Muslim Brotherhood influence declining among Arabs

A new in-depth assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood finds an organisation struggling to operate as a global force and coming under increased pressure in the Arab world. So much so, that the brotherhood has been forced to change its mode of operation, becoming more decentralised. However, in a digital environment, this might yet prove advantageous. Therefore, the MB is not yet a spent force.

The UAE based thinktank Trends Research and Advisory launched two initiatives together on 8 February 2026. They are the Artificial Intelligence for Interfaith Dialogue alliance alongside the release of the 2025 Muslim Brotherhood Power Index (MBIPI). This unique index measures the group’s weight and influence around the world. The reason for combining these two services is, Trends claims, to show that combatting the MB requires more than just a security-based approach.

In a statement, Trends emphasises the need to diagnose “the paths of influence of political Islamist groups with the presentation of cognitive and ethical alternatives that employ artificial intelligence to promote dialogue and tolerance and to confront polarisation and extremism”. In other words, counter-narratives, often faith-based, added to the power of AI can generate a strategy for combatting MB propaganda.

The index paints a mixed picture for the Muslim Brotherhood with weakening support in the Arab world, especially compared to the Arab Spring over a decade ago. In 2021, using several criteria, the index rated the MB’s overall power at 64% (strong) but that has reduced to 47.3% (moderate) today.

The criteria for determining these figures include economic power, media power, societal power, and political power. Each of the criteria are divided into sub-categories. So, political power drills down into elements like participation in government, presence in opposition, legitimacy, and regional strength.

Worryingly for the MB, the index reveals that its centralised, hierarchical organisation is falling apart, meaning it now operates as a “fragmented network of branches, initiatives, and civil institutions”. Also, its highest levels of power in society are felt in the Americas (84.3%) and Asia (83.2%), way ahead of Arab countries.

The decline in the MB’s influence in the Middle East is attributed by Trends to structural fragmentation in Egypt and Turkey; declining political and financial support from one-time friends; and increased legal and security scrutiny. The latter has turned the MB’s once stronger international links into a hazard. Far better to have different parts of the MB being ignorant of their respective operations if a member is questioned by law enforcement or security agencies.

The index report observes:

As its organisational centre has weakened, the MB has adopted new survival strategies focused on social and media influence rather than direct political engagement.

In country after country, there has been bad news for the MB. In Tunisia, Ennahda has “experienced a steep decline” since President Kais Saied took power. Morocco saw the Justice and Development party suffer a significant electoral defeat. MB-affiliated movements in Syria and Iraq “remain in a state of prolonged organisational and political erosion”. But when the index undertakes a geographical analysis of the MB’s power indicators, the Americas come first at the organisation’s top location today with Asia second and the Arab world trailing after both Europe and Africa.

The shift to both North and South America reflects growing preaching and educational projects as well as using civil society tools and religious media to legitimise itself. Interestingly, the United States administration has just designated the MB’s chapters in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan as Foreign Terrorist Organisations. While within the US, the states of Florida and Texas have moved to designate one civil society group as a terrorist organisation over its alleged links to the MB.

Professor Magnus Ranstorp is a globally recognised expert on terrorism. He was the first academic to map the links between Hezbollah and international terrorism as well as its strategic relationships with Iran and Syria. He has observed the MB’s declining influence in Europe, noting that policy makers are no longer engaging with MB-linked actors while the French have exposed and challenged MB’s claimed “gatekeeper” role within Muslim civil society. He tells The Beiruter:

In countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, MB-affiliated organizations have lost public funding and faced tighter oversight under counter-extremism and transparency frameworks. At the same time, internal fragmentation, financial constraints, and generational shifts among European Muslims — who increasingly prefer decentralized, issue-based activism — have further weakened the movement’s influence.

But he warns that rather than disappearing, the MB is “restructuring and reorienting itself, adopting a lower profile and more cautious posture in order to preserve its remaining institutional foothold in Europe”. Nevertheless, despite the setbacks, Europe now ranks above the Arab world in terms of MB’s influence.

Rashad Ali is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. He has given evidence to the UK parliament on Islamist-inspired extremism and is the author of Islam, Shariah, and the Far Right.

Rashad points out that the MB has struggled for relevance in Lebanon as a global Sunni Muslim movement in a country where the Shia militant group Hezbollah overshadows them. “It is a kind of joke among analysts, and even those who are supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, who say things like: ‘there’s an MB in Lebanon?’”

However, they do exist with their Lebanese franchise, al-Jāmiyyah al-Islaīyyah, holding one seat in parliament. “They have in the past sought legitimacy among other Islamists through saying that they would and do cooperate with Hamas in Lebanon”, but Rashad adds that this has so far failed to result in anything meaningful.

The MB’s trend towards decentralisation is having unintended consequences, according to Rashad Ali: “MB’s politics, and political context, often means it can be at loggerheads with itself, its sister organisations and even other factions, and sympathisers.”

One headache for the MB is the growing rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Turkey and Qatar on the other. This has been to the detriment of MB interests.

So, what can one conclude from the index’s findings? There is clearly a shift from the Arab world to western and Asian regions where it might be easier for the MB to operate, through civil society, but does this give the organisation the political authority it craves?

Long criticised by other Islamists for being too abstract and intellectual, it risks starting to look like a discussion group and not a serious political force. However, it should never, even in times of distress, be underestimated. This is a period of transition for an organisation with a chameleon-like talent for adapting to a changing environment. The MB is bruised but not yet knocked out.