Empty measures…Too late

Sovereignty in Lebanon has long been invoked as a rallying cry, a constitutional principle, and a diplomatic demand. Yet it remains elusive, asserted in speeches, negotiated in foreign capitals, and contested in practice. The Lebanese state today stands at the intersection of external pressures and internal fragmentation, where sovereignty is both a legal doctrine and a lived crisis.

At its core, sovereignty traditionally denotes the state’s exclusive authority over its territory and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. German sociologist Max Weber famously defined the modern state as the entity that successfully claims this monopoly. Although the Constitution affirms absolute sovereignty, but political custom, foreign interference, and armed non-state actors have hollowed out its substance.

This dissonance is not unique to Lebanon. Political scientist Stephen Krasner described sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy”, a principle states publicly uphold while frequently violating in practice. In Lebanon, this hypocrisy operates on multiple levels. International donors condition assistance on reforms that reshape domestic authority. Regional powers leverage financial aid and reconstruction funds to influence security policy and, most critically in this moment, non-state armed groups claim to have the right to share this sovereignty with the state.

A history of managed weakness

Since the 1989 Taif Agreement, Lebanon has functioned with what can only be described as a managed weakness. The Lebanese Army was rebuilt but never empowered to become a fully capable national defense force. External defense remained underdeveloped, while internal political balances took priority. Syrian tutelage until 2005 entrenched dependency, and ongoing Israeli violations of Lebanese territory further exposed the state’s fragility.

The Syrian withdrawal reshaped the political landscape, but it left Lebanon with two parallel security structures. On one side stood the formal army with limited capacity, while on the other stood Hezbollah’s far more robust “resistance” apparatus.

The 2006 war with Israel made this imbalance undeniable. Hezbollah led the military confrontation and the state remained largely sidelined. The perception that national defense was not exclusively a state function became deeply entrenched.

In a sectarian political system, fragmentation at the societal level inevitably seeps into state institutions. Sovereignty becomes negotiated between communities and factions rather than embodied by the state as a unified authority.

The external and internal erosion

Lebanon’s sovereignty has been repeatedly undermined from abroad. Israel’s occupation of the south until 2000, continued airspace violations, and persistent border tensions represent clear infringements. Palestinian armed factions once operated autonomously during the civil war. Syrian dominance lasted nearly three decades. More recently, Hezbollah’s regional military engagements have further complicated Lebanon’s claim to independent foreign policy.

Yet external interference alone does not explain the problem. Internally, Lebanon operates through informal power-sharing deals, sectarian quotas, and patronage networks that often override formal law. The formula “Army, People, and Resistance” institutionalized ambiguity regarding who truly controls the use of force. What was presented as national consensus effectively entrenched dual authority.

The financial collapse since 2019 has added another layer to this crisis. A bankrupt state dependent on international assistance cannot convincingly claim full autonomy. Sovereignty without economic capacity is precarious. Fiscal dependency translates into political vulnerability.

Half-measures won’t cut it anymore

What makes this moment different is not just the severity of the crisis, it is the exhaustion of public patience. For years, successive governments have issued reform plans, announced investigations, promised restructuring, and declared turning points. Yet implementation rarely followed, leaving the issue to be decided through closed-door political compromises.

Empty promises and half-measures can no longer be tolerated. Symbolic decisions without enforcement only deepen cynicism and further erode state credibility and social cohesion. The language of sovereignty means nothing if it is not matched by decisive action. The Lebanese public has heard enough declarations; what it demands now is execution. Without tangible steps, each new announcement becomes another layer in the accumulation of distrust.

Recent events have made this painfully clear. Israel continues to strike and violate Lebanese territory with little meaningful deterrence from the state. At the same time, Hezbollah responds unilaterally, deciding when and how Lebanon enters confrontation. These parallel actions, external incursions and internal armed responses, expose the same underlying truth: the Lebanese state is not the primary decision-maker in matters of war and peace.

When another country can operate militarily inside Lebanese territory and a non-state actor can independently determine the timing and scope of retaliation, sovereignty is absent. The government’s failure to assert clear, enforceable authority signals that the old strategy of ambiguity and accommodation has run its course.

The current turning point

Lebanon now stands at a critical juncture. Its international credibility, economic survival, and internal cohesion are all at stake. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s decision to ban Hezbollah’s security and military activities, formally labeling them illegal, signals a break from the politics of accommodation. But enforcement must follow. The state must demonstrate in practice that when it comes to security, there can only be one authority.

No serious economic reform or reconstruction effort can succeed if Lebanon remains vulnerable to recurring episodes of violence. Instability fuels corruption, paralyzes institutions, and reinforces sectarian loyalties over national ones. Investors will not commit capital to a country where the monopoly of force is uncertain.

Recent proposals such as the “Homeland Shield Plan” reflect this reality. Reconstruction assistance, particularly for southern Lebanon, is increasingly tied to measurable progress in consolidating state control over security. Gulf and Western governments have made similar conditions clear: financial support will follow institutional consolidation.

Yet external pressure cannot substitute for domestic legitimacy. It can create incentives, but it cannot manufacture trust.

Hezbollah’s time is up: But does it end here?

There is a sense that we are on the verge of a “post-Hezbollah” phase in Lebanon. But reducing sovereignty to the question of weapons alone risks oversimplifying the challenge.

Lebanon’s sovereignty deficit extends far beyond war and peace. It is embedded in financial mismanagement, administrative decay, weakened oversight institutions, and a collapse of public trust. Even if the Cabinet formally controls security decisions, sovereignty remains hollow if institutions lack credibility and governance remains dysfunctional.

A purely security-first approach, demanding disarmament without rebuilding state capacity, reverses the necessary sequence. Durable sovereignty emerges when institutions function, public services are restored, and fiscal autonomy is regained. When citizens experience the state as capable and fair, parallel structures lose their appeal.

The real challenge now is transforming “Lebanese sovereignty” from a political rallying cry into a concrete, enforceable plan of action. Until then, this current crisis will not see an end.