Indonesia’s Gaza calculus

Under President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia has quietly begun positioning itself as a potential peacekeeper and humanitarian bridge between the Muslim world and the West. Jakarta increasingly views an international mission in Gaza as a moral obligation and a strategic opportunity as the country strives to be looked at as a responsible middle power on the global stage.

Although Indonesia’s direct involvement in the Israel–Gaza conflict has so far been limited, the possibility of a multinational stabilization force has opened the door to a more substantial role. U.S. President Donald Trump has floated the idea of an international force to govern or stabilize Gaza, and while the contours of such a plan remain uncertain, reports suggest that draft proposals have circulated at the UN Security Council level. Should a UN-mandated mission materialize, Indonesia would be among the strongest candidates to contribute troops, particularly if the operation is framed as humanitarian in nature.

Indonesian officials have already indicated that up to 20,000 soldiers could be placed on standby. However, Jakarta has drawn a clear red line: participation would be contingent on explicit UN authorization. Indonesia has consistently emphasized that it will not take part in any mission perceived as serving the unilateral interests of the United States, Israel, or any other single power. Without a Security Council resolution, Indonesia’s involvement would be highly unlikely.

A rising ower with bridge-building ambitions

Indonesia’s interest in Gaza is driven by a convergence of diplomatic, strategic, and identity-based motivations. As the world’s fourth most populous country, third-largest democracy, and largest Muslim-majority state, Indonesia sees itself as uniquely positioned to speak to both Western capitals and the broader Muslim world. It is also the only Southeast Asian member of the G20, a status Jakarta is eager to leverage.

Participation in a Gaza stabilization mission would allow Indonesia to demonstrate leadership beyond its immediate region. Its ambition lies in becoming a bridge between polarized international camps, thereby cultivating favorable perceptions across them. It is important to note that Indonesia does not aspire to relinquish its long-standing foreign policy doctrine of non-alignment. Dating back to the Cold War, adherence to this doctrine enabled Indonesia to resist great power competition and secure its autonomy.

This sensitivity explains why Indonesia does not want to be seen as facilitating an outcome that sidelines Palestinian aspirations. On the contrary, Indonesian leaders believe that pairing humanitarian engagement with visible support for Palestinian statehood could generate significant goodwill across the Muslim world, while simultaneously aligning Indonesia with Western efforts to stabilize Gaza.

These calculations also intersect with Indonesia’s longer-term ambitions, including its desire to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). While rarely stated openly, OECD accession would require consensus from all member states, including Israel. Therefore, the status of Indonesian-Israeli relations becomes increasingly difficult to avoid.

Quiet ties with Israel

Prior to October 7, 2023, Indonesia’s relationship with Israel was best described as discreet. Indonesia has engaged in limited defense and technology-related cooperation, including the purchase of Israeli weapon systems despite constraints stemming from strong domestic opposition to Israel. President Prabowo’s priorities of military modernization generated interest in Israeli technological and military expertise. However, domestic sentiments in Indonesia remain pro-Palestinian and public engagement with Israel could result in severe domestic backlash.

This cautious approach distinguishes Indonesia from neighboring Malaysia, which has adopted a more openly hostile stance toward Israel. On September 16, 2025, speaking at the emergency joint summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League in Doha, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for the severing of diplomatic and trade relations with Israel, condemning its actions as an “irresponsible provocation.” He stressed that rhetorical condemnations were insufficient, stating: “Condemnations will not stop the rockets. Statements will not liberate Palestine… Diplomatic ties must be cut, and trade relations as well.” 

Indonesia has deliberately avoided such positions, opting instead for quiet pragmatism. This restraint reflects Jakarta’s awareness that eventual normalization with Israel may be necessary to achieve its broader geopolitical and economic objectives.

Normalization: A long and fragile path

Despite these underlying dynamics, Indonesian–Israeli normalization remains distant. Progress depends on a series of highly uncertain conditions: the emergence of a UN-mandated multinational force, meaningful movement toward Palestinian statehood, the absence of Indonesian casualties in Gaza, and positive perceptions of Indonesia’s role across the Muslim world.

President Prabowo has been explicit in stating that Indonesia would consider normalizing relations with Israel if a Palestinian state was established. Before October 7, there were tentative signs that Jakarta was edging cautiously in that direction.

The timing and form of normalization remain unclear, as Indonesia remains sensitive to domestic opinion. Although OECD aspirations and other geopolitical gains are potentially lucrative, the risks associated with official normalization are ones Indonesia is not yet prepared to confront.

Domestic constraints and political space

The greatest obstacle to normalization remains public opinion. Indonesian society is overwhelmingly supportive of the Palestinian cause, and Israel’s already poor image has deteriorated further since October 7. Any overt move toward normalization would carry serious political risks.

Yet President Prabowo enjoys a uniquely strong domestic position. His governing coalition controls around 70 percent of parliamentary seats, limiting the opposition’s ability to block controversial decisions.

Even so, any engagement with Israel must be framed as independent, humanitarian, and firmly rooted in Indonesia’s foreign policy traditions.

Militarization and the Prabowo doctrine

Indonesia’s Gaza calculus cannot be separated from broader domestic trends under President Prabowo, particularly the growing role of the military in governance and the economy. Since taking office, Prabowo has overseen the removal or weakening of legal barriers that once prevented active-duty or retired military officers from holding civilian ministerial posts or leading state-owned enterprises.

As a result, military figures have increasingly assumed senior roles across government and key economic sectors. This shift is partly driven by Prabowo’s flagship food security program, which assigns the Indonesian armed forces a central role in agricultural production, processing, and distribution.

More broadly, Indonesia is witnessing a gradual centralization of power. As a former general, Prabowo draws his political strength from the military, and reinforcing its institutional role bolsters his own authority. Defense spending is expected to rise in the coming years, further entrenching this trend.

A Gaza mission, if executed without major incidents, would offer the Indonesian armed forces an opportunity to showcase their capabilities internationally and enhance their credibility. However, the expanding military role has raised concerns among democracy advocates, who warn of potential democratic backsliding.

From the government’s perspective, however, militarization is viewed as a strategic asset: a means to elevate Indonesia’s international standing, project influence beyond Southeast Asia, and reinforce its leadership role within the Muslim world.