Iran and Israel: The threat within

Despite decades of defining security primarily through external threats, the most serious challenge facing both Israel and Iran may now come from within.

In Tehran, the recent U.S-Iran negotiations and agreement has triggered an unprecedented public confrontation between supporters of diplomacy and hardline factions that view any compromise with Washington as a betrayal of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary principles.

In Israel, meanwhile, new polling suggests that most citizens no longer view Iran, Hamas, or external enemies as the primary threat. Instead, they fear growing polarization, social fragmentation, and the possibility of internal conflict; reviving fears witnessed prior to the 7 October 2023 attacks.

From here, after years of confrontation, military escalation, and mutual hostility, both Iran and Israel increasingly appear to be threatened less by one another than by their own internal divisions.

The post-Khamenei power struggle in Iran

The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2026 marked the end of an era and accelerated shifts that had been developing for years; most recently being in late 2025 and early 2026. Although Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei formally succeeded his father, the transition that followed strengthened the position of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose commanders emerged as some of the most influential actors within the political system.

The agreement with Washington exposed and deepened these internal divisions. While the state, led by so-called “moderates” such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, supported the deal as a pragmatic step to reduce tensions, ease economic pressure, and open a diplomatic channel, hardline factions condemned it as a strategic retreat. Conservative parliamentarians, IRGC-linked media outlets, and members of the Endurance Front (Jebhe-ye Paydari) coordinated a public campaign against the negotiations and the officials involved.

Araghchi and Ghalibaf became central targets of criticism, with demonstrations in Tehran, Mashhad, and other cities accusing them of undermining Iran’s strategic leverage and betraying national sacrifices. Some protesters questioned whether the agreement aligned with the principles of the new leadership, while others alleged that key details had been concealed from the public. Hardline lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian described the deal as a step toward turning Iran into “a colony of America,” while other conservatives argued it weakened Iran’s position in the Strait of Hormuz without securing meaningful sanctions relief or access to frozen assets.

In response, President Pezeshkian strongly defended the negotiating team, stressing that decisions on war and diplomacy are made collectively through the Supreme National Security Council, which includes all major state institutions, including the office of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. He warned against attempts to deepen internal divisions and criticized efforts to place partisan interests above official decision-making channels. While acknowledging legitimate criticism, he rejected attacks on officials acting under state authority, reflecting growing concerns that political disagreement over the agreement could escalate into a broader challenge to national cohesion.

Israel’s growing fear of internal division and of “two Israels”

Similar concerns are increasingly dominating political discourse in Israel.

A recent report by the Jewish People Policy Institute revealed that 55% of Israelis now view internal polarization as the greatest threat facing Israel, compared to only 23% who view the Iranian nuclear program as the primary danger. The findings indicate a significant shift in public perceptions of security, moving away from a traditional focus on external threats toward concerns found within Israeli society itself.

The report found that 6 out of 10 Israelis fear internal violence could eventually escalate into civil conflict. Confidence in the country’s future has also weakened among secular Israelis, with nearly half questioning whether Israel remains the safest and most desirable place for future generations.

Although overall optimism remains relatively high, the figures reveal a deep ideological divide. Right-wing Israelis reported optimism levels exceeding 9 points on a 10-point scale, while left-wing respondents recorded less than 4 points; the lowest level ever recorded. These numbers suggest not merely political disagreement but the emergence of two increasingly incompatible and divergent visions of Israel’s future.

Warnings about internal fragmentation are not new. For years, Israeli academics, former security officials, and political analysts have warned that the country is becoming divided into competing political, cultural, and ideological camps. The conflict over judicial reforms during the early 2020s intensified those concerns. Mass protests, accusations of authoritarianism, clashes between demonstrators and police, and growing hostility between rival political camps created fears that Israel was entering a period of profound constitutional and social crisis.

Former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin warned that Israel was approaching conditions historically associated with civil conflict. Other analysts described the emergence of “two Israels:” a largely secular, liberal, urban Israel and a more religious, nationalist, and conservative Israel.

The divisions extend beyond mere domestic politics. They increasingly involve disagreements over identity, religion, democracy, military service (especially regarding the exemption of Haredi Jews), the role of the judiciary, and even the fundamental character of Israel itself.

The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 remains a powerful reminder of how internal tensions can erupt into violence. Today, many Israelis fear that the social cohesion that once helped Tel Aviv navigate external wars is steadily eroding.

A shared strategic vulnerability

The comparison between Iran and Israel reveals a remarkable convergence.

Both remain militarily powerful, possess strong security institutions, and continue to view each other as major strategic adversaries. Yet in both, leaders increasingly find themselves confronting a different challenge: maintaining internal unity in deeply polarized societies.

In Iran, the struggle revolves around the balance between revolutionary ideology, economic necessity, and the growing influence of IRGC-linked power centers after Ali Khamenei’s death.

In Israel, it centers on competing visions of democracy, religion, national identity, and Tel Aviv’s future direction.

Hence, the most important lesson emerging is that nations are rarely weakened only by their enemies. More often, they are tested by the divisions that develop within. Today, both Iran and Israel appear to be confronting precisely that challenge.