Guardianship of the jurist in Iran

Iran’s Assembly of Experts selected a successor to the country’s Supreme Leader following the killing of Ali Khamenei, in a move that appeared both swift and decisive. The council did not engage in a prolonged debate over potential candidates, despite the presence within Iran’s religious establishment of numerous clerics possessing the high scholarly and jurisprudential qualifications stipulated by the constitution for assuming the position of Waliy al-Faqih.

The surprise lay not in the transfer of power itself, but in the identity of the successor. Days after the strike that targeted Iran’s leadership headquarters on February 28, it was announced that the heir would be Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the slain leader. Iranians thus found themselves confronting a new leader emerging from within the same ruling family.

For many observers, the transition bore the hallmarks of a hereditary transfer of power. A figure who had spent years operating within his father’s office and who was frequently accused of managing networks of financial and political influence suddenly ascended to the highest authority in the state. The development raises a fundamental question about the nature of the Iranian system: does the Islamic Republic continue to function as a republic, or is it evolving into a closed structure managed by a family and a security establishment?

The appointment process itself appeared to signal a shift from an Islamic republic toward a form of political inheritance. This carries a striking historical irony. The 1979 Iranian revolution was, at its core, an uprising against monarchy. Millions took to the streets to overthrow Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, demanding an end to dynastic rule and the establishment of a state grounded in justice and representation.

Nearly five decades later, the system now faces accusations of reproducing that same model this time framed in religious language with power transferring from the Pahlavi family to the Khamenei family.

Prior to Mojtaba’s appointment, Ali Khamenei had gradually positioned his son within the center of decision-making, amid quiet competition with clerics who held higher scholarly standing. In Iran, the Supreme Leader is expected to possess a high religious rank, enabling him to issue rulings and provide guidance to the nation.

This status is also linked to a symbolic relationship with the awaited Imam Mahdi. Some hard-line factions view the Supreme Leader as a deputy of the Hidden Imam during the era of occultation. While Shiite tradition maintains that the era of the Imam’s envoys has long since ended, this symbolic dimension remains embedded in the political language used to reinforce legitimacy.

From republic to the suspicion of inheritance

Power in Iran rests on the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, a concept that has defined the system since 1979 by granting the Supreme Leader ultimate authority over political, military, and national decision-making.

The transfer of leadership is therefore not merely a change of individuals, but a revealing moment that exposes the nature of the system itself. The question is no longer simply who governs Iran, but how it is governed: as a religious system guided by jurisprudence, or as a political structure that uses religion as a source of legitimacy.

To understand this tension, one must return to the doctrinal roots of Wilayat al-Faqih. In Twelver Shiite thought, the twelfth Imam entered occultation and is expected to return at the end of time. He is regarded as an infallible figure connected to divine guidance.

This raises a central question: in the Imam’s absence, who leads the community?

Traditionally, Shiite scholars maintained that the role of the jurist should remain limited to judicial and religious matters issuing rulings, overseeing religious affairs, and managing endowments. The jurist was understood as a religious authority, not a political ruler.

The Islamic Revolution introduced a transformative reinterpretation. Ayatollah Khomeini argued that the qualified jurist must assume leadership of the state itself, asserting that the implementation of Islam cannot be suspended due to the Imam’s absence.

From this emerged the concept of absolute guardianship. The authority of the jurist expanded to encompass governance in its entirety including the military, foreign policy, security, and the economy.

In this framework, the Waliy al-Faqih became the ultimate authority within the system, while elected institutions operate within boundaries defined by the Supreme Leader.

For this reason, critics argue that the Islamic Republic does not function as a republic in the conventional sense, as the expression of popular will ultimately remain subordinate to the authority of the Supreme Leader.

Deputy of the Mahdi

The legitimacy of the Supreme Leader rests not only on political authority, but also on the notion that he serves as the general deputy of Imam Mahdi during the Major Occultation. He does not claim to embody the Imam, but rather to preserve both religion and state until the Imam’s return.

This imbues the position with a dimension that transcends conventional politics. Opposition can thus be framed not merely as political dissent, but as a challenge to the religious system itself.

However, Shiite doctrine holds that during the Major Occultation, the Imam does not communicate through intermediaries. Instead, the concept of general representation by jurists emerged as a theological solution.

