Lebanon’s Army at the crossroads

After the Lebanese civil war, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) underwent reconstruction and redeployment within the political constraints of the post-Taif order and Syria’s military dominance. External support was limited, focusing on basic training, low-intensity equipment, and institutional continuity rather than modernization. France and the US were key partners, providing officer training, military education exchanges, modest materiel support in the form of International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. This exposed Lebanese officers to U.S. doctrine but offering minimal material assistance, shaped by concerns over Hezbollah and regional escalation. Syrian influence meant most aid was largely symbolic, preventing full monopolization of security.

However, since 2005, aid to the LAF became a strategy to counter Hezbollah’s influence. Post the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war, the U.S. became the primary external supporter investing over $3 billion in training, equipment, and institutional capacity-building (U.S. Department of State, 2025). The Gulf states attempted a similar strategy when in December 2013, Saudi Arabia pledged a $3 billion grant to enable the LAF to purchase French military equipment (Reuters, 2015). However, the grant was suspended in 2016 amid deteriorating Saudi–Lebanese relations, highlighting the political conditionality of Gulf military assistance. The latter incident showcases the conditionality of Gulf aid to the LAF.

Despite the suspension of large Gulf packages, Western assistance continued throughout the late 2010s with an emphasis on border security, counterterrorism, and cooperation with UNIFIL. The goal was to frame the LAF as a partner in regional stability and migration control.

The post 2019 crisis situation

Lebanon’s financial collapse after 2019 prompted a qualitative shift in international support. Rather than focusing solely on equipment and training, donors increasingly prioritized sustaining the army’s basic functioning. In this context, the United States redirected portions of its military assistance to support soldiers’ salaries and living expenses, working in partnership with UNDP to prevent institutional collapse (U.S. Embassy in Beirut, 2023). This approach reflected growing concern that economic deterioration could undermine the LAF’s cohesion and neutrality. By 2023–2025, international support to the LAF became explicitly tied to crisis management and ceasefire stabilization, particularly in southern Lebanon. In parallel, Qatar provided direct financial aid and vehicles to the LAF, positioning itself as a key Arab supporter during Lebanon’s economic crisis (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2025).

US support to the LAF: A heated American debate

In January 2023, the United States redirected $72 million in aid to Lebanon to support the salaries of Lebanese soldiers and police, many of whom struggled amid the country’s economic collapse. This decision, delayed for over two years, reflected not only legal ambiguities surrounding such aid but also the influence of voices both inside and outside the US government opposing further support to the LAF (Saab, 2023). This episode illustrates how US military assistance, despite longstanding commitment, remains susceptible to domestic political debates.

Critics of US support to the LAF often conflate overall US policy toward Lebanon with military assistance specifically. While US policy toward Lebanon has faced multiple challenges, military aid to the LAF over the past 15 years has largely succeeded in enhancing the army’s cohesion and operational capabilities (Saab, 2023). The inability of the LAF to contain Hezbollah, secure borders, or enforce UNSC resolutions reflects Lebanon’s dysfunctional political system rather than the failure of US assistance. The LAF operates under civilian guidance and requires cabinet approval, and its effectiveness depends on political support, which is often absent in Lebanon’s fragmented governance.

Success should therefore be measured by improvements in military effectiveness rather than the achievement of broad policy objectives, which require Lebanese government consensus (Saab, 2023). Evidence from key battles, such as Fajr al-Jouroud, demonstrate the impact of US support where the LAF emerged as a professional and capable force, reflecting the tangible results of sustained military support.

US support and the ambition of disarmament

The US’s 2026 National Defense Authorization Act demanded that the Secretary of Defense and the head of US Central Command must submit by June 30, 2026 a report that includes a “rubric for assessing the progress of the Lebanese Armed Forces in disarming Hezbollah, and options for suspending assistance to the Lebanese armed forces if it is determined that such forces are unwilling to act to disarm Hezbollah”. These statements suggest that Western aid to the LAF is undeniably tied to political conditions, the primary one being the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Sources indicate that the Paris meeting to support the LAF will be held on the evenings of the 17th and 18th to continue discussions on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, and on the Lebanese government’s commitment to disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River. Furthermore, it might indicate the commitment of the LAF to disarming Hezbollah north of the river. It also noted that the meeting will address economic and financial reforms as well as parliamentary elections.

What does this continued support represent?

What does sustained external support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) signify? On the one hand, such support has prevented the total collapse of the army amid the chronic absence of meaningful backing from successive dysfunctional governments. The continued presence of the LAF has helped avert the re-emergence of a nationwide civil war. Nevertheless, internal security remains fragile, with turf wars and episodes of communal violence persisting across the country.

At the same time, this external support has produced a structural dependency. The LAF has become increasingly reliant on foreign assistance to the extent that it lacks the capacity to act independently or to formulate and implement a coherent national defense strategy. The need to comply with the political constraints of external backers, combined with domestic political paralysis, has confined the army largely to the role of maintaining internal cohesion rather than exercising full sovereign authority.

The current political environment highlights this dilemma. The LAF finds itself in a precarious position in which it risks either losing vital external support or becoming entangled in internal conflict. This strategic bind limits its room for maneuver at a moment of significant regional and domestic flux.

The weakening of Hezbollah has nevertheless created an opening for the army to extend its presence across Lebanese territory, particularly in the south. The LAF has established approximately 200 posts south of the Litani River, operates 29 fixed checkpoints, and conducts round-the-clock patrols. It has reportedly seized 566 rocket launchers, neutralized 177 tunnels, and closed 11 crossings (Jaber, 2025). This deployment marks a notable shift, as the army is now stationed in areas where Hezbollah had previously exercised largely uncontested dominance.

However, the LAF’s inability to respond to Israeli military actions is increasingly undermining its credibility, especially among southern communities in urgent need of security guarantees. These constituencies are precisely those the army must win over to consolidate its authority. Yet without the capacity to deter or meaningfully respond to Israeli aggression, the LAF risks being perceived as present but powerless, thereby weakening its claim to being the primary guarantor of national security.