Echoes of violence: Lebanon’s post 2005 political assassinations

Throughout history, notable figures which have taken bold policies and decisions have often been subject to targeted assassinations. Lebanon is no different as it has suffered from similar political violence when prominent leaders sought to uphold their national responsibilities no matter the cost. From Riad al-Solh, Kamal Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel, Mufti Hassan Khaled, René Moawad, Dany Chamoun, to Rafik Hariri, among numerous others, each assassination signaled a defining turning point in the country’s political landscape.

Hariri’s assassination on 14 February 2005 was not the end of this dark chapter, but one which triggered a sustained wave of violence targeting politicians, journalists, security officials, and intellectuals alike. Many of these figures were outspoken critics of Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon and of Hezbollah’s growing political and military role.

Although legal responsibility for most of these assassinations remains contested, the network accused of perpetrating these crimes remains the same; one which is related to Syria and its supporters in the country. Since 2005, Hezbollah particularly has repeatedly faced accusations from political opponents, segments of civil society, and international observers. The limited success of judicial accountability has further entrenched mistrust and reinforced Lebanon’s pervasive atmosphere of impunity.

The enduring culture of impunity

The creation of the United Nations-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in 2007, in pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1664 (2006), represented an unprecedented attempt to address political assassination through international judicial mechanisms. Tasked primarily with prosecuting those responsible for Rafik Hariri’s assassination and related attacks, the tribunal represented an unprecedented judicial mechanism, combining elements of Lebanese and international law, introduced advanced forensic and investigative techniques, as well as established a detailed evidentiary record of the attack.

In 2020, the STL convicted Hezbollah-affiliated operative Salim Jamil Ayyash in absentia, marking the first international judicial ruling linking an individual associated with Hezbollah to a major political assassination. Despite this achievement, the tribunal faced significant limitations. It failed to identify senior political planners behind the attack, and its inability to enforce arrests underscored structural weaknesses in implementing judicial rulings; Ayyash was killed instead in al-Qusayr, Syria by an Israeli strike on 9 November 2024. Its jurisdiction was also limited, preventing prosecution of perpetrators involved in subsequent assassinations. Additionally, 3 other suspects accused were acquitted due to insufficient evidence, further highlighting the difficulties of securing judicial accountability in cases involving clandestine political violence.

The tribunal’s partial success reflects the persistence of Lebanon’s atmosphere of legal impunity. The absence of comprehensive accountability has eroded public trust in judicial institutions and reinforced perceptions that powerful political actors remain beyond legal reach. Such impunity risks incentivizing further political violence by demonstrating that targeted assassinations can occur without significant legal consequences. This dynamic undermines democratic governance, weakens institutional legitimacy, and obstructs efforts to build a capable and accountable state based on the rule of law. Thus, without meaningful mechanisms to ensure accountability, Lebanon’s political system remains vulnerable to recurring cycles of violence that threaten its long-term stability and sovereignty.

The motives behind the political assassinations

The post-2005 wave of assassinations cannot be viewed as isolated security incidents but rather as part of a broader struggle over sovereignty, domestic power distribution, and regional influence.

A major catalyst was the political transformation that followed mounting resistance to Syrian dominance and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops on 26 April 2005, following the “Cedar Revolution” on 14 March 2005. Many of those targeted advocated national sovereignty and openly challenged Hezbollah’s armed autonomy, which they viewed as incompatible with state authority. Their positions threatened an existing political equilibrium shaped by Hezbollah’s military capabilities and its regional alignment with Syria and Iran.

These assassinations appear to have pursued several strategic objectives.

First and foremost, they removed influential figures capable of mobilizing political and public opposition. Journalists, parliamentarians, and security officials played central roles in shaping public discourse, influencing policymaking, and investigating political violence, making them formidable obstacles to actors seeking to preserve their influence.

Second, several attacks occurred during politically sensitive moments, including elections and government formation processes. Eliminating key opposition figures sought to alter parliamentary balances, weaken rival coalitions, and prolong institutional paralysis, enabling dominant actors to maintain or expand their leverage within Lebanon’s fragmented political landscape.

Equally significant was the psychological impact. The targeting of prominent public figures, often through highly visible attacks (such as car bombings), fostered a climate of fear extending beyond individual victims. These acts discouraged public criticism and undermined confidence in state institutions, particularly when security officials engaged in sensitive investigations were themselves targeted.

Collectively, these factors contributed to consolidating political influence, suppressing dissent, and narrowing political opposition challenging Hezbollah’s military and security role and broader regional entanglements, as well as Syrian and Iranian influence.