As such, claims suggesting a direct connection with the Mahdi are more accurately understood as tools of ideological mobilization rather than elements of traditional jurisprudence.

Authority above the State

The notion of belonging to the Mahdi has also been deployed politically, with the state presenting itself as preparing the ground for his return thereby acquiring symbolic power.

This becomes particularly sensitive during internal power struggles, where the issue shifts from political competence to the question of who is more worthy of representing the Hidden Imam.

Within this context, Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise becomes especially significant. He was not widely recognized as a senior jurist with traditional qualifications, prompting questions about whether his ascent reflects religious merit or internal power dynamics.

A political “Minor Occultation”

Mojtaba Khamenei remained largely absent from public life, yet was widely perceived as an influential figure within his father’s office, particularly in security affairs. This dynamic can be described as a form of “political minor occultation”: present within the structures of power, yet absent from public visibility.

His rise appears less as a sudden development than the culmination of a long process of preparation. Nevertheless, it presents a structural challenge: he must secure religious legitimacy, political legitimacy, and military backing simultaneously. This brings into focus the central role of the Revolutionary Guards.

The revolutionary guards

Established after the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has evolved into one of the most powerful institutions in Iran  militarily, economically, and politically. It functions not merely as a military force, but as an expansive network of influence spanning multiple sectors and extending beyond Iran’s borders. The Guards view themselves as custodians of the revolution, rather than as a conventional state institution.

Formally, they operate under the authority of the Supreme Leader. In practice, however, the relationship reflects a mutual dependency: the Leader provides legitimacy, while the Guards provide coercive power.

With Mojtaba’s ascent, reliance on security institutions may deepen, particularly as traditional sources of religious legitimacy weaken.

The Basij militia, affiliated with the Guards, has played a central role in suppressing protests notably in 2009, 2019, and 2022 reinforcing perceptions that the system relies not only on religious legitimacy, but also on security enforcement.

A religious or security state?

Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise sharpens a central question about the nature of the Iranian system. While the revolution promised a religious form of governance, the system has evolved into a hybrid model combining religious legitimacy with security authority.

Ideological language remains prominent, but real power appears to be increasingly concentrated within hard institutions.

A paradox thus emerges: the Supreme Leader risks becoming a symbolic figure who legitimizes decisions shaped within security circles.

The Shiite world challenge

Not all Shiite authorities accept the doctrine of absolute guardianship as implemented in Iran. The Najaf school of thought, for instance, advocates a separation between religious authority and political rule. Legitimacy, therefore, is not determined solely within Iran, but also within the broader Shiite religious sphere.

A key question is whether Mojtaba Khamenei can secure acceptance among the religious establishment while maintaining the support of military institutions. His prolonged absence from public life contributes to an aura of ambiguity one that may simultaneously reinforce authority and limit broader legitimacy.

Iran between region and domestic arena

At the regional level, the leadership transition suggests continuity in strategic policy, particularly in supporting allied groups and relying on the Revolutionary Guards. Yet leadership change also introduces uncertainty, potentially increasing the influence of surrounding power centers within the system.

A crisis of doctrine

The crisis surrounding Wilayat al-Faqih extends beyond the question of succession. It is, fundamentally, a crisis of the doctrine itself.

Originally conceived as a solution to the absence of the Imam, the doctrine now confronts a critical question: what happens when the concept of “deputyship of the Mahdi” begins to resemble hereditary succession?

Does guardianship remain grounded in jurisprudence and justice, or does it become an instrument of power consolidation?

This is the central challenge facing Iran today. What was once a theoretical framework has become a system under mounting pressure. The more it leans on inheritance or military power, the closer it moves toward the very systems it once sought to overthrow.

A system that derived its legitimacy from revolution against monarchy now risks replicating its logic. Ultimately, Iran cannot be understood through politics or religion alone. It represents a complex intersection of religious doctrine, military power, and state interests.

Within this intersection, Wilayat al-Faqih continues to evolve. The system seeks to justify its continuity, yet the method of succession suggests that survival itself may have become the overriding objective. Between doctrine and power, Iran’s future remains defined by uncertainty, tension, and competing trajectories.