Hamas official to The Beiruter: We welcome NCAG and call for pressure on Israel

After over 2 years of armed conflict between Israel and Hamas, and more than 15 years of Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip, a drastic change has occurred as new faces and entities have emerged to govern the devastated Strip. Indeed, the “National Committee for the Administration of Gaza” (NCAG) was announced on 15 January 2026, marking a significant development in post-war governance arrangements for the Gaza Strip, after Hamas became a center stage with regards to the ongoing conflict.

Established in the aftermath of the 2023 Gaza War, the committee is designed as a technocratic, transitional Palestinian administration tasked with stabilizing the territory, overseeing reconstruction and managing civilian affairs pending the full return of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Backed by international legitimacy and cautiously endorsed by Palestinian factions, the NCAG represents an attempt to bridge a prolonged governance vacuum while navigating intense regional and political sensitivities.

Replacing Hamas’ administrative role

The Beiruter reached out to Walid al-Kilani, Hamas Media Official in Lebanon, to better understand the recent dynamic in the Strip.

One of the most consequential aspects of the NCAG’s formation is that it replaces Hamas’ Government Follow-up Committee, which had managed civil and internal security affairs in Gaza for 15 years. Hamas has publicly welcomed the establishment of the technocratic committee, describing it as a constructive step toward consolidating the ceasefire with Israel and alleviating the humanitarian crisis. Kilani noted that the group “submitted more than 40 to 45 names, and an agreed-upon name has since begun circulating in the media.”

Kilani stated that the group “welcomes the formation of the administrative committee for the Gaza Strip,” and is working with “the mediators to open the crossings, allow the entry of aid and secure the withdrawal of occupation forces from the Gaza Strip in accordance with what was agreed in the October agreement last year.” Indeed, Kilani believed that “nature abhors a vacuum,” which makes it essential during this period for an entity managing the Strip to protect aid and its warehouses and to ensure it reaches those entitled to it.”

Hamas officials have reiterated that the movement does not seek a role in Gaza’s post-war administration, instead positioning itself as a political actor that will monitor governance outcomes to ensure stability and facilitate reconstruction. At the same time, Kilani stressed that the success of the transition depends heavily on international guarantees, particularly US pressure on Israel to uphold ceasefire commitments and allow reconstruction to proceed without obstruction. He noted that Hamas, for its part, “has implemented most of the provisions of the agreement, including the handover of captives (whether alive or deceased), refraining from opening fire and adhering to what was agreed.” Meanwhile, he claimed that “the Zionist enemy has violated this agreement more than 1,200 times, resulting in more than 500 martyrs and approximately 1,000 wounded.”

While the NCAG enjoys unprecedented international backing, it faces formidable challenges. These include securing sustained funding, managing the sensitive issue of weapons and security control, ensuring the protection and delivery of humanitarian aid and maintaining public trust in a context shaped by deep trauma and political fragmentation. The contentious issue of weapons retention is problematic and controversial since Tel Aviv has expressed its resolve to achieve this objective, while Kilani stated that “weapons are linked to the Palestinian state. As a people under occupation, we have the right to resist this occupation and to defend ourselves. This is guaranteed by all constitutions, laws, and international norms, including United Nations law (Article 51 stipulates that any people living under occupation have the right to resist that occupation, including by using all forms of force, among them weapons). Therefore, as long as we are under occupation, we have the right to defend ourselves, our homes, and our land.”

Regional and international reactions

The committee’s launch has been met with broad, though cautious, international engagement.

Egypt played a central role in mediating agreement on the committee’s composition, while Qatar and Türkiye have been acknowledged for their support of stabilization efforts. At the same time, the involvement of these regional actors has sparked controversy in Israel, where some officials have objected to Turkish and Qatari representation on the “Board of Peace” overseeing the process.

Despite these tensions, US officials have framed the NCAG as the cornerstone of the second phase of the Gaza peace plan, which includes disarmament provisions and large-scale reconstruction. Diplomatic coordination is expected to intensify in the coming months as the committee transitions from planning to implementation.

NCAG and its mandate

The NCAG was established under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the Gaza conflict and promote long-term stabilization. Its creation was formally authorized by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2803, providing it with international legitimacy absent from previous interim arrangements. The committee operates under multilayered oversight, reporting to UN High Representative Nikolay Mladenov and a newly formed “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump, reflecting a balance between Palestinian ownership and international supervision.

Mandated to manage Gaza’s post-conflict transition, the NCAG focuses on restoring essential services, strengthening internal security and leading reconstruction efforts. Immediate priorities include reviving electricity, water, healthcare, education, humanitarian assistance and damaged infrastructure. Meanwhile, longer-term goals emphasize economic recovery, institutional reform, transparency, accountability and the principle of “one authority, one law and one weapon,” paving the way for a return to full Palestinian Authority governance.

In addition, the NCAG comprises 15 Gaza-based Palestinian technocrats, led by engineer Ali Shaath. The emphasis on professional expertise rather than factional affiliation is central to the committee’s stated identity as a non-partisan body formed “by Palestinians, for Palestinians,” with the backing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the PA and major Palestinian factions.

In conclusion, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza represents a pragmatic attempt to navigate between conflict and recovery through technocratic governance and international oversight. Its success will depend on its ability to deliver tangible improvements in daily life, uphold Palestinian ownership of the process and operate within a volatile regional environment. If effective, the NCAG could serve as a transitional bridge toward unified Palestinian governance and long-term stability in Gaza. If not, it risks becoming another interim structure weighed down by political constraints and unmet expectations.