India: Between BRICS and the West

When India assumed the BRICS chairmanship in 2026, it inherited a grouping under pressure from several crises at once. The war in Iran and the struggle over the Strait of Hormuz placed Iran and the UAE, both BRICS members, on opposing sides and later prevented the bloc’s foreign ministers from agreeing on a joint statement. At the same time, competition over critical minerals and advanced technology was hardening worldwide, as China restricted rare-earth exports, Western governments raced to secure alternative supplies, and Washington tightened controls on Chinese access to advanced chips and AI technology. As India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar acknowledged at the launch of the country’s BRICS chairmanship, “The current global environment presents complex and interlinked challenges.”

With the global order under growing strain, many expected India to use its chairmanship to double down on BRICS and help turn the grouping into a stronger challenge to Western influence. Modi did the opposite, spending much of the first half of the year securing major agreements across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

The logic of balance

Yet this apparent contradiction is the point of India’s strategy. New Delhi does not see BRICS and its Western partnerships as competing choices. BRICS gives India a larger voice among emerging economies and strengthens its claim to represent the Global South. Relations with Europe and the Indo-Pacific, meanwhile, provide access to markets, capital and technologies that BRICS cannot supply on its own. Modi’s aim is to benefit from both without allowing either side to limit India’s freedom of action.

This helps explain why India has resisted efforts to turn BRICS into a formal anti-Western alliance. New Delhi supports reforming institutions such as the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank, where developing countries remain underrepresented, but it does not seek to replace one rigid international order with another. India also remains a member of the Quad alongside the United States, Japan and Australia while maintaining its longstanding defense relationship with Russia. Likewise, New Delhi sees China, one of BRICS’s most powerful partners, as one of its main rivals while cooperating closely with Europe.

India’s partnerships within BRICS

That does not mean Modi has neglected relations within the grouping. India signed a mining and minerals agreement with Brazil as the two countries sought to secure critical raw materials and raise bilateral trade to $20 billion within five years. With the UAE, New Delhi reached agreements covering investment, defense cooperation and the possible storage of up to 30 million barrels of ADNOC oil in India’s strategic reserves. These arrangements give India greater protection against energy disruptions while drawing one of the Gulf’s largest investors deeper into the Indian economy.

Indonesia offers the clearest example of how India uses BRICS ties to build practical strategic partnerships. During Modi’s July visit, the two countries reached agreements covering maritime security, critical minerals, telecommunications and, most importantly, the BrahMos missile system. This weapon system was jointly developed by India and Russia, combining Russian expertise in propulsion with Indian work on guidance, avionics, fire-control systems and production. Manufactured largely in India through the bilateral joint venture, it is now being offered to Indonesia. The deal would connect three BRICS nations through defense technology and production while strengthening India’s position at the center of that relationship. It would also turn Indo-Russian technology into an instrument of New Delhi’s growing influence as a major defense exporter in Southeast Asia.

Yet the way these agreements were secured also exposed a basic weakness in BRICS. The grouping gave India political access and a wider diplomatic platform, but the concrete gains still came through direct negotiations with individual governments. Modi is using India’s relationships with BRICS countries rather than relying on the organization itself to deliver trade, energy or defense agreements. The same approach became even more visible in his dealings outside the grouping.

Beyond the grouping

Many of the agreements offering India the greatest economic rewards came from outside BRICS. The free-trade agreement concluded with the European Union covers a relationship already worth more than €180 billion a year and will improve access for Indian textiles, chemicals and electronics. At the same time, the agreement with Britain, where bilateral trade had reached about £47 billion, is expected to create further opportunities for Indian exporters and service companies, while more than 75,000 Indian professionals could benefit from a five-year exemption from paying social-security contributions in both countries during temporary assignments.

Together, the agreements give Indian companies greater access to wealthy markets while reducing New Delhi’s dependence on any single trading partner. They also give Modi more room to reject unfavorable terms in negotiations with Washington.

Beyond expanding India’s export markets, Modi’s diplomacy has focused on securing the technology and resources needed to support the country’s industrial ambitions. Germany agreed to deepen cooperation in semiconductors, critical minerals and defense production. In the Netherlands, Tata Electronics reached an agreement with ASML to support semiconductor manufacturing in India.

France and India expanded cooperation on artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, while Japan agreed to work with New Delhi on AI, minerals, energy security and resilient supply chains. Canada signed a long-term uranium supply contract and a critical-minerals agreement, while Australia cleared the administrative path for uranium exports to India.

Building greater leverage

Together, these agreements help India tackle one of its main weaknesses: its reliance on foreign suppliers for advanced machinery, semiconductors, energy and critical minerals. China remains central to many of these supply chains and possesses far greater economic weight than India inside BRICS. New Delhi cannot remove Beijing from the grouping, nor would it benefit from doing so. It can, however, enter negotiations with China from a stronger position if it has alternative sources of technology, investment and raw materials.

This is where Modi’s diplomacy becomes more than a collection of bilateral deals. India is attempting to occupy a position that neither China nor most Western countries can easily reproduce. It can present itself to developing countries as a large non-Western power offering medicine, digital infrastructure, defense equipment and development partnerships. At the same time, Western governments see India as a huge market, a possible manufacturing alternative to China and an important security partner in the Indian Ocean.

The domestic test

The greater test for India now lies at home. Agreements on semiconductors, critical minerals, defense production and advanced technology will mean little unless India can build the infrastructure, skilled workforce and manufacturing capacity needed to absorb them. Modi has expanded the country’s options abroad, but turning diplomatic access into lasting industrial power will be far more difficult.

Still, the direction of Modi’s foreign policy is increasingly clear. India is not using its BRICS chairmanship to retreat from the Western-led economy, and it is not abandoning BRICS in favor of the West. New Delhi understands that India’s strategic importance lies in its ability to participate in both worlds without fully belonging to either. In many ways, this continues India’s traditional foreign policy of engaging with competing powers while preserving the freedom to chart its own course. And whether India becomes truly indispensable will depend solely on how successfully these agreements are implemented.