Lebanon’s Sunni political landscape faces a potential shift as debates emerge over Iran’s influence, Turkey’s role, and state-centered politics.
Is Iran losing its last Sunni bridges in Lebanon?
On 10 March 2024, following the deaths of three members of the Fajr Forces, the military wing of the Islamic Group (Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya), in the Israeli airstrike on Hebbariyeh, the group held a funeral procession in Beirut, departing from Imam Ali Mosque in Tariq El Jdideh. The appearance of masked gunmen during the funeral sparked discontent among a segment of the area's residents and opened a broader debate about the position of the Islamic Group and its relationship with Iran's axis and Hezbollah.
The objection was not to Palestine or to opposing the Israeli occupation. The Palestinian cause has remained deeply rooted in the consciousness of Lebanon's Sunni community. However, attitudes toward regional wars have changed significantly since 7 May 2008, and later following the Syrian revolution and the intervention of Hezbollah and Iran in Syria. Large segments of the Sunni community have become more inclined toward the state and diplomacy and less willing to engage in wars that, over decades, have brought Lebanon nothing but further losses.
Within this context, one can understand the growing debate inside the Islamic Group over its political future, particularly the idea of separating religious outreach (da'wah) from political activity and reactivating the Reform and Development Party.
The idea is not new. The party project dates back to the 1990s, and there is a political document dating to 1999 before the name resurfaced in later years. Today, the project is primarily associated with figures such as the group's former Secretary-General, Azzam Al-Ayoubi, and former MP Imad Al-Hout.
What is taking place does not appear to be merely an organizational dispute. There is a clear divergence in political vision. The group's current leadership, headed by Mohammad Takkoush, has maintained a position more aligned with the Axis of Resistance, while the opposing current advocates greater independence from that axis and emphasizes the role of the state and its exclusive monopoly over arms.
Turkey emerges here as a key factor in understanding this shift. Communication with Turkey is not new, and Azzam Al-Ayoubi has previously spoken about the importance of drawing lessons from the Turkish experience. The difference today is that the region itself has changed: Iranian influence has receded on multiple fronts, Turkey has become a more prominent regional actor, and the balance of power in Syria has shifted.
According to information circulating about the project, the Reform and Development Party enjoys Turkish interest and endorsement. Should this interest develop into clear political support, it could provide significant momentum for the project and pave the way for broader alignment with Syria and Qatar.
More importantly, the model that Turkey could offer this current is not based solely on confronting Iran, but rather on a different formula for political Islam: one centered on the state, institutions, elections, the economy, and development, while avoiding the transformation of domestic arenas into permanent battlegrounds for regional conflicts.
This model may resonate with a segment of Lebanese Sunnis who wish to maintain their support for the Palestinian cause while also seeking a strong state, a productive economy, and an independent Lebanese decision-making process regarding war and peace.
From this perspective, the return of the Reform and Development Party may represent more than just a split within the Islamic Group. It may signal an attempt to redefine Sunni political Islam in Lebanon by separating religious outreach from politics and transforming the party into an independent political framework that contests elections and operates within state institutions.
However, the project's success will not be guaranteed simply by distancing itself from Iran or moving closer to Turkey. The Sunni community requires a clear vision on the economy, the state, weapons, relations with Syria, Palestine, and the broader Arab world.
Therefore, the real question is not merely: Who has left the Islamic Group? Rather, it is: Where are Lebanon's Sunnis heading?
If the Reform and Development Party succeeds in establishing itself, Lebanon may be witnessing the beginning of a transition by part of Sunni political Islam from the politics of regional axes to the politics of the state.
