Greater Lebanon and the search for a new system

As Lebanon marks the anniversary of the proclamation of Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920, the country is once again confronted with a question that has accompanied its modern history: how can a state built on profound religious, regional, and cultural diversity preserve its territorial identity while developing a political system capable of containing its internal divisions?

In an interview with The Beiruter, historian and political activist Dr. Imad Mrad argued that more than a century of experience has also demonstrated the shortcomings of the centralized political system established alongside the Lebanese state. For Mrad, the challenge today is therefore not whether Greater Lebanon should be preserved, but how it should be governed.

The 1920 state and the Maronite aspiration

According to Mrad, the creation of Greater Lebanon fulfilled what he describes as a centuries-old Maronite and broader Christian aspiration: the establishment of a political entity centered on Mount Lebanon that could provide security, sovereignty, and institutional protection.

“What happened in 1920 was a Maronite and Christian dream for which they struggled, sacrificed, and were martyred throughout these centuries.

He traced this aspiration back to the early history of the Maronite community, particularly to Saint John Maron, whom he identifies as the first Maronite patriarch. In Mrad’s interpretation, the desire for a protected political space developed over centuries of conflict, persecution, displacement and hardship.

The achievement of Greater Lebanon, however, cannot be attributed solely to the sacrifices of the Lebanese Christian communities. Mrad stressed that the international circumstances created by the World War I (1914-1918) were equally decisive.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after four centuries fundamentally altered the political map of the Middle East. At the same time, the emerging international order increasingly invoked the principle of self-determination advocated by United States (U.S.) President Woodrow Wilson, while the victorious Allied powers sought to reorganize territories previously governed by defeated empires.

The mandate system became part of this new order. Although it retained foreign control, it also introduced institutions of local administration and political participation. Mrad argued that Lebanese Christians were able to take advantage of these transformations to advance their demand for a distinct Lebanese state.

The circumstances that allowed the Maronites to achieve this dream were certainly regional and international circumstances.

France and the creation of Greater Lebanon

France played a central role in this process. Mrad emphasized the historical relationship between France and Lebanon’s Maronite community, particularly during the 19th century and the sectarian violence of 1860, as well as during the World War I.

Maronite representatives subsequently pressed their case at the postwar peace negotiations, seeking the establishment of a larger Lebanese territory. Mrad acknowledged that there were competing French visions for the region, including ideas that would have incorporated Lebanon into a broader Syrian framework.

Ultimately, however, he argued that persistent Maronite demands, combined with the long-standing relationship between France and the Maronites, contributed to the proclamation of Greater Lebanon in 1920.

For Mrad, this was not simply the creation of an entirely new territorial entity. He strongly rejected the description of Patriarch Elias Hoyek as having merely “expanded” Lebanon by annexing foreign territories.

Hoyek and the question of Lebanese borders

Mrad argued that Hoyek’s role should instead be understood as the recovery of territories that, in his historical interpretation, had previously been connected to Mount Lebanon but had been separated from it under earlier administrative arrangements, particularly during the Mutasarrifate period (1861-1918). He pointed specifically to Beirut, the North, the Bekaa, and the South, noting that these areas had historical connections to Lebanon under the Maans and Chehabs.

Patriarch Elias Hoyek did not expand Lebanon. He reclaimed Lebanese territories that had been severed from it.

He also disputed claims that Hoyek deliberately excluded predominantly Orthodox territories in Syria from Greater Lebanon. In his view, such an interpretation oversimplifies the historical record.

Mrad further maintained that the territories incorporated into Greater Lebanon contained substantial Christian populations, pointing to communities in areas including Rmeish, Ain Ebel, Debl, Marjayoun, and elsewhere as evidence of long-standing Christian roots in southern Lebanon.

This interpretation remains part of a wider historical debate over the boundaries and political meaning of Greater Lebanon, but for Mrad it is essential to understanding why the 1920 settlement should be regarded as a recovery of a broader Lebanese geography rather than simply territorial expansion.

From Greater Lebanon to the crisis of the political system

The creation of the state, however, did not resolve the fundamental question of how its diverse communities would coexist politically.

Mrad identified the 1926 Constitution as an important turning point. While he considered it advanced for its time, he argued that its institutional model failed to sufficiently reflect Lebanon’s religious and communal composition. Drawing heavily from the constitutional model of the French Third Republic (1870-1940), the system was designed around a political environment fundamentally different from Lebanon’s pluralistic society.

We were sectarian communities, and the 1926 Constitution did not take that into consideration.

The tensions became increasingly visible after independence. Mrad cited the 1958 crisis as an early manifestation of the divide, particularly as Nasserism and Arab nationalism gained substantial support among Lebanese Muslims.

The growing Palestinian armed presence after the 1969 Cairo Agreement further intensified the dispute over Lebanon’s political identity and sovereignty. According to Mrad, these tensions ultimately contributed to the broader confrontation that culminated in the Lebanese War (1975-1990).

The postwar period did not permanently resolve these contradictions. Instead, the unresolved implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement, Syria’s prolonged occupation and influence and, later, the dominance of the Shiite political duo produced new challenges to the existing political order, in Mrad’s assessment.

Preserving Greater Lebanon, changing the system

Lebanon’s experience since 1920, in Mrad’s interpretation, offers a lesson that extends beyond the anniversary itself. The establishment of Greater Lebanon may have fulfilled a historic aspiration, but the political system developed around it has repeatedly struggled to accommodate the country’s competing identities and external pressures.

Despite these repeated crises, Mrad does not advocate abandoning Greater Lebanon. On the contrary, he considered its preservation essential.

Greater Lebanon must be preserved, but within a new system.

His argument is that the problem lies not with the country’s diversity but with the centralized political structure through which that diversity has been governed.

After more than a century of experience, he believed Lebanon should consider a new political model based on expanded decentralization. Such a system, in his view, would preserve the country’s territorial unity while recognizing its religious communities, minorities and regions and strengthening the role of citizenship.

The precise terminology, Mrad argued, is less important than the principles behind the system: maintaining Greater Lebanon, protecting pluralism, guaranteeing the rights and political role of communities, empowering regions and strengthening citizenship.

For him, expanded decentralization could provide a mechanism through which Lebanon’s communities participate meaningfully in public life without constantly turning control of the central state into an existential political struggle.

Hence, the challenge may consequently be to learn from the failures of the past without discarding the state that emerged from them: preserving Greater Lebanon, strengthening citizenship, empowering its regions and communities, and building a political system better suited to the country’s pluralistic reality.