Lebanon’s schizophrenia

Lebanon has long existed in two forms: a Lebanon of war and a Lebanon of peace. It is a nation marked by an unresolved duality a chronic political disorder immune to speeches and impervious to successive governments.

The reality is clear: this is not a matter of ordinary political disagreement, but a form of national schizophrenia reflected in fragmented state institutions, a compromised sovereign decision-making structure, and a security and economic landscape moving along parallel tracks that never intersect a formal state attempting to enforce the rule of law, and another authority operating beyond it.

In Lebanon, investment and development plans may be announced in the morning, while fighter jets thunder over the southern border by evening. Economic conferences may open in Beirut with diplomatic protocol, even as major international actors continue to treat Lebanon as a suspended security case rather than a fully functioning state.

This is not simply a paradox; it is an accurate portrayal of a political model that avoids decisive choices, survives on the brink, and has perfected the logic of operating in the grey zone neither fully at war nor genuinely at peace.

The central question remains:
Which Lebanon do we truly belong to?

The Lebanon striving toward a viable future, or the Lebanon trapped in a past that refuses to recede?

The analysis begins here with the recognition that this is not a temporary crisis, but a structurally fragmented system that stabilizes only through disorder, functions only under pressure, and halts only at the point of collapse.

This paradox is no longer superficial. While official discourse speaks of economic committees, investment opportunities and renewed cooperation, meetings scheduled for the Army Commander in Washington were canceled in a clear message that American support is conditional and the next phase will not resemble the one before it.

Beirut one the first test of Lebanon’s return to the investment map

The Beirut One conference was launched under the patronage of President Joseph Aoun, initiated by Economy Minister Amer Bissat and the Economic, Social and Environmental Council headed by Charles Arbid. This conference marks a critical signal  perhaps the most meaningful to date that Lebanon is attempting a return to the regional investment landscape. The launch of Beirut One by the Minister of Economy is not a ceremonial gesture nor a passing announcement, but a deliberate and strategic step toward establishing a practical reform framework capable of repositioning Lebanon at the negotiation table. The message is clear: Lebanon must no longer be perceived solely as a crisis file, but as a potential opportunity contingent on political will, institutional accountability, and transparent governance.

Beyond its economic positioning, Beirut One carries an intangible but significant social impact. Its announcement has resonated visibly among youth and across Lebanese public sentiment, reviving a notion many feared had been lost that Lebanon still belongs to its Arab environment, culturally and economically, and remains capable of rebuilding relevance within it. For many, the initiative signals more than investment prospects: it signals possibility, dignity, and the restoration of meaning in a country fatigued by collapse.

The value of this initiative lies precisely in that shift. It reintroduces a vision of Lebanon rooted in productivity, openness, and regional integration a Lebanon citizens can once again identify with, aspire to, and take pride in. This is the model that requires collective alignment, protection, and continuity not as a slogan, but as a sustained policy direction.

The conference is being presented as the first platform of its scale since the financial collapse six years ago, not to announce ready-made projects but to reassert that Lebanon remains investable if reforms and transparent regulatory frameworks are put in place. Its official theme, Restored Confidence, reflects an attempt to gradually reinsert Lebanon into the consideration of regional and international investors. Yet this economic ambition now unfolds alongside a complex political scene intensified by the latest dispute between the Lebanese Army and Washington following the cancelation of the Army Commander’s scheduled visit to the United States. The development signals that the military is no longer viewed as the reassuring institutional exception but as part of a broader file requiring explicit alignment and defined choices.

Washington redraws the rules

Since 2007, the relationship between the Lebanese Army and the United States has formed a central pillar of Lebanon’s institutional balance. American support has not only been technical but also political, based on the assumption that the Lebanese Armed Forces remain the only institution outside internal political alignments. Today, the cancelation of official meetings indicates that Washington seeks to redefine the arrangement: support in exchange for alignment, not support in exchange for neutrality.

Sources in the United States confirm that the decision reflects a high level of dissatisfaction within the administration of President Donald Trump, while ambiguity remains over whether the cancelation is final or a calculated pressure tactic. In parallel, Senator Lindsey Graham criticized the Army Commander’s position, describing it as a major setback to efforts aimed at reshaping Lebanon’s regional role. The picture became clearer when the Lebanese Embassy in Washington issued an official notice postponing the planned reception to an unspecified date, a move described by diplomatic sources as unusual and revealing the depth of official confusion.

The South a calm hanging by a drone

Alongside diplomatic pressure, developments on the ground in southern Lebanon are accelerating. Israeli drones, intermittent strikes, targeted precision operations against Hezbollah members and low-altitude overflights reaching Beirut’s southern suburbs reflect a gradual return to pre-war dynamics but within calculated boundaries.

United Nations and international reports have documented more than seven thousand aerial violations and two thousand four hundred military activities within one year, confirming that the current ceasefire resembles a gray truce more than a stable agreement. Even UNIFIL has not been exempt, as Israel’s firing on one of its units from territory under its control signals that rules of engagement are shifting slowly.

A final chapter open in two directions

The situation today is no longer economic, security or political in isolation. It is a compressed intersection of all three.

- The state seeks investments.

- Washington is redefining the boundaries of military and political support.

- The south is witnessing gradual escalation leading either to negotiation or confrontation.

The question is no longer where Lebanon is heading, but rather whether Lebanon will be allowed to choose its direction or whether the next stage will determine its position rather than negotiate it.

Today, Lebanon seems to exist in two separate timelines: one speaking the language of conferences, investment incentives and rebuilding confidence, and another written through drones, strikes and sharp political messages. Between these two narratives, the outlines of Lebanon’s future are quietly taking shape.