Lebanon’s diplomatic moment with Israel

The prospect of direct talks between Lebanon and Israel marks a significant development in the bitter history that has characterized their bilateral relations. For the first time in over 4 decades, both parties appear poised to engage in direct dialogue (through high-ranking diplomats), mediated by the United States (U.S.), despite the persistence of military hostilities on the ground (most notably in southern Lebanon).

Although Lebanon’s and Israel’s ambassadors to Washington (Nada Hamadeh Moawad and Yechiel Leiter, respectively) held their first ever phone call with the U.S. Ambassador to Beirut, Michel Issa, as means of opening a channel, and agreed to meet today at the U.S. Department of State (D.O.S.), their discussions will namely be centered around the possibility of announcing a ceasefire and potentially arranging a preliminary framework that could, if conditions permit, lead to direct negotiations.

The success, or failure, of potential negotiations will depend on Lebanon’s ability to clearly define its national priorities, maintain internal cohesion, and resist pressures to relinquish its interests or succumb to unwanted ends. In doing so, Lebanon faces both a historic opportunity and a structural challenge in asserting itself as a sovereign negotiating actor.

Fundamental legal nuances and diverging endgames

As soon as it became evident that Lebanese and Israeli diplomats would conduct direct talks in Washington, D.C., actors across Lebanon’s political spectrum highlighted one central concern: the prospect of concluding a formal peace agreement and achieving normalization with Israel. However, in the study of International Relations (I.R.), there exist key differences between the following conflated concepts, as each represents a distinct phase in conflict resolution:

Ceasefire/Armistice Agreement: While truces or cessations of hostilities are typically provisional and non-binding, a ceasefire constitutes a temporary, formal, and binding agreement to suspend a given armed conflict. Meanwhile, an armistice (which falls within the military and technical domains) entails a more comprehensive and enduring halt of military operations between the belligerent parties, often accompanied by agreed terms regulating the pause in hostilities. However, neither of these settlements end the state of war permanently or establish peace, but rather merely pause the conflict and may serve as a crucial bridge toward comprehensive peace talks.

Examples: The General Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel (1949), the Korean Armistice Agreement (1953), and the Minsk I and Minsk II Agreements (2014-2015).

Peace Agreement: A peace agreement (which involves not only military and technical aspects, but rather a political and diplomatic one as well) is a formal treaty between warring parties that officially terminates the state of war between the aforementioned belligerents. It is designed to resolve underlying issues fueling the enmity, aiming for long-term peace and stability.

Examples: The Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979), the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty (1994), and the Good Friday Agreement (1998).

Normalization: Normalization represents an even more advanced stage in conflict resolution, implying not only the absence of war and conflict (such as the case in a peace agreement), but also establishing (or restoring if previously existed) full diplomatic, political, economic, and social relations between former adversaries.

Examples: The U.S.-China Normalization Communiqué (1979), the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979), the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty (1994), the Abraham Accords (2020-2021).

In today’s context, Lebanon and Israel appear to be pursuing fundamentally different objectives. Israeli officials, including Prime Minister (P.M.) Benjamin Netanyahu, have insisted that Tuesday’s discussions aim to advance the disarmament of Hezbollah as well as the conclusion of a peace agreement and normalization with Beirut. Conversely, Lebanese leadership, led by President Joseph Aoun, has framed the talks as narrowly focused on securing an immediate ceasefire and opening the door to future, unspecified negotiations. These divergent endgames risk generating friction that could undermine the diplomatic process altogether.

The signing of the General Armistice Agreement, on 24 February 1949 on the Greek island of Rhodes, between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. This agreement marked the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and established the armistice demarcation lines between Israel and neighboring Arab countries (known as the “Green Line” or the “1949 Armistice Line”).

From foreign tutelage to autonomy: Lebanon negotiates for itself

A noteworthy dimension regarding the current talks with Israel is Lebanon’s posture at the negotiating table. For the first time in decades, Lebanon has effectively assumed the initiative to negotiate on its own behalf, especially as the country’s leaders refused to link its own fate to that of Tehran within the framework of the U.S.-Iran negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Historically, Beirut’s foreign policy was, ab initio, deeply constrained by Syrian influence under the Assad regime (1970-2024). Following the collapse of the “17 May Agreement” in 1983, Damascus enforced a policy of “unity of track and fate,” effectively preventing Beirut from pursuing separate peace arrangements with Tel Aviv by insisting they move in tandem. This ensured Syria’s exploitation of the “Lebanese card,” which was used as leverage over both Israel and the U.S. to advance its own strategic interests (including the recovery of the Golan Heights).

