It doesn’t end with Iran

When Narendra Modi addressed the Knesset on February 26, 2026, the visit symbolized more than a diplomatic gesture between India and Israel. It revealed the contours of a shifting geopolitical landscape in the region. Standing alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Modi highlighted deepening strategic ties and emphasized cooperation through initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and the I2U2 framework, which includes India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States.

The symbolism of the moment extended far beyond economic collaboration. Netanyahu used the occasion to outline a broader geopolitical vision: a network of “like-minded” states that share Israel’s view of the region’s evolving threats. According to Netanyahu, this proposed alliance would include partners such as India, Greece, and Cyprus, along with several unnamed Arab, African, and Asian states, He described emerging coalition as countries that “see eye to eye” regarding regional challenges and the need to confront what he termed “radical axes.”

Netanyahu framed the proposed alliance as a response not only to the Iran-led “radical Shia axis” but also to what he described as an “emerging radical Sunni axis” without elaborating on the latter.

For decades, analysts relied heavily on the Shia–Sunni divide to explain the structure of Middle Eastern alliance. In this reductionist framework, Iran and its partners, particularly Hezbollah and other members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance”, were viewed as natural adversaries of Sunni Islamist movements. Yet the realities emerging from October 7th and subsequent regional confrontations suggest that this paradigm may no longer be sufficient.

The Muslim brotherhood and the region

Meanwhile, Washington has taken steps to reshape its own policy toward Islamist movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2025, U.S. Senator Ted Cruz introduced the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2025, proposing a comprehensive framework to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. The initiative reflects growing concern in parts of the U.S. political establishment that Brotherhood-linked networks may play a destabilizing role in regional conflicts.

In early 2026, the U.S. government moved further by designating several branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, including those in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, as terrorist organizations. The Lebanese branch received the additional classification of a Foreign Terrorist Organization, criminalizing material support to the group under U.S. law. The United States Department of State also designated the Sudanese branch of the Brotherhood as a terrorist entity in March 2026, citing its alleged involvement in the ongoing conflict in Sudan and links to Iranian networks.

This is leading to regional state actors being reassessed through a new perspective. Among them is Türkiye, which Israeli officials increasingly view with suspicion. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara has expanded its influence across multiple fronts, including Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia. Some Israeli analysts now describe Türkiye as a potential “new Iran,” suggesting that its regional ambitions could mirror Tehran’s long-standing strategy of projecting influence through political and military networks.

At the same time, Israel’s relationship with key Arab states remains uncertain. Prospects for normalization with Saudi Arabia, once considered the crown jewel of the U.S.-backed Abraham Accords, have dimmed significantly since the Gaza war. Riyadh has openly criticized Israeli policies, particularly regarding annexation moves in the West Bank and the lack of progress toward a two-state solution. Complicating matters further, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its strategic cooperation and defense coordination with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Such developments underscore the possibility that the region’s power balances may continue to shift in unexpected ways.

A power structure around Israel

Netanyahu’s vision of a “hexagonal alliance” reflects more than a security strategy. It is also an economic and geopolitical project designed to reposition Israel within emerging global trade routes. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, for example, aims to link India to Europe through Gulf infrastructure networks and Israeli ports, potentially transforming Israel into a key transit hub between Asia and Europe. Parallel efforts are underway in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel has deepened its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus in energy exploration, natural gas development, and maritime transport.

For Israel, the worry is no longer confined to Iran alone. Instead, it involves navigating a far more complex network of actors, rivalries, and partnerships that extend across continents. If Netanyahu’s proposed alliance materializes, it will mark an attempt to reshape the region’s balance of power for decades to come. Whether this “hexagon” of partnerships succeeds, however, will depend on forces that extend well beyond Israel’s traditional confrontation with Iran.

It doesn’t end with Iran

Israel’s growing military capabilities, expanding economic partnerships, and diplomatic outreach suggest that it is preparing for a changing regional security environment and a potential “post-Iran” scenario. As conflicts involving Iran and its allied networks remain central to Israeli strategic thinking, policymakers in Israel are also increasingly considering how the regional balance of power may evolve if the Iranian threat were to diminish or transform.

Some analysts argue that Israel is already positioning itself for this possibility. These discussions sometimes include movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the regional role of Türkiye under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While these actors are not currently at the center of Israel’s security agenda in the same way that Iran is, debates within policy and academic circles occasionally frame them as potential sources of future strategic competition.