Lebanon and Iraq face parallel struggles to assert state monopoly over arms, as entrenched militias, political integration, and regional influences complicate disarmament efforts, exposing the fragility of state sovereignty and the potential risks of escalation.
Lebanon and Iraq: Parallel struggles over disarmament
Lebanon and Iraq: Parallel struggles over disarmament
Across the Middle East, the question of who holds the legitimate right to use force remains central to state sovereignty. In both Lebanon and Iraq, this issue has crystallized into a shared disarmament dilemma: how to reconcile the authority of the state with the entrenched power of non-state armed factions.
Recent developments in Baghdad, including the attack on an Iraqi intelligence headquarters and the subsequent political fallout, have underscored the fragility of efforts to bring armed groups under state control. At the same time, Lebanon’s renewed push to establish a state monopoly of arms has revived a longstanding internal debate while resonating deeply within Iraqi political discourse. Together, these cases illustrate the structural, political, and regional complexities that hinder disarmament in fragmented states.
The Iraqi case: The presence of militant factions such as the PMF
The recent drone attack on Iraq’s intelligence headquarters marked a critical turning point in the relationship between the government and armed factions. Prime Minister (PM) Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s strong condemnation signaled a shift away from dialogue and toward a more confrontational stance. By stressing that decisions of war and peace must rest solely with the state, Sudani reaffirmed a fundamental principle of sovereignty. However, this assertion also exposed the limits of governmental authority in a system where armed groups operate with significant autonomy.
Iraq’s dilemma is rooted in the legacy of conflict and the institutionalization of militias in the post-2003 collapse of state authority following the United States-led invasion of Iraq; which enabled the rise of powerful non-state armed groups, many backed by Iran. These militias were later formalized under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in 2014 to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), gaining legitimacy, state funding, and deep political influence. While nominally integrated into the Iraqi state, many factions maintain independent command structures, ideological loyalty to Tehran, and significant military capacity outside full state control, thus posing a challenge to centralized governance. Efforts by successive governments, including those led by Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, to assert monopoly over arms have faced resistance due to the militias’ entrenched power, public support derived from anti-ISIS campaigns, and their role in regional geopolitics. For many factions, disarmament is not merely a technical issue but an existential one.
Moreover, attempts to negotiate disarmament have proven fragile. Sudani’s proposed solutions (integrating fighters into state institutions or transforming them into political entities) require sustained cooperation from actors who may perceive such measures as diminishing their influence. The recent escalation of attacks against state institutions and foreign interests demonstrates that some factions are unwilling to compromise, thereby complicating any path toward a unified security framework.
The Lebanese case: The Hezbollah question
Lebanon faces a strikingly similar challenge, albeit within a different historical and political context. Backed by Iran and closely linked to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah gradually evolved into a hybrid actor with both a powerful armed wing and significant political influence within the Lebanese state. Its military role was further enhanced after Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 and reinforced following the 2006 July War. Despite repeated international and domestic calls for disarmament, including United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701 (2006), efforts have stalled due to Hezbollah’s deterrence narrative, its integration into state institutions, and fears that forced disarmament could destabilize Lebanon’s fragile sectarian and political balance.
Recent developments, however, have intensified the urgency of the issue. Calls by the Lebanese leadership to restore the state’s exclusive authority over weapons reflect both domestic concerns and external pressures, especially as Hezbollah launched its support front for Iran. The Lebanese Armed Forces’ efforts to deploy in the south and limit the reconstitution of non-state military capabilities represent a concrete step toward this objective.
However, Hezbollah’s entrenched position as both a military and political actor as well as its lack of cooperation in this matter complicate these efforts. Like Iraqi militias, Hezbollah justifies its arsenal as necessary for national defense, particularly against Israel. This framing transforms the disarmament debate into a broader question of sovereignty and resistance, rather than a purely internal security matter. The group is also structurally and ideologically affiliated with Iran and its Islamic regime, thereby complicating efforts to achieve total disarmament and distancing the group from Tehran.
Shared structural challenges
Despite their differing contexts, Lebanon and Iraq face remarkably similar structural obstacles. In both countries, armed factions are deeply embedded within political systems and social networks. Disarmament, therefore, is not simply about collecting weapons; it entails redefining power structures, redistributing resources, rehabilitating members (especially from ideological indoctrination), and addressing the future of thousands of fighters and their constituencies.
Additionally, both states must contend with the influence of external actors, particularly Iran, which has played a significant role in supporting armed groups in each country. This external dimension transforms domestic disarmament efforts into regional issues, where local decisions are intertwined with broader strategic calculations. The level of embeddedness of the IRGC in Iraq’s militant factions and Lebanon’s Hezbollah has been profound, crystalized following the death of the group’s former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in 2024 and the current regional armed conflict.
Another common challenge lies in the framing of the debate itself. Proponents of disarmament stress the necessity of a unified state authority and preventing external interference in domestic affairs, while opponents recast the issue as one of resistance against foreign intervention. This divergence in narratives makes consensus difficult, as each side operates within a fundamentally different understanding of sovereignty.
The limits of dialogue and the risks of escalation
The breakdown of dialogue in Iraq following the intelligence headquarters attack highlights a critical risk: the transition from negotiation to confrontation. When armed groups directly challenge state institutions, the space for political compromise narrows significantly. Lebanon faces a similar threat, where any attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah could trigger internal conflict or undermine fragile state stability.
Both cases demonstrate that disarmament cannot be achieved solely through coercion or rhetoric. It requires a carefully calibrated approach that balances state-building with political inclusion and assertive measures. Without credible guarantees, incentives, and measures, armed factions are unlikely to relinquish their weapons voluntarily.
Hence, the recent escalation in Iraq underscores the fragility of dialogue-based approaches, while Lebanon’s ongoing debate illustrates the enduring difficulty of reconciling resistance narratives with state authority. Moving beyond this will require constructive dialogue, institutional reform, and restoring the primacy of the state.
