Deprivation in the Shiite environment: Four decades of misguided policies

Deprivation in the Shiite Environment: Four Decades of Misguided Policies and the Absence of Development

For more than forty-three years, the Shiite environment in Lebanon particularly in the Bekaa Valley and the Baalbek–Hermel region has lived under a deeply rooted culture of deprivation. This deprivation was not accidental, nor was it an inevitable outcome of geography or fate. Rather, it was the result of political and strategic choices that prioritized slogans and power struggles over people’s basic economic and social needs. Over time, these choices produced a reality in which the community itself became the primary victim of policies it did not design but was forced to live with.

When the party was established in the Bekaa, its declared objective was the liberation of Lebanon. This goal carried a strong symbolic and moral appeal, especially for a community that had long felt marginalized and excluded from the state’s priorities. At that stage, economic and social issues such as employment opportunities, infrastructure, and sustainable development were considered secondary. The dominant discourse focused on dignity and resistance rather than on production and social welfare. In the context of occupation and regional conflict, this approach may have seemed justified or even necessary at the time.

The problem began when this logic transformed from a temporary priority into a permanent doctrine. By the mid-1980s, the Shiite environment had entered a phase of internal conflict, as factions within what later became known as the “Shiite duality” fought one another for influence and control. This internal war was not driven by the needs of the people, nor by genuine social demands, but by struggles overpower and dominance. Many observers argue that this conflict was artificially fueled by the desire of Iran’s Supreme Leadership to shape the Lebanese Shiite scene in a way that ensured loyalty and subordination, even if that meant weakening the community internally.

As a result, Shiites were drawn into internal confrontations and political rivalries, while their fundamental economic problems were pushed aside. Poverty, unemployment, and the lack of basic services faded from the public agenda, replaced by security narratives and ideological mobilization. This shift came at a very high cost. Despite the availability of significant financial resources within the parties at the time, no serious investments were made in productive sectors. No factories were built to create sustainable jobs, no strong public schools were established to empower future generations, and no hospitals were developed to secure accessible healthcare for the poor.

Instead of development, a culture of permanent “revolution” was reinforced a culture aligned with Iran’s broader ideological vision, where societies are kept in a state of constant mobilization rather than long-term planning. Within this framework, the Lebanese Shiite community functioned largely as a satellite of a regional project, rather than as an independent social group with its own developmental priorities. Economic self-sufficiency was sacrificed in favor of political alignment, and local needs were subordinated to regional calculations.

As economic pressure intensified, weapons were gradually presented as an alternative path for survival. For many young people, joining armed structures became one of the few available options in the absence of jobs, industries, or productive opportunities. This was not necessarily driven by conviction alone, but by necessity. Over time, this dynamic eroded the productive capacity of the Shiite society. Entire regions shifted away from agriculture, industry, and trade, becoming increasingly dependent on aid, informal economies, or security-related activities.

This process inevitably deepened deprivation, particularly in Baalbek–Hermel, which became one of the most marginalized regions in Lebanon. The area suffered from a dual abandonment: neglect by the Lebanese state on one hand, and the failure of dominant political forces to offer a genuine developmental alternative on the other. Following the July War, economic hardship worsened, and illegal activities such as fuel and arms smuggling expanded—not because people were inherently inclined toward lawlessness, but because legitimate economic opportunities were virtually non-existent.

Many of the negative behaviors that later emerged within parts of this environment must be understood within this broader context of long-term deprivation. Poverty does not only generate material hardship; it also produces social tension, frustration, and a sense of alienation from the state and the rule of law. Yet instead of addressing the root causes, the entire community was often collectively blamed and stigmatized for outcomes that were, in reality, the product of decades of misguided policies.

Today, with the state attempting however modestly to reassert its presence, and with parties retreating from their former levels of social support, this environment has been left to bear the consequences alone. Political actors have withdrawn, but the structural damage remains. The community now faces unemployment, mass emigration, collapsing public services, and a heavy moral burden imposed by narratives that hold it responsible for choices it did not freely make.

In conclusion, the Shiite environment in Lebanon is not the perpetrator, but the victim. It is the victim of policies that prioritized weapons over work, slogans over people, and regional projects over local development. Real solutions to deprivation will not come through further mobilization or confrontation, but through restoring the value of productive economies, education, healthcare, and equal integration into the state as a unifying institution rather than a security tool. Without such a shift, deprivation will continue to reproduce itself, and the community will remain trapped in the consequences of decisions made in its name but never in its interest.