Israel’s nuclear program

Israel’s obsession with nuclear weapons predated the Islamic revolution of Iran and what Netanyahu has dubbed for the last 30 years as an “existential threat” to Israel. It was Ben-Gurion’s advocacy and enthusiasm to protect Israel that allowed for the nuclear program to develop. In an interview with the Atomic Heritage Foundation in 2018, historian Avner Cohen revisits Israel’s nuclear trajectory. Amidst the current regional circumstances, assessing Israel’s self-proclaimed “need” to develop a bomb is required.

Israel was established in 1948 following the end of the British Mandate for Palestine, after which Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion quickly initiated efforts to develop a nuclear program. Viewing science and technology as central to the Zionist project, Ben-Gurion argued that mastery of atomic power could compensate for Israel’s geographic and demographic limitations, a belief later recalled by Shimon Peres. Early steps included a 1949 geological survey by the Israel Defense Forces in the Negev desert, which identified uranium traces in phosphate deposits, alongside the recruitment of leading scientists such as Ernst David Bergmann, who later chaired the Israel Atomic Energy Commission.

Israel’s pursuit of nuclear capability was also deeply influenced by the memory of the Holocaust, during which six million Jews were murdered by Nazi Germany. This historical trauma shaped strategic thinking among Israeli leaders, reinforcing the belief that the Jewish state must possess the means to deter existential threats. Historian Avner Cohen explained the relationship between the Israeli nuclear program and this legacy: “The commitment ‘never again’ means that to prevent another Auschwitz, we must be in position to threaten explicitly, implicitly, to have the capability to do what was done in Hiroshima. That will prevent or deter another Auschwitz.” Similarly, nuclear scientist Ernst David Bergmann argued that an Israeli bomb would guarantee “that we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter.”

The french helping hand

France soon emerged as Israel’s closest political ally during its early years. During the 1950s, the French nuclear program was in the process of building a sprawling complex of nuclear reactors. Chemist Bertrand Goldschmidt, the only Frenchman to work on the Manhattan Project in the United States, recalled a secret meeting in September 1956 when the two countries agreed on a deal to expand Israel’s “nuclear capacity.” Goldschmidt noted, however, the need for the Franco-Israeli agreement to remain a secret so the French would not be looked on unfavorably by the Arabs.

Although Franco-Israeli nuclear cooperation had already started by this point, the Suez Crisis, initiated by Abdel Nasser’s decision to nationalize the strait, was a turning point in France’s decision to assist Israel. France built 24-megawatt nuclear reactors for Israel in 1957. This was coupled with French assistance in building the Negev Nuclear Research Facility near Dimona. Historian Avner Cohen even claimed Israeli scientists were present during the French atomic test of 1960. 

Unnerving the US

American satellite imagery first identified the Dimona nuclear facility in 1958. U.S. intelligence had already suspected that Israel might be pursuing nuclear weapons, and a 1960 CIA assessment noted that “The secrecy and deception surrounding the undertaking [at Dimona] suggest that it is intended at least in part for the production of weapon-grade plutonium.” Washington was also aware of nuclear cooperation between Israel and France, though French authorities publicly rejected such allegations.

The JFK Administration started exerting pressure on Israel to prevent its attainment of a nuclear weapon, fearing this would push the Arab states closer to the Soviet orbit. Ben-Gurion assured JFK that Israel’s intention was not to “develop weapons capacity now” and allowed for American inspections. The Atomic Energy Commission concluded in its 1961 report that

the site was conceived as a means for gaining experience in construction of a nuclear facility which would prepare them for nuclear power in the long run and that American scientists were satisfied that nothing was concealed from them and that the reactor is of the scope and peaceful character previously described to the United States by representatives of the Government of Israel.

A second inspection in September 1962 affirmed that Dimona only had a research reactor and could not produce weapons-grade plutonium.

However, later accounts suggest that the inspections were largely superficial. Inspectors were barred from using their own equipment or collecting samples, and one recalled signs of freshly plastered and painted walls. In retrospect, it is evident that the United States significantly underestimated the scope of Israel’s nuclear program at the time.

When President Charles de Gaulle assumed office in 1958, French support for the Israeli program massively diminished. In 1963, Israel sought Argentina’s help secretly to purchase 100 tons of uranium ore or “yellowcake.” When the Americans found out and questioned the nature of the deal, the Israelis evaded the questions.

The U.S. turns a blind eye

Pinpointing the exact date that Israel had obtained a weapon remains a point of contestation due to lack of archival access. By 1969, the U.S. was advocating for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and was put in a precarious position regarding Israel’s nuclear development. Israel did not sign the NPT and opposed admitting the existence of its program.

On September 26, 1969, President Richard Nixon hosted Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir at the White House. Prior to the meeting, Nixon was briefed by the State Department that “Israel might very well now have a nuclear bomb” or “have the technical ability and material resources to produce weapons-grade uranium for a number of weapons.”

Avner Cohen proclaimed that the meeting concluded with “Israel would refrain [from] testing, would refrain keeping a high profile, would refrain announcement or declaration. In return, the United States would look the other way and would no longer press Israel to sign the NPT.” The arrangement benefited both parties: Israel avoided publicly disclosing its nuclear capabilities, while the United States was reassured that Israeli nuclear weapons would not destabilize the broader global balance of power.

Time to test it?

Although Israel has never publicly acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons, there were moments when its leadership reportedly considered demonstrating such capability. During the Six-Day War in June 1967, when Israel launched preemptive strikes against Egyptian forces, historian Avner Cohen suggests the country already had enough material for a rudimentary nuclear device. Israeli leaders reportedly contemplated a demonstration test as a last-resort deterrent if the war turned against them, though Israel ultimately achieved a decisive victory without resorting to such measures.

A similar discussion emerged during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. As Israeli forces initially struggled, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan reportedly proposed a nuclear “demonstration” to Prime Minister Golda Meir, who rejected the idea.

Unlike other nuclear powers, Israel has never conducted a confirmed nuclear test. However, speculation persists that the Vela Incident of 1979, when a U.S. satellite detected a double flash over the Indian Ocean, may have been a joint Israeli–South African test. Israel provided technical support for the South African nuclear program in exchange for a supply of yellowcake. Mathematician Leonard Weiss, staff director of the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation, was told not to report the incident. “I was told it would create a very serious foreign policy issue for the U.S., if I said it was a test,” recalled Weiss.

Someone had let something off that U.S. didn’t want anyone to know about.

Amimut

Regarding its nuclear program, Israel adopts a policy of opacity, or amimut. As Avner Cohen explained, “Amimut is the overall public trademark of Israel’s bargain with the bomb. It combines secrecy, ambiguity and taboo.” Its usefulness lies in preserving Israeli nuclear monopoly in the region and reducing the chance of other states following suit. Amimut has been ingrained in Israel’s political heritage and has never confirmed the existence of its weapons. It is important to note that in 1981, the UN passed resolution 487 urging Israel to “place its nuclear facilities under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency” but has yet to do so. The secrecy surrounding the program was challenged in 1986 when former technician Mordechai Vanunu revealed details and photographs from the Dimona facility to the British press. Israel subsequently convicted him of treason and espionage, sentencing him to 18 years in prison.

To this day, Amimut remains Israel’s strategy when asked about its nuclear arsenal. However, Israel’s ability to navigate geopolitical circumstances and acquire a bomb has given other states the blueprint for their own programs. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and of course Iran, have all toyed with the idea of building or purchasing a bomb. Therefore, when Israel sought to be the only nuclear power in the region, it opened the floodgates for nuclear proliferation in a region plagued with revisionist powers.