The evolving nature of the political assassinations

While the motives behind Lebanon’s assassinations illuminate the political logic driving them, a closer look at the methods themselves reveals a separate but equally important evolution. Political killings did not remain static: they shifted dramatically concerning where they occurred, how they were carried out, and the scale of collateral harm they produced.

2005-2013: the era of car bombs and mass casualties

Between 2004 and 2013, Beirut served as the primary theater for political assassinations. 10 of the 15 assassinations during this period (66.7%) occurred in the capital, and all but 1 (93.3%) relied on car or truck bombs. Tellingly, the only assassination that did not employ a car or truck bomb (the killing of former Member of Parliament Pierre Gemayel by gunshots) also did not take place in Beirut.

The casualties were severe. All 57 collateral deaths and all 429 injuries across the 19 assassinations occurred 2013 and prior. The assassination of Rafik Hariri alone resulted in 22 fatalities and over 100 injuries, while the 2013 bombing that killed Mohammad Chatah caused 75 casualties. The methods were designed for maximum visibility. They created not just political shockwaves but physical, urban disruption on a massive scale.

2020-2023: a new phase of targeted assassinations

Following a 7-year pause after Chatah’s assassination, killings resumed in 2020 with markedly different characteristics. With the assassinations of Mounir Abou Rjeili, Joe Bejjani, Lokman Slim, and Elias al-Hasrouni, 3 defining features emerge: none occurred in Beirut, none involved car or truck bombs, and none produced collateral casualties.

These killings relied on close-range methods (sharp objects, gunfire, and physical force) executed in areas removed from the capital’s density and visibility. Several factors may explain this transformation. One explanation is strategic containment due to the high political costs. Large-scale bombings attract intense media scrutiny, diplomatic pressure, and domestic backlash. In an era of heightened surveillance and expanded investigative capabilities, actors may favor low-profile operations that avoid national outrage or international consequences.

Operational considerations may also play a role. Sophisticated bombings require extensive networks and logistical capacity. Changes in regional dynamics, financial pressures, and evolving strategic priorities may have encouraged smaller, less resource-intensive operations. Against this backdrop, Hezbollah’s altered posture since 2017, shaped by prolonged regional engagement and growing external scrutiny, could have contributed to this shift.

The evolving nature of political assassinations in Lebanon therefore suggests not simply a change in the tools of violence but a deeper shift in the strategic logic governing political conflict.

Consequences for Lebanon

The impact of these assassinations has been profound, affecting Lebanon’s institutions, political system, freedom of expression, and social cohesion.

Institutionally, political violence weakened already fragile state structures. The loss of experienced political leaders contributed to chronic governmental paralysis, delays in constitutional processes, and declining public confidence in the state’s ability to uphold the rule of law.

Freedom of expression also suffered significantly. The assassination of journalists and intellectuals encouraged widespread self-censorship among media professionals, writers, and activists, particularly regarding criticism of Hezbollah. This shrinking space for dissent weakened Lebanon’s historically vibrant media landscape and limited democratic discourse.

Politically, the assassinations intensified polarization and fragmentation. The removal of prominent opposition figures weakened reform movements and contributed to repeated governmental deadlock, including prolonged presidential vacancies and difficulties forming stable administrations.

Beyond institutional and political consequences, these assassinations also undermined social cohesion. The normalization of political violence thus eroded shared national identity and weakened prospects for reconciliation, further destabilizing Lebanon’s already fragile social fabric.

Resilience of political opposition

Despite sustained intimidation, political opposition in Lebanon has demonstrated notable resilience. Rather than eliminating dissent, many assassinations strengthened public determination to challenge Hezbollah’s armed status and external influence.

This endurance highlights the limitations of political intimidation as a long-term strategy for consolidating political dominance. Although assassinations inflicted severe losses, they did not fully extinguish demands for sovereignty, institutional reform, and strengthening state authority.

Honoring the victims and moving forward

The memory of Lebanon’s political assassination martyrs continues to form the country’s political and cultural identity, and are commemorated annually through public ceremonies, journalism awards, and civil society initiatives.

However, remembrance alone cannot address the structural conditions that allowed political violence to flourish. Combined tangible efforts to strengthen the state and its institutions (especially advancing accountability and achieving state monopoly over the use of force) would help overcome the cycles of political assassination, rebuild social cohesion, and advance toward a stable, sovereign Lebanese state.