Hezbollah and models for employing civil resources

Source: Nida Al Watan - Ziad Bitar

The Iranian “Fars” news agency published a report comparing the American model and the Iranian model in the Middle East, arguing that the United States (U.S.) provides security to states in exchange for money, while the Iranian model is based on the principle of self-sufficiency and knowledge transfer.

The report overlooked the fact that the U.S. provides protection to countries and supports and arms legitimate entities in Arab and Gulf states within official frameworks and under clear agreements, and does not provide military support to illegitimate groups operating outside the control of state institutions. The issue is not limited to the financial dimension, but extends to the question of sovereignty, as supporting unofficial actors may undermine state authority and weaken national sovereignty.

The question of money remains a central element in Tehran’s policy, which does not prioritize concepts of sovereignty or balanced neighborly relations, but rather relies on multiple tools of pressure, including threats in maritime corridors, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, to achieve political and financial gains, or through its armed proxies within states by threatening governments and regimes with coups and assassinations.

The Iranian report noted that the capabilities for manufacturing and developing missiles and drones have been transferred to Yemen, Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, where these actors have reached a stage of local production of advanced weapons.

It further explained that Tehran has moved toward adopting an approach based on transferring technology and knowledge rather than merely selling military products, focusing on training and establishing local production lines instead of only sending ready-made weapons.

This idea suggests that possessing a local military manufacturing infrastructure is not limited to production under normal conditions, but also grants the concerned actors a high capacity for rapid recovery after military strikes. Rather than relying on external supply chains that may be disrupted or targeted, internal manufacturing enables production to resume in shorter timeframes, even under complex security conditions.

Moreover, adopting decentralized production models based on multiple workshops and dispersed locations reduces the impact of any direct targeting, as the destruction of a single site does not lead to the paralysis of the entire system. This pattern enhances the resilience of the military structure and makes it more capable of adapting to sustained pressure.

In addition, the availability of local technical knowledge, combined with continuous training, allows for the repair of damage, the development of existing models, and even improvements in military capabilities despite ongoing challenges. Thus, the issue is not limited to reconstruction, but extends to continuous development, creating an ongoing cycle of recovery and modernization simultaneously.

The Hamas model in the Gaza Strip represents an advanced case of local military production that emerged and evolved under siege conditions, making it a practical reference for any organization seeking to reduce dependence on external sources. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades succeeded in building a self-sufficient production system through a wide network of workshops and factories, many of which operate underground, with a clear ability to utilize civilian materials in manufacturing military tools.

This experience is no longer confined to Gaza, but has become a clear source of inspiration for Hezbollah in Lebanon, especially in light of regional shifts that have constrained traditional supply lines. Estimates indicate that Hezbollah has gradually begun adopting key elements of this model, foremost among them decentralized production, and the establishment of distributed and concealed industrial infrastructures that reduce the impact of airstrikes and provide greater continuity.

The idea of converting dual-use materials, civilian on the surface, into military tools, as demonstrated in Hamas’s experience, also appears applicable in the Lebanese context, allowing greater production flexibility and reducing dependence on external sources. In addition, the use of tunnels or hidden infrastructure as a hub for production and storage represents a strategic option to enhance resilience.

While Hezbollah possesses military and technical capabilities exceeding those of Hamas, the new challenges it faces, particularly in terms of supply, are pushing it to combine its technical superiority on one hand with the decentralized local production model on the other. In this sense, the party is not copying the Gaza experience entirely, but rather adapting it within a broader Lebanese context, aiming to build a production system capable of continuity and recovery even under prolonged military escalation.

In detail, Hamas has developed a systematic capability to convert dual-use materials, which are classified as civilian on the surface, into military applications. Among the most notable examples is the use of steel water pipes in the manufacturing of rocket bodies, as well as the utilization of simple chemical compounds such as sugar and potassium nitrate, commonly used as fertilizer, in the production of solid rocket fuel.

This also includes collecting and dismantling unexploded Israeli ordnance, where Hamas has developed specialized technical teams that extract high-quality explosive materials and reusable components.

Solid propellant fuel is considered one of the fundamental concepts in rocket engineering. It is based on a simple chemical principle involving the combination of a combustible material and an oxidizer capable of providing the oxygen necessary for combustion without the need for external air.

Civilian materials such as sugar are used as a fuel source, alongside commonly used industrial oxidizers such as potassium nitrate, which is also used in fertilizers. This reaction is based on rapid combustion, where the interaction of the two substances releases large quantities of hot gases in a short time, generating the thrust force upon which certain rocket propulsion systems depend.

Hezbollah is increasingly moving toward restructuring its military system on the basis of local manufacturing, amid a declining reliance on external supply lines and the growing complexity of the regional environment. This shift is based on an internal conviction that building power is no longer possible through external logistics, which has necessitated a redirection of the center of gravity from smuggling to production and manufacturing.

In this context, a strategic trend emerges aimed at transferring manufacturing capabilities into Lebanon itself, as part of what is described as an attempt to entrench self-sufficient weapons production capacity, seen as a key factor for Hezbollah’s continued existence as an effective military force and as a regional proxy of Iran. This path is not entirely new, as in previous years there was a gradual transfer of some production operations from Iran to Syria, before later extending into Lebanon. However, recent developments have made this direction an even more urgent strategic necessity.

The transformation in Hezbollah’s structure would not have been possible without a parallel evolution in Iranian doctrine, which shifted from the role of a direct arms supplier to that of a “knowledge intermediary” focused on transferring military expertise and technology. This model achieves a range of objectives for both Iran and Hezbollah, most notably reducing exposure to direct targeting during transfer operations, enhancing political deniability, and lowering logistical costs associated with traditional supply chains.