Lebanon left off the new Middle East map

Source: Nida Al Watan

After the closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the war against Iran, Gulf states rushed to search for alternatives in the western part of the Middle East. Lebanon was expected to be at the center of those plans, yet it was excluded for political reasons linked to the ongoing conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.

Lebanon’s absence from the energy maps and land corridor plans revealed by the United States was not accidental. It was the natural result of a U.S. vision that sees neighboring Syria as a new transit point and an overland alternative for oil, gas, and goods after the shutdown of Hormuz.

The region is being redrawn around Lebanon

The region is being logistically redesigned around Lebanon, not through it.

While Lebanon remains consumed by debates over the format of negotiations with Israel, whether direct or indirect, and even the sectarian identity of negotiators, plans are being discussed for the ports of Baniyas Port and Tartus Port, the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline, the Qatar-Turkey gas route, the Arab Gas Pipeline, and even rail links between Saudi Arabia and Turkey through Syria.

Amid all this, Lebanon is absent from the picture, except for a brief and vague mention of a possible future extension of the Kirkuk-Baniyas line through Tripoli.

A four-part regional plan

This absence is not incidental. It is deeply political.

The American framework views Syria as the only viable land route connecting Iraq and the Gulf on one side with Turkey and the European Union on the other, linking economic viability with geopolitical security amid disruptions in Hormuz and the Red Sea.

- The plan reportedly includes four main pillars:

- Reviving the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil line

- Relaunching the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline

- Activating the Azerbaijan-Aleppo gas route

- Extending the Arab Gas Pipeline toward Turkey and Europe

It also includes a Syrian energy rehabilitation program between 2026 and 2030.

Even when Lebanon is mentioned, it appears only as a later extension possibility rather than a core partner in this new energy architecture.

Syria’s energy revival in three stages

The plan for Syria’s energy sector unfolds in three phases from 2026 to 2030.

Phase One: Low-cost well maintenance and basic infrastructure repairs aimed at increasing production by around 45,000 barrels per day, alongside higher gas output through Saudi-backed technical agreements.

Phase Two: Between 2027 and 2028, the second phase includes water injection systems, artificial lift technologies, pipeline rehabilitation, modernization of the Homs Refinery and Baniyas refineries, plus a new refinery with capacity of 150,000 barrels per day.

Phase Three: From 2028 to 2030, full field redevelopment, offshore exploration infrastructure, and a gas export route to Turkey and Europe could restore production to around 380,000 barrels per day or more.

$4.5 billion corridors

At the center of the transport plan is the revival of the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline stretching from Kirkuk through Syria to the Mediterranean, at a cost of around $4.5 billion over 36 months.

Its capacity could reach 1.5 million barrels per day through two new lines, with discussion of a future extension to Tripoli port.

Alongside it is the return of the Qatar-Turkey gas route linking the Gulf to Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and then Europe as part of a strategy to diversify beyond Russian supply.

Also highlighted is the Azerbaijan-Kilis-Aleppo gas route, already operational, feeding Aleppo’s power station, with possible extension southward toward Homs near Lebanon’s northeast border.

Lebanon loses its geographic advantage

The harshest reality is this: a country with a long Mediterranean coastline facing Europe, with the ports of Beirut and Tripoli, and a natural position linking East and West, is no longer viewed internationally as a reliable corridor or stable platform.

Major trade routes do not look only for geography. They look for guarantees.

It is no longer enough to have a port. A country must also offer:

- A single sovereign decision-making authority

- Secure borders

- Manageable military risk

- A state able to provide long-term guarantees to investors, insurers, and operators

These are precisely the elements Lebanon lacks today.

Hezbollah’s weapons as Lebanon’s constraint

The conflict tied to Hezbollah’s weapons has become a direct factor behind Lebanon’s exclusion.

As long as decisions of war and peace remain outside full state control, and as long as southern Lebanon remains an open confrontation zone with Israel, Lebanon is viewed by investors and corridor planners as a risk project, not a transit project.

That is why international plans increasingly prefer routes through Syria and Turkey, despite their own complexities, rather than betting on Lebanon.

The cost of missing the moment

The irony is that Lebanon could have been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the redrawing of energy maps in the Eastern Mediterranean and wider Arab region.

Tripoli port was historically a logical western outlet for Iraqi oil lines to the Mediterranean. Beirut port, despite the scars of the explosion, still holds major commercial weight.

The loss is not only transit fees, shipping revenue, or storage business.

It is something deeper: the loss of a chance to build a new economic identity after the 2019 collapse.

Lebanon has spent years searching for a new model beyond its broken rentier economy. Its coastline, ports, and logistics sector could have formed part of that future through services, energy, transport, insurance, maintenance, and regional finance.

Instead, the opposite is happening.

The Middle East is rebuilding its corridors. Lebanon, meanwhile, is moving backward and being pushed to the margins while the unresolved question of weapons and sovereignty continues to define its future.