Lebanon’s history of postponed elections

In any functioning democracy, elections are not a procedural luxury. They are the core mechanism through which authority is renewed, accountability is enforced, and political legitimacy is maintained. When elections are postponed - whether for weeks, months, or years - the very principle of democratic rotation of power is placed under strain. Lebanon’s parliamentary history from 1923 to the present offers a revealing case study of how and why a legislature extends its own mandate - and what that means for the health of democratic life.

As Lebanon once again faces debates over the electoral law and concerns about potential delays to the 2026 parliamentary elections, it is essential to look back at the historical record. Since the establishment of Lebanon’s parliamentary life under the French Mandate, the country has witnessed repeated extensions of parliamentary terms. Some occurred under the exceptional pressures of civil war and political assassination. Others reflected political deadlock and an inability - or unwillingness - to agree on the rules of electoral competition.

The fundamental hypothesis remains clear: in a true democracy, postponing elections is either an extraordinary measure justified by overwhelming force majeure, or it is a reflection of resistance to political change.

Political institutions and democratic legitimacy

Political institutions - legislatures, executives, courts, and political parties - form the structural backbone of modern states. In parliamentary systems such as Lebanon’s, the legislature is not merely a law-making body. It is the central arena of representation, mediation, and accountability. Its legitimacy depends on periodic elections through which citizens renew or withdraw their consent.

Democracy presupposes alternation in power. Without elections at regular constitutional intervals, political authority risks becoming self-perpetuating. The postponement of elections interrupts the mechanism of renewal and weakens the relationship between citizens and their representatives.

Lebanon’s parliamentary system, rooted in the 1926 Constitution, functions within a Consociational framework. Its political institutions have historically been mostly shaped by regional pressures, and geopolitical entanglements. These factors have often influenced whether elections could take place on time.

The long war: Eight extensions (1976–1992)

The most dramatic chapter in Lebanon’s history of parliamentary extensions occurred during the so called Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). With the outbreak of armed conflict on 13 April 1975, the country entered a prolonged period of territorial fragmentation and institutional paralysis. Nationwide elections became practically impossible.

Between 1976 and 1989, Parliament extended its own mandate eight times.

- First extension (Law 1/76, 13 March 1976): Extended the mandate until 30 June 1978 - two years and two months.

- Second extension (Law 3/78, 20 February 1978): Extended until 30 June 1980 - two additional years.

- Third extension (Law 14/80, 2 June 1980): Extended until 30 June 1983 - three years.

- Fourth extension (Law 9/83, 21 May 1983): Extended until 31 December 1984 - one year and six months.

- Fifth extension (Law 3/84, 22 June 1984): Extended until 31 December 1986 - two years.

- Sixth extension (Law 11/86, 11 February 1986): Extended until 31 December 1988 - two years.

- Seventh extension (Law 52/87, 22 December 1987): Extended until 31 December 1990 - two years.

- Eighth extension (Law 1/89, 7 December 1989): Extended until 31 December 1994 - four years, later shortened.

The eighth extension was later shortened when parliamentary elections were held in 1992, ending the extended mandate on 15 October 1992.

On the surface, these extensions were justified. A country at war cannot organize credible national elections. Yet the consequences were profound. A political class remained in office without electoral accountability for nearly two decades.

Even more critically, the 1992 elections themselves did not represent a full restoration of democratic sovereignty. They were conducted under Syrian military and political dominance. Syrian forces had entered Lebanon in 1976 and remained throughout the war and after the Taif Agreement of 1989. The post-war political order was structured within the framework of Syrian tutelage.

The 1992 parliamentary elections were therefore the first post-war elections - but not the first free post-war elections. They took place under Syrian occupation and heavy Syrian influence over candidate lists, alliances, and electoral engineering. The legitimacy of representation remained contested.

This distinction is crucial. The mere occurrence of elections does not automatically guarantee democratic freedom. Elections held under foreign tutelage limit genuine political competition and the autonomy of voter choice.

The 2005 crisis: A Twenty-day extension

The ninth extension came under dramatically different circumstances. On 14 February 2005, former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated. The country entered a period of profound instability that ultimately led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces.

On 28 April 2005, Law 676 extended Parliament’s mandate until 20 June 2005 - a brief twenty-day delay. Compared to wartime extensions, this postponement was limited and explicitly justified by extraordinary security conditions.

Nevertheless, it highlighted a recurring pattern: when crisis strikes, the first institutional reflex is delay rather than immediate recourse to the electorate.

2013–2017: Deadlock, Extensions, and Regional Hegemony

The next major constitutional crisis came in 2013. With the expiry of the legislature’s term approaching, Parliament once again failed to agree on an electoral law. The result was two sequential extensions:

- 31 May 2013: Parliament extended its mandate by 17 months until November 2014.

- 5 November 2014: A second extension followed, adding roughly two years and seven months, postponing elections until June 2017.

Unlike the civil war era, Lebanon was not in full-scale conflict. The state remained institutionally intact. Instead, the deadlock stemmed from political disagreement—especially over the electoral law and presidential vacancy—and, importantly, from the influence of regional powers through their Lebanese proxies.

At the heart of this political paralysis was the hegemonic role of Iran through Hezbollah and its allied political blocs.

Hezbollah, a powerful political and military actor backed by Iran, had by this time become central to Lebanese power-sharing arrangements. Its alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and other pro-Iran blocs, anchored by memoranda such as the 2006 Mar Mikhael Agreement, gave it decisive leverage in Lebanese politics.

Iran’s influence in Lebanon has been long-documented, with Tehran maintaining diplomatic and political networks and using Hezbollah as its principal vehicle for exerting power. The Syrian Civil War—beginning in 2011—deepened this dynamic. Hezbollah’s participation in the fighting in support of the Assad regime reinforced its military credentials and bolstered its political weight domestically.

These factors contributed directly to the 2013 electoral deadlock:

- Political polarization: March 8 (pro-Hezbollah/Iran) and March 14 coalitions could not agree on a new electoral law due to competing visions for representation and power distribution.

- Hezbollah’s strategic veto: With parliamentary blocs shaped by Iran’s backing, any electoral reform threatening Hezbollah’s political dominance was blocked or diluted.

- Security concerns tied to regional conflict: Lebanon’s northern and eastern regions experienced rising tension linked to spillover from Syria, which political actors cited to justify delaying elections.

The outcome was an extended legislature with no electoral renewal for nearly four years (2013–2017). The political deadlock was less about technical procedural issues and more about deep structural competition influenced by regional power alignments, particularly Iran’s indirect influence through Hezbollah.

The 2026 debate: Diaspora voting and institutional risk

Today, Lebanon once again faces tension surrounding the electoral law, particularly regarding diaspora voting. Article 112 of the current law reserves six parliamentary seats for expatriates. Some political forces support maintaining this formula. Others demand a return to the 2018 and 2022 framework, which allowed expatriates to vote in their original districts as if they were physically present.

On the surface, this is a legal dispute. At its core, it is a political struggle over representation, demographic influence, and power balance.

If no compromise is reached, the risk of postponement re-emerges.