey Graham, echoing this sentiment, recently praised President al-Sharaa for being a “true thorn in the side of Iran” and urged the U.S. to give him the tools to build a functioning, united Syria—a blow to Tehran’s regional ambitions.

For Israel, the message is more complex. “The U.S. is invested in Syria’s success, and the administration has pushed back on Israeli intervention in Syria,” Schenker notes. The status of the Golan Heights remains a sticking point, but al-Sharaa is seen as unlikely to escalate over that issue. “He can’t have peace with Israel as long as that remains unresolved, but he also recognizes the risks of further conflict.”

As for Lebanon and the Gulf states, the implications are mixed. Arab efforts to reintegrate Syria may find new momentum, but old suspicions linger, especially given Syria’s fraught history in Lebanon and the enduring presence of Hezbollah. Schenker is wary of proposals to deploy the Syrian army against Hezbollah, warning that such moves could “further undermine regional stability and U.S. interests” by reigniting sectarian tensions and distracting Syria from its primary goal of internal stabilization.

Success or Failure: What’s at Stake?

What would success look like? For Schenker, it’s not about instant transformation. “Success means Syria remains a responsible state, focused on internal stabilization, not exporting violence or providing haven to terrorist groups. It means continued cooperation on counterterrorism, accountability for past abuses, and gradual economic recovery that benefits ordinary Syrians.”

Failure, on the other hand, would be a return to impunity, either through renewed support for terrorism, resurgence of sectarian violence, or a slide back into authoritarianism. It could also mean Syria becoming a battleground for regional powers, or a source of instability for its neighbors.

Schenker’s prescription for the administration is clear. He underscores that the most important benchmark for Syria’s normalization is a sustained rejection of support for terrorism. He argues that this principle remains the foundational reason behind the original designation and should continue to serve as the minimum requirement for any future U.S.-Syria relationship.

A Calculated Strategy

As the 45-day review unfolds, the Trump administration’s move to delist Syria from the SST roster stands as a calculated strategy. The rationale is grounded in a recognition of changed realities on the ground, a desire to give Syria a chance to rebuild and reintegrate, and an acknowledgment that the old tools of leverage had become counterproductive. Yet the risks, from insufficient accountability to regional blowback, are real.

Ultimately, as Schenker emphasizes, the process is not about rewarding Syria, but about aligning U.S. policy with evolving facts, retaining the capacity to punish backsliding, and giving the Syrian people a shot at something better after years of war and isolation. “No one expects miracles,” he concludes, “but we can and should expect measurable progress.”

The next six weeks will tell whether this new chapter brings Syria closer to the community of nations or reveals the limits of American optimism and leverage in the Middle East.