Europe moves ahead on returns, Lebanon left behind

In the aftermath of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on 8 December 2024, the question of Syrian refugee repatriation has re-emerged as a central policy challenge across both Europe and the Middle East. Europe, which previously welcomed in refugees and advocated for their acceptance and even integration in other countries (including Lebanon), it has recently shifted its policy in a drastic manner.

While European governments have begun actively engaging with Syria’s new leadership under President Ahmad al-Sharaa, Lebanon, despite hosting one of the largest refugee populations per capita, has yet to adopt a similarly structured or decisive approach.

This divergence highlights not only contrasting political capacities but also differing strategic visions regarding Syria’s reconstruction and the future of displaced populations.

Europe’s strategic shift toward repatriation

European states, led by Germany, are increasingly transitioning from protection policies toward conditional repatriation frameworks. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has taken a leading role in this shift, emphasizing cooperation with Damascus as a prerequisite for facilitating returns.

During a landmark meeting in Berlin with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, Merz outlined an ambitious plan to enable the return of up to 80% of Syrians residing in Germany over the next 3 years. With approximately 700,000 to 800,000 Syrians currently living in Germany, this proposal represents one of the most significant repatriation initiatives in Europe since the 2015-2016 refugee crisis; marking a drastic shift in German policy in comparison to former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s “Open Door” policy, during which she reiterated “Wir schaffen das” (We can manage it).

The German approach rests on 3 key pillars:

First, it prioritizes the return of individuals who no longer qualify for legal residence, particularly those involved in criminal activity.

Second, it seeks to incentivize voluntary returns by linking them to reconstruction opportunities in Syria.

Third, it integrates the concept of “circular migration,” allowing Syrians to contribute to rebuilding their country without permanently forfeiting their lives in Europe.

Beyond Germany, the broader European Union (EU) had also adjusted its institutional framework. Updated guidance from the European Union Agency for Asylum reflects a reassessment of conditions in Syria, noting that certain categories of refugees, such as political opponents of the former regime, may no longer face the same level of risk. This shift has already contributed to a decline in asylum applications and prompted several European countries to reconsider pending cases or pause new ones.

Nevertheless, European policy remains cautious. While political rhetoric increasingly favors returns, legal, humanitarian, and security concerns continue to impose constraints. Reports of ongoing instability, sectarian tensions, and fragile infrastructure in Syria underscore the complexity of large-scale repatriation.

Engagement with Damascus: A new diplomatic reality

A defining feature of Europe’s evolving approach is its willingness to directly engage with Syria’s new leadership. Since assuming power, Ahmad al-Sharaa has undertaken multiple diplomatic visits to Western capitals, including Berlin, Paris, and Washington, signaling a broader effort to normalize relations and attract international support for reconstruction.

For European governments, this engagement serves both pragmatic and strategic purposes. On one hand, cooperation with Damascus is essential to organizing safe and coordinated returns. On the other, it provides leverage to push for governance reforms, rule-of-law commitments, and accountability mechanisms.

Merz explicitly linked future cooperation to the establishment of a stable and lawful Syrian state, indicating that repatriation is not merely a migration issue but part of a wider geopolitical recalibration. In this sense, refugee returns are being framed as a component of Syria’s post-war recovery, with returnees viewed as vital human capital for rebuilding destroyed infrastructure and institutions.

However, this normalization process remains contested within Europe itself. Critics warn against “premature normalization,” pointing to allegations of authoritarian tendencies and unresolved human rights concerns under the new Syrian leadership. As a result, European policy continues to balance engagement with conditionality.

Lebanon’s paralysis and missed opportunities

In stark contrast, Lebanon has yet to translate its long-standing calls for refugee returns into a coherent or actionable strategy. Despite repeated political statements highlighting the urgency of repatriation, Beirut has not pursued direct, high-level engagement with President Ahmad al-Sharaa comparable to that undertaken by European leaders.

This inaction is particularly striking given Lebanon’s acute exposure to the refugee crisis. Hosting over a million Syrians, the country faces immense economic, social, and infrastructural pressures. Yet internal political divisions, institutional fragility, and competing foreign policy alignments have hindered the formulation of a unified approach.

Recent visits by Lebanese officials to Syria have not produced a structured bilateral framework for returns. Nor has Lebanon capitalized on al-Sharaa’s international outreach to position itself as a key partner in repatriation efforts. The absence of a formalized dialogue mechanism contrasts sharply with Europe’s proactive diplomacy.

Moreover, Lebanon lacks the administrative capacity and financial resources to independently manage large-scale returns. Unlike European states, it cannot offer reintegration incentives or reconstruction support, further limiting its leverage in negotiations with Damascus.

The result is a persistent policy gap: while European countries are actively shaping the terms of repatriation in coordination with Syria, Lebanon remains largely reactive, constrained by domestic instability and limited strategic vision.

Between reality and ambition: The limits of repatriation

Despite Europe’s growing momentum, the feasibility of mass returns remains uncertain. Surveys indicate that only a minority of Syrian refugees intend to return in the near term, citing security concerns, economic hardship, and the lack of basic services in their home country.

In Germany, for instance, many Syrians have integrated into the labor market, with hundreds of thousands employed and tens of thousands acquiring citizenship. For these individuals, the decision to return is influenced not only by conditions in Syria but also by the opportunities they have built in Europe.

Similarly, conditions on the ground in Syria, while improved in some areas, remain volatile. Ongoing violence, political fragmentation, and the scale of destruction pose significant obstacles to sustainable reintegration.

Hence, these realities suggest that repatriation will likely be gradual and uneven, shaped by a combination of voluntary choices, policy incentives, and evolving conditions within Syria.