Erdogan’s 2028 bid and the stakes for Türkiye’s future

Türkiye is entering a new political phase as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s potential bid for another presidential term in 2028 raises questions about the country’s constitutional framework, democratic institutions, and future foreign policy direction.

A senior presidential adviser recently indicated that Ankara is considering holding elections on 16 April 2028, approximately one month before the currently scheduled vote, through a constitutional mechanism known as “renewal of elections.”

A constitutional debate shaping Türkiye’s political future

In an interview to The Beiruter, Turkish journalist, political scientist, and publicist Musa Özuğurlu explained that under Article 101 of the Turkish Constitution, the president is limited to two terms in office. However, there are two possible legal routes that could allow Erdogan to seek another term: triggering early elections through parliament or amending the Constitution.

The first option relies on Article 116, which allows the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) to call for renewed elections if supported by 360 of its 600 members. According to supporters of this interpretation, if elections are held before the completion of the current presidential term, Erdogan would not technically be completing a second full term, allowing him to run again.

The second option involves constitutional reform. If Erdogan’s allies secure 400 votes in parliament, the Constitution can be amended directly. Alternatively, amendments approved by 360 lawmakers can be submitted to a public referendum, where voters would decide whether to adopt the changes.

Özuğurlu stated that these mechanisms have become the center of a major political dispute. While they may be constitutionally possible, critics argue that using them specifically to enable Erdogan’s continued presidency represents an abuse of constitutional procedures.

According to Özuğurlu, opponents of Erdogan’s candidacy view the process as “legally possible but politically opportunistic,” arguing that constitutional rules are being used to achieve an outcome that contradicts their original purpose.

The parliamentary arithmetic makes the issue particularly complex. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its nationalist ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), currently hold 326 seats, leaving them approximately 34 votes short of the 360-seat threshold required for renewed elections or constitutional amendments requiring a referendum.

This makes the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), which controls more than 50 seats, a potentially decisive actor. Özuğurlu explained that Ankara’s ongoing “peace process” initiative with Kurdish actors could become an important factor in future negotiations, as the government may seek DEM Party support.

However, he stressed that significant obstacles remain. The DEM Party has repeatedly stated that the process should not simply become a mechanism to extend Erdogan’s presidency, while public opinion also presents a challenge. A late 2024 survey found that 66.3% of Turks, including nearly 89% of DEM Party voters, opposed a constitutional amendment that would allow Erdogan to run again.

The opposition has also strongly rejected the possibility of another Erdogan term. According to Özuğurlu, opposition parties argue that regardless of the legal method used, a third presidential term would further weaken institutional checks and balances.

The opposition accuses Erdogan’s government of attempting to remove his strongest political rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, through judicial pressure while seeking to weaken the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). They warn that another Erdogan victory could deepen the concentration of power under the executive presidential system, further affecting judicial independence and local governance.

The regional stakes of Erdogan’s political future

Beyond domestic politics, Erdogan’s potential continuation in power would have major consequences for Türkiye’s regional strategy. Özuğurlu argued that Erdogan’s leadership has transformed Türkiye into one of the Middle East’s most influential actors, with Ankara pursuing an increasingly active foreign policy.

Noting that Türkiye’s influence has expanded significantly under Erdogan’s leadership, Özuğurlu said that fundamentally,

we can expect Erdogan to pursue his regional policies with even greater vigor.

One of Ankara’s main priorities remains Syria, where Türkiye is seeking to shape the post-Assad transition. Following the collapse of the Assad government, Türkiye has emerged as a key actor in Syria’s political and security landscape, while attempting to limit Iranian influence and maintain stability along its southern border. Özuğurlu explained that regional competition has shifted significantly after Assad’s fall. Iran, which previously maintained a strong strategic position in Syria, has lost one of its most important regional footholds, while Türkiye has attempted to strengthen its influence.

At the same time, Ankara continues to manage complicated relations with multiple powers. Türkiye remains a NATO member with strategic ties to the United States (U.S.) and Europe, while also maintaining diplomatic and economic relations with Russia. According to Özuğurlu, despite disagreements with Washington and tensions with some Western partners, Türkiye remains fundamentally aligned with the Western security framework. “Even while maintaining ties with Russia, Erdogan remains fundamentally aligned with the US and NATO camp,” he said, explaining that Ankara seeks to pursue its regional ambitions while remaining within the broader Western alliance structure.

Türkiye’s relationship with Israel will also remain an important factor. While relations have deteriorated publicly over disagreements regarding Gaza and regional policies, Özuğurlu noted that historical strategic ties between Ankara and Tel Aviv continue to influence the relationship.

Looking ahead, he stressed that the Middle East remains highly unpredictable. Developments in Syria, US-Iran tensions, the policies of Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries, the rivalry between Washington and Beijing, and the future trajectory of the Ukraine conflict will all influence Türkiye’s strategic environment.

The evolution of Erdogan’s long political journey

Erdogan’s possible 2028 candidacy is rooted in Türkiye’s transformation from a parliamentary system to an executive presidential model.

Erdogan first came to power as prime minister in 2003 and served three terms before becoming president in 2014. Following the 2017 constitutional referendum that introduced the presidential system, he was elected president again in 2018 and won another term in 2023.

The government argues that his current presidential terms began with the introduction of the new system, allowing him to seek another mandate if elections are renewed before the end of his second term.

The date proposed for a possible election, 16 April 2028, also carries symbolic significance. It coincides with the anniversary of the 2017 referendum that approved Türkiye’s transition to the presidential system.

For Erdogan’s supporters, another term would represent continuity and the continuation of Türkiye’s regional ambitions. For critics, it risks further consolidating a system they believe has already weakened institutional independence.