This approach was explicitly reiterated by former Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Farouk al-Sharaa, in 1999, as he affirmed that

Syria will not sign a peace agreement with Israel until Lebanon signs a peace agreement with Israel, and Lebanon will not sign a peace agreement unless Syria signs a peace agreement as well. This means that the two tracks are interdependent, as are the separate negotiations, the withdrawals, and the signing of the peace agreements.

In contrast, following the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, the decline of the Axis of Resistance’s previously dominant role in Lebanon, and the emergence of a new presidency and cabinet (seemingly more aligned with Western and Gulf orientations), the country is no longer subject to Syrian tutelage, at least in principle, and thus possesses a greater capacity to act as an independent actor as well as articulate its own negotiating position.

Foundations of Lebanon’s negotiating posture and approach

Regardless of what outcomes today’s initial meeting will yield, Lebanon must carefully calibrate and navigate its foreign policy in a manner that safeguards in sovereignty, security, stability, and internal cohesion.

Aside from resolving outstanding bilateral disputes (including land border demarcation), it is imperative that Lebanon insists, first and foremost, on the restoration of its full sovereignty and territorial integrity; which is indeed twofold.

On the one hand, the country’s negotiators must secure a total ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (I.D.F.) from all occupied Lebanese territories (be it during the 2023-2024 or the current 2026 armed conflicts); as for the disputed status of the Shebaa Farms, Kfarchouba Hills, and Nkheileh village, the issue remains contingent upon a Lebanese-Syrian settlement beforehand. This, along with demanding the permanent cessation of all Israeli violations (across land, air, and sea), is crucial to remove the “resistance” argument, build meaningful trust (including abolishing any indications of potential expansionist aspirations in southern Lebanon, through the so-called “Greater Israel” project), and ensure Lebanon’s territorial integrity (which is considered as a foundational principle of statehood in international law that should not be compromised). Consider the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979), for instance. In exchange for Cairo’s recognition of Israel and its security concerns, the latter was compelled to withdraw its forces and dismantle its established settlements in the Sinai Peninsula; a process which was completed by April 1982, in accordance with the aforementioned treaty’s provisions.

On the other hand, Lebanon must simultaneously address the issue of the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The disarmament of Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups constitutes not only an international obligation (enshrined, inter alia, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006), but also a fundamental Lebanese national demand (formally reflected in the decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers on 5 and 7 August 2025 as well as on 2 March 2026). Thus, resolving this matter is essential as a sign of good faith and as a means of consolidating state authority across all of the country’s territories. After all, Lebanon’s representatives cannot credibly negotiate over matters their country possesses no effective control. This would weaken the negotiating team’s bargaining hand and undermine any effort to build the mutual trust required for any meaningful diplomatic breakthrough.

Furthermore, Lebanon could consider leveraging U.S. mediation, in a manner consistent with its national interests and legal framework. Washington holds considerable influence over Israel, which allows it not only to facilitate negotiations but also provide necessary guarantees; including ensuring Tel Aviv’s withdrawal and bringing the two parties to common grounds. For instance, following the failure of U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy between Egypt and Israel in 1975 regarding concluding a second interim agreement (later known as Sinai II), as Tel Aviv was perceived to have been reluctant and not as forthcoming as Cairo, U.S. President Gerald Ford called for a reassessment of his country’s policy towards Israel (entailing a pause in crucial arms sales). The reassessment contributed to a more flexible Israeli position in the negotiations, leading to an interim deal. Given that Israel’s northern front remains its central and last security concern along its borders, Washington could well view the facilitation of a Lebanese-Israeli agreement as essential to its broader regional strategy (based on expanding the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords and ensuring Israel’s security).

Finally, the success of any negotiation depends on internal consensus. Lebanon’s diverse political factions must rally around a unified negotiating position to ensure both legitimacy and durability. Fragmentation weakens a state’s bargaining power and increases the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes. Given that significant segments of the Christian, Sunni, and Druze communities expressed no reservations for negotiating with Israel and potentially securing an agreement (based on the preservation of national sovereignty and interests), it thus comes down to the Amal Movement led by Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri. In light of the political weight and legitimacy that Berri holds amongst his constituencies (namely Shiite), his stance (which remains somewhat ambiguous, to the public at the very least) remains pivotal to ensure that all of the country’s factions are represented in any possible negotiations and agreement.

Hence, whether this moment evolves into a limited de-escalatory arrangement or, subject to significant legal and political conditions, a broader diplomatic process depend on the strategic choices that both parties, Lebanon and Israel, choose to make. For as Dr. Albert Einstein once said,

Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding.