Lebanon’s gold reserves could help address the deposit crisis, but a reported proposal to tie their use to South Lebanon reconstruction raises questions about political influence, public accountability and depositors’ rights.
Political blackmail shifts to gold reserves… Recovery of deposits in exchange for reconstruction of the South?
Political blackmail shifts to gold reserves… Recovery of deposits in exchange for reconstruction of the South?
Source: Nida Al Watan
Ongoing discussions on addressing the deposit crisis are moving toward opening an extremely sensitive issue concerning how to benefit from the gold reserves held by Banque du Liban (BDL). The danger lies in attempts by some within the government to bring this wealth into political bargaining by linking an amendment to Law No. 42, which has prohibited the disposal of gold since 1986, to the allocation of part of its value to finance the reconstruction of southern Lebanon and its infrastructure. This is a trade-off that can only be regarded as a form of political blackmail, particularly when depositors’ rights become hostage to conditions imposed by political forces, foremost among them Hezbollah, under the banner of reconstruction.
Information circulating about the ongoing discussions indicates that some parties are moving toward adopting a clear formula: if the objective is to approve a legislative amendment allowing Banque du Liban to use part of its gold holdings and convert them into income-generating financial assets, thereby contributing to securing the liquidity needed to repay deposits, then approval of this amendment must be accompanied by allocating another portion of the gold’s value to finance the reconstruction of the South. Some individuals following these discussions even report having heard Hezbollah MPs propose a more specific condition: allocating $15 billion from the value of the gold to reconstruct the South in exchange for approving the law that would allow gold to be used to address the deposit crisis.
These developments mean that we are facing a dangerous precedent in the management of public funds and national wealth, as a strategic asset owned by the country's central bank is being treated as though it were property available for political distribution, or a fund from which shares can be deducted to satisfy the demands of influential political forces, while the rights of hundreds of thousands of depositors have remained suspended for more than seven years.
What is even more dangerous about this approach is that it attempts to portray the reconstruction of the South as though it were a special political right that can be imposed through a legislative trade-off. The people of the South have the right to demand reconstruction, but no political party has the right to turn this obligation into a bargaining tool to obtain a share of the Lebanese people's wealth, nor to force the rest of the Lebanese population to finance the state's obligations by deducting assets that are supposed to be used within the framework of addressing the financial collapse.
In this context, it is necessary to recall that Banque du Liban has clarified its position regarding its gold reserves, confirming that the legislative framework currently in force, particularly the law issued in 1986, imposes explicit restrictions on the use or disposal of gold. Consequently, these reserves cannot be considered an available financial resource that can be liquidated or automatically included in the current restructuring plan.
However, Banque du Liban does not rule out, in principle, the possibility of a future scenario, conditional upon obtaining the necessary legislative authorization, that would allow part of its gold holdings to be converted into income-generating financial assets, such as long-term US Treasury bonds. In this case, the returns that could result from such an arrangement must be allocated exclusively to covering Banque du Liban's share of the obligations it owes to depositors, not to repaying state debts or financing its projects, nor to covering the obligations of commercial banks.
This is precisely where the danger of the political proposal currently being discussed lies. The proposal does not stop at demanding an amendment to the 1986 law, but goes beyond that by attempting to impose a specific use for part of the returns, fundamentally undermining the very purpose that could justify any legislative amendment, namely contributing to the recovery of depositors' rights. How can the Lebanese people be convinced that the objective of opening the gold reserves file is to find an additional resource to address the deposit crisis if the first political condition raised in return is the deduction of $15 billion from the value of this wealth to finance reconstruction?
Equally dangerous is the fact that this proposal comes at a time when a preliminary framework is being discussed to repay up to $100,000 to each depositor, based on the total value of their deposits across all banks, rather than for each account separately. According to the proposed framework, this ceiling is expected to cover approximately 90% of depositors, with their entitlements to be repaid over four years, after deducting payments they have already received under Circulars 158 and 166, estimated at around $2 billion, in order to prevent double counting. As for the remaining obligations within this ceiling, they are expected to be repaid over five to six years through regular monthly installments.
These figures reflect the scale of the financial effort required to secure the liquidity necessary to return deposits and confirm that every resource capable of contributing to this process must be subject to one criterion: protecting depositors' rights. It is not logical to discuss providing liquidity to depositors while, at the same time, demands are being made to deduct billions of dollars from the country's gold wealth to finance other purposes.
Furthermore, the question that those behind this proposal must answer is: Why should the gold reserves bear the cost of reconstructing the South? And is it acceptable for reconstruction to become a pretext for relieving the state of its responsibilities, or a means of imposing the priorities of one political party at the expense of depositors' rights?
A state that spends public money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects is required to ensure transparency, oversight, and accountability, particularly in a country that has accumulated bitter experiences with waste and corruption in public contracts and deals over the decades. Allocating billions of dollars to projects that are not subject to a clear plan and strict oversight mechanisms opens the door to additional risks, especially if these funds are treated as a political share rather than national resources that must be spent according to public priorities and standards.
Ultimately, gold must not become hostage to a trade-off between depositors' rights and the demands of political forces. Anyone seeking to amend the 1986 law must make clear to the Lebanese people that the objective is to protect and invest this wealth, within strