Lebanon–Syria: 40 agreements under review

More than 40 legacy agreements are being reassessed as Beirut and Damascus seek to revive trade that has fallen to about $250mn a year and turn their 375km border into a more effective commercial corridor to Jordan and the Gulf. But before talk of “billions” can become reality, the two neighbors must tackle tariffs, transit bottlenecks and a legal framework largely inherited from the 1990s.

The announcements made in July 2026 generated considerable optimism but also confusion.

Lebanon and Syria have not signed 40 new multibillion-dollar contracts. Instead, they have begun reviewing more than 40 existing agreements, protocols and memorandums, most of them concluded under Syria’s former regime, to determine which should be retained, amended, replaced or scrapped.

The full list has not yet been made public. Nor have the two governments released a detailed timetable or firm financial commitments.

For decades, Lebanon and Syria have shared far more than a border. Agricultural produce, manufactured goods, travelers and capital moved in both directions, while Lebanese exporters relied on Syrian roads to reach Jordan, Iraq and Gulf markets.

Yet in recent years, that geographic proximity has failed to translate into an economic relationship commensurate with the potential of the two countries.

Bilateral trade, which once approached $800mn a year, fell to about $250mn in 2025. Lebanon’s economy and trade minister, Amer Bisat, has said he believes the figure should eventually be measured in the billions of dollars, although no formal target or deadline has been set.

Forty new agreements? Not quite

The figure “40” has sometimes been interpreted as the announcement of a sweeping new package of deals.

In reality, the exercise concerns more than 40 existing bilateral agreements, protocols and memorandums negotiated with Syria during the Assad era.

A commission established in early July 2026 is expected to review those texts over the coming months. Its task is to identify which agreements remain relevant, which have become obsolete and which need to be rewritten to reflect the new political, commercial and regulatory environment.

A broader trade agreement could come at a later stage and may take considerably longer to negotiate.

The legal architecture dates back to the 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination, registered with the United Nations, followed by economic and social co-operation agreements and subsequent trade arrangements.

Lebanon’s economy ministry has also referred to a free-trade agreement that entered into force in 1994, covering economic, social, health and agricultural co-operation as well as the movement of goods and people. A 1998 agreement also envisaged the gradual reduction of duties on industrial products.

What sectors are actually covered?

The information made public so far allows several broad areas to be identified, although the 40 texts have not yet been disclosed one by one.

1. Trade and customs duties

The immediate priority is to reduce barriers to the movement of goods.

One of the key distortions highlighted by Bisat is the apparent lack of symmetry in duties applied to exporters. Lebanese operators may face certain export or transit charges that are not always mirrored for Syrian businesses.

Any revised trade framework will therefore need to address tariff harmonization and introduce greater reciprocity.

That matters because the economics of cross-border trade can quickly be undermined by uneven charges. A Lebanese producer may have a geographical advantage, but that advantage disappears if customs costs make the final product uncompetitive.

2. Transport and overland transit

Lebanon shares a 375km border with Syria. For Lebanese exporters, the Syrian road network remains the natural overland route to Jordan and Gulf markets.

The review is therefore expected to cover border crossings, customs procedures, waiting times, transit fees, recognition of documents and truck movements.

For example, a Lebanese food producer shipping canned goods to Riyadh could save several days if customs checks were digitized and mutually recognized. By contrast, slow procedures or unpredictable transit charges can wipe out Lebanon’s geographic advantage over maritime shipping.

Transport reform is therefore not a peripheral issue. It is central to whether the broader economic relationship can actually scale.

3. Investment

Some of the older agreements include frameworks for investment protection and promotion. Their revision is likely to focus on investor guarantees, licensing procedures, the transfer of profits, dispute resolution and the sectors open to private capital.

Reuters has reported that investment arrangements are among the areas being reviewed.

Syrian authorities have also referred to plans for closer institutional partnerships, new investment initiatives and agreements between chambers of commerce and industry.

For investors, however, the key question will be whether the revised framework offers legal certainty rather than simply political intent.

4. Taxation

Tax arrangements are also under review. This could involve avoiding double taxation, clarifying the tax treatment of companies operating in both countries and making fiscal charges more predictable. No new tax schedule or rates have yet been officially published.

That means taxation remains one of the most important unresolved elements of the process. Businesses will want clarity on where profits are taxed, whether tax credits are recognized across the border and how disputes will be handled.

5. Visas and business mobility

Both governments have said they want to facilitate business travel and simplify procedures for entrepreneurs.

Possible areas include business visas, length of stay, work permits and border-crossing rules.

The principle is clear: closer commercial ties require easier movement of executives, investors and technical staff.

But the practical rules have yet to be negotiated.

6. Product standards and mutual recognition

Another important area is the harmonization of commercial standards. This could include health certificates, product conformity, packaging, labelling, quality control and mutual recognition of laboratory testing. For Lebanese agricultural and food producers, clear and predictable rules could reduce rejected shipments, repeated inspections and administrative costs. Official talks have also referred to improved data-sharing, the creation of specialized centers for collecting and analyzing information, and better mechanisms for measuring economic performance.

Tourism is also part of the equation

The discussions are not limited to goods and logistics. Officials have also raised the prospect of investment in historic Syrian hotels, the restoration of heritage buildings, their conversion into tourism infrastructure, co-operation in hospitality and the creation of joint travel itineraries between the two countries.

In theory, a route combining Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, Damascus and Syrian heritage sites could appeal to visitors seeking a broader regional experience.

But such a model would depend on more than tourism marketing. It would require predictable security conditions, smooth border procedures, travel insurance and functioning payment mechanisms.

Without those elements, the opportunity remains largely conceptual.

How much money has actually been announced?

For now, no bilateral investment fund, quantified project pipeline or binding multibillion-dollar investment package has been announced.

The only figures made public concern historic and current trade flows:

nearly $800mn at their previous peak, about $250mn in 2025 and a political ambition to raise bilateral trade eventually to “several billion dollars”.

That last figure is an aspiration, not an official forecast or contractual commitment.

The distinction matters.

Headlines about “billions” can create the impression that financing has already been secured. It has not.

For the process to move from diplomacy to economics, Lebanon and Syria will still need to clarify or publish: the list of agreements under review, which texts will be retained, amended or cancelled, new customs duties, transit rules, investor protections, implementation timelines, dispute-resolution mechanisms;

and the institutions responsible for enforcement and follow-up.

Until then, the “40 agreements” remain a potentially significant diplomatic and economic reset but not yet an operational economic program.

The opportunity is real. So is the gap between political ambition and commercial execution.

For Lebanese businesses in particular, the outcome will depend less on the number of agreements than on whether the revised rules lower costs, improve access, create legal certainty and make cross-border trade genuinely easier.