Inside Aoun's strategic visit to Ankara

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Türkiye comes at a pivotal moment for Lebanon and the wider Middle East, following Prime Minister (PM) Nawaf Salam’s recent trip to Ankara.

Although the official agenda includes bilateral cooperation, economic recovery, and regional security, the visit also carries broader strategic implications. Ankara has expanded its influence across Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and Africa, making it an indispensable actor in regional affairs.

To better understand the significance and implications of Aoun’s visit as well as broader Lebanese-Turkish relations, The Beiruter reached out to university professor and Turkish affairs specialist Dr. Mohammad Noureddine.

Testing Türkiye’s position on Syria

According to Dr. Noureddine, one issue overshadows all others: whether Türkiye would support any future Syrian involvement in Lebanon. He noted that recent statements by President Trump encouraging Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to intervene against Hezbollah have introduced a new variable into regional calculations.

President Aoun’s main objective is to understand whether Türkiye supports any Syrian intervention in Lebanon.

In his assessment, Ankara is unlikely to endorse such a scenario.

First, Türkiye has little interest in seeing Hezbollah completely eliminated. Although Ankara does not support the group’s military role, Dr. Noureddine argued that Turkish strategists view Hezbollah’s continued presence as one factor that keeps Israel strategically preoccupied inside Lebanon. “If Israel were to eliminate Hezbollah entirely,” he explained, “its strategic focus could shift elsewhere, potentially bringing it into a more direct confrontation with Türkiye.”

Second, he believed Syria currently lacks the military capability to conduct an effective intervention inside Lebanon. “The Syrian military simply does not possess the necessary operational capacity,” he said. “Any intervention could destabilize Syria itself, creating consequences that would eventually affect Türkiye.”

A third consideration involves Iran. Any Syrian military campaign against Hezbollah, Dr. Noureddine argued, would inevitably be interpreted as action against Iran’s regional influence. “Türkiye wants to preserve workable relations with Iran,” he explained. “This is not the moment for Ankara to become involved in direct confrontation with Tehran.”

Türkiye’s regional ambitions continue to expand

While dismissing the likelihood of Turkish support for military intervention, Dr. Noureddine acknowledged that Ankara’s regional ambitions have grown significantly over the past several years.

Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government, Türkiye substantially expanded its influence in Syria while maintaining an active military and political presence in Libya, Somalia, Qatar, and other regional theaters.

No state that accumulates power limits its ambitions to its own borders.

From Ankara’s perspective, Dr. Noureddine noted, the fall of the Assad government fundamentally altered Lebanon’s strategic environment. “When the Syrian regime collapsed, Türkiye effectively became Lebanon’s new regional neighbor through its influence in Syria.”

This explains why Lebanon has become increasingly relevant to Turkish strategic planning.

Does Türkiye seek influence inside Lebanon?

Despite Türkiye’s growing regional role, Dr. Noureddine rejected the idea that Ankara is on the verge of establishing significant political influence within Lebanon itself.

Although Türkiye possesses historical, cultural, and Ottoman-era connections, particularly in parts of northern Lebanon, he believed these factors alone are insufficient to build lasting influence. “Türkiye certainly aspires to expand its regional presence,” he said. “But aspirations alone do not automatically translate into influence.”

He argued that Lebanon’s domestic political landscape presents significant structural limitations. The Sunni community, traditionally viewed as the constituency most receptive to Turkish engagement, remains politically closer to Saudi Arabia than to Türkiye. “The overwhelming majority of Lebanon’s Sunni political establishment does not operate within Turkey’s sphere,” Dr. Noureddine explained. “It remains much more closely aligned with Saudi Arabia.”

Nor does he believe Ankara seeks to challenge Riyadh directly. “I do not think Türkiye even wants to compete with Saudi Arabia over Lebanon’s Sunni leadership,” he said. “That would unnecessarily create tensions with an important regional partner.”

Among Lebanon’s other sectarian communities, Turkish influence remains even more limited, particularly within the Shiite community.

Rather than cultivating direct influence inside Lebanon, Dr. Noureddine believed Ankara will rely primarily on its leverage in neighboring Syria. “Türkiye does not possess the domestic political foundations necessary for significant influence inside Lebanon,” he said. Instead, any Turkish impact is likely to emerge indirectly.

If Ankara wishes to influence Lebanese affairs, it will do so through its influence over Syria rather than through internal Lebanese political actors.

A visit shaped by regional upheaval

President Aoun’s visit follows an intense period of diplomatic activity. His recent meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, PM Nawaf Salam’s discussions in Türkiye, and Syria’s increasing engagement with regional and international actors all reflect a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.

For Lebanon, maintaining dialogue with Ankara has become increasingly important as Türkiye’s influence over post-Assad Syria continues to grow. While economic cooperation, infrastructure, energy, and security are expected to feature prominently during the discussions, Dr. Noureddine believed these subjects are secondary to a much larger strategic question.

The visit came immediately after Washington. Its central objective is to gauge the Turkish position on developments in the region, particularly in Lebanon.