Lebanon’s fragile political dance

What is unfolding in Lebanon today increasingly resembles a series of political role-playing exercises, though it is essential to distinguish two dynamics that follow different logics.

On one side, President Joseph Aoun and the Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese Army, Rodolphe Haykal, appear to be moving, despite certain differences in method, in the same strategic direction: implementing the state’s international commitments while avoiding a harsh confrontation that could destabilize the country. On the other side, Nabih Berri, joined to a lesser extent by Walid Joumblatt and Gebran Bassil, seems to play a more political role, maintaining a space for dialogue, or even a form of coverage, around Hezbollah to manage this transition.

This distinction lies at the heart of Lebanon’s current political balance. While all actors participate, each in their own way, in the same political sequence, their objectives are not necessarily identical, nor are their methods. This mechanism is not new. For years, Lebanese power has operated according to implicit balances, where each actor assumes a role that absorbs tensions without causing a frontal rupture.

However, recent developments in the indirect negotiations between Lebanese and Israeli delegations in Washington appear to have accelerated this dynamic. Under dual American and Saudi pressure, Joseph Aoun seems to have been forced to take a step he had carefully avoided for nearly fifteen months: initiating the implementation of the agreed roadmap while remaining cautious to avoid direct confrontation with Hezbollah.

From this moment, the division of roles becomes more visible. Joseph Aoun seems to gradually take on the state’s international commitments, while Nabih Berri occupies the political and media space to maintain a permanent communication channel with Hezbollah and reassure his environment. This is not a new role: for decades, the Speaker of Parliament has been the preferred interlocutor during transitions or crises involving the Shiite party.

The positioning of the Army Commander, however, follows a different logic. Despite some methodological or managerial differences with the President, the two appear aligned in a strategic direction: preserving stability, avoiding premature confrontation, and allowing the military institution to support political decisions when required. Recent events illustrate this approach: the army intervened to contain incidents while preventing escalation, projecting the image of an institution intent on maintaining order without appearing as a direct actor against Hezbollah.

This supposed complementarity between the Presidency and the Army does not follow the same logic as Nabih Berri’s positioning. Berri appears to operate in a political register aimed at maintaining a protective and negotiating space around Hezbollah, similar to the long-standing strategy of Walid Joumblatt: supporting regional developments while keeping channels open to preserve influence under any circumstance. To a lesser extent, some observers note that Gebran Bassil adopts a position that, without being identical, contributes to maintaining political coverage around Hezbollah for his own reasons.

This occasional convergence of positions has led some critics to speak of an informal “quadripartite alliance.” While debated, it reflects the growing perception that several leaders are simultaneously attempting to manage a transition while avoiding a harsh rupture with Hezbollah.

Ultimately, this division of roles reflects a persistent reality: despite Hezbollah’s military setbacks and regional upheavals, some state institutions continue to evaluate the group’s disruptive potential and the risks a direct confrontation could pose to internal stability. Each player seems to be performing a different part, with a shared objective: manage an inevitable evolution without triggering internal explosion.

Yet this mechanism remains extremely fragile. It relies on the assumption that negotiation margins still exist and that international partners will accept a Lebanese-paced process. If Washington increases pressure or if Lebanese-Israeli negotiations fail due to a challenge from Hezbollah or its allies, all these precautions could quickly become irrelevant. A resurgence of conflict remains a scenario that cannot be ruled out.

This role-playing has long allowed time to be gained, balances to be preserved, and appearances maintained. But the context has changed. Power relations are no longer the same, red lines have been redrawn, and international expectations are now explicit. The cards are on the table. What worked yesterday no longer works. The game has become too visible to remain credible.