Expanded decentralization: A reform long promised

Since the Taif Agreement came into force, every ministerial statement in Lebanon has included a clause calling for the adoption of expanded administrative decentralization. Yet to this day, this provision has not been implemented. It is worth noting that the 1977 Municipalities Law had already established administrative decentralization, designating the municipality as the nucleus of this system and granting it broad powers under Article 47, as well as appropriate powers to municipal heads under Article 74. However, these powers and the financial independence of municipalities did not transform them into engines of development. With few exceptions, most municipalities remained political entities subject to polarization and disputes, rather than integrated development units capable of achieving financial independence through their authorities. Instead, they continued to be a burden on the state, undermining the objective of the 1977 law and making it necessary to consider a new law on administrative decentralization.

The demand for administrative decentralization was a constant feature throughout the 1990s. Most politicians and advocates of administrative reform in Lebanon repeatedly expressed their desire to reform the state’s administrative and political system by adopting decentralization and granting local authorities greater powers and responsibilities to manage their own affairs and provide public services aligned with local needs and priorities.

Today, more than two decades after the adoption of the “National Accord Document” known as the Taif Agreement, the project of administrative decentralization remains ink on paper, despite repeated promises by successive governments. Numerous proposals, initiatives, and draft laws have been put forward over the years, without leading to concrete results.

The primary objective of adopting administrative decentralization is to achieve balanced development across all regions. Any decentralization law that fails to genuinely ensure balanced development would fall short of its purpose and violate the preamble of the Lebanese Constitution, which states in paragraph “G” that “balanced cultural, social, and economic development is a fundamental pillar of the unity of the state and the stability of the system.”

In brief, expanded administrative decentralization in Lebanon can be defined as an administrative system that aims to transfer certain powers and authorities from the central government to local authorities such as municipalities and local councils. The goal is to enhance regional autonomy in decision-making and improve service delivery, while maintaining coordination between local and central authorities.

It is essential to emphasize that administrative decentralization is fundamentally different from federalism (sometimes referred to as political decentralization). Federalism is a political system rooted in the constitution and based on the distribution of powers among geographic units. Administrative decentralization, by contrast, is an administrative system established by law rather than by the constitution. It can therefore be adopted, amended, or repealed by legislation. It grants locally elected units that enjoy administrative and financial independence broad administrative powers.

There is also a clear distinction between administrative decentralization, which relies on the election of local bodies with legal personality and financial and administrative autonomy to manage decentralized units, and deconcentration, which involves empowering appointed officials of the central administration in governorates and districts to provide central government services locally, sparing citizens the need to travel to the capital to obtain them.

For more than 35 years, a recurring question has been raised without an answer: when will a new law on administrative decentralization be adopted?

In this regard, several draft laws and proposals were discussed between 1995 and 2015 without reaching a conclusion. However, in 2015, the relevant parliamentary committees completed a draft law on administrative decentralization comprising 147 articles.

The draft law is based on the following principles:

An expanded decentralized system built on elected local councils with legal personality and financial and administrative independence, exercising broad powers. These include municipal councils, district councils, and the Beirut City Council. The draft adopts the district (qada’) as a decentralized unit, with an elected council in each district granted extensive administrative powers and independent financial resources enabling it to carry out its responsibilities.

The draft abolishes the positions of district commissioners (qaimaqam) and transfers their powers to the elected district councils. It retains the role of the governor as a link between the regions and the central authority through deconcentration, while transferring a number of the governor’s executive powers to the elected district council.

Replacing the Independent Municipal Fund with a decentralized fund designed to ensure balanced development. The fund would have legal personality and financial and administrative independence, and would be subject to ex-post oversight by the Court of Accounts, without prior control. A board of trustees appointed from district and municipal councils would oversee its operations for a fixed term. The fund would serve as the main mechanism to create equal development conditions across regions and gradually reduce disparities between wealthy and poorer areas.

The draft allocates 70% of the fund’s resources to district councils and 30% to municipalities. The Treasury and Public Debt Directorate at the Ministry of Finance, along with public, private, mixed institutions, and autonomous agencies, would transfer the fund’s revenues quarterly. The board of trustees would distribute allocations to districts and municipalities every six months. The fund’s annual budget is expected to reach approximately 2% of GDP, compared to 0.6% for the current Independent Municipal Fund, placing Lebanon among financially decentralized countries (the global average is 3%). Funding sources include 25% of VAT revenues, 10% of total mobile phone bills, 25% of customs revenues, 5% of lottery revenues, and 25% of inheritance and estate transfer fees.

Establishing an independent authority to oversee elections for district councils and the Beirut City Council, with broad powers to prepare for and supervise all stages of these elections.

Adopting the district as a decentralized unit, managed by a district council exercising a wide range of powers defined by law. District councils would consist of a general assembly and an executive board. Members of the general assembly would be elected by direct vote under a majoritarian system in towns and villages within the district. The executive board, composed of 12 members, would be elected by the general assembly under a proportional representation system using closed lists, complete or incomplete.

The draft grants the district executive board, which holds executive authority, extensive powers detailed in Article 55, including developing and amending a strategic development plan for the district (subject to approval by the general assembly) and preparing the necessary studies.

Decisions of the executive board would be self-executing and would not require approval from any authority, except for matters related to national security, protection of archaeological sites, master plans, detailed zoning plans, and building and subdivision regulations affecting all or part of the district. In such cases, decisions would be referred directly to the competent authority, which must issue an opinion within a specified timeframe.

The general assembly would elect the president, vice president, and members of the executive board, from which the board derives its representative legitimacy. The assembly would participate in managing district affairs by approving key decisions and exercising oversight, including the power to withdraw confidence from the executive board, its president, or vice president.

Transferring broad powers and responsibilities from the central authority to district councils, accompanied by the provision of the necessary financial resources. Article 78 of the draft lists district revenues, including income from projects directly operated by the district and its share in joint ventures.

Providing for central oversight, including the authority to dissolve district executive boards in cases of constitutional violations. Any dissolution decree issued by the Council of Ministers must be justified and remains subject to appeal before the State Council.

Managing Beirut through a unified City Council, composed of a general assembly and an executive board, without subdividing the capital. The draft provides for the election of representatives from each of Beirut’s twelve historic districts to form the City Council. Each district would elect five representatives to the general assembly by direct vote, in addition to one district representative, resulting in a 72-member general assembly.

Beirut’s executive board would consist of 12 members, one from each district, with the candidate receiving the highest number of votes in each district automatically winning the seat. The governor, as representative of the central authority, would have the right to attend executive board meetings without voting, review its work, request reconsideration of decisions through a reasoned request, and place items on the agenda for discussion.

In conclusion, the draft law on administrative decentralization prepared in 2015 can be adopted as is or amended. Its approval requires a two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers. In Parliament, pursuant to Article 34 of the Constitution, a quorum of an absolute majority is required, and decisions are taken by a majority of votes. If these procedures are completed, the government would have resolved a file that has been debated, studied, and theorized for decades without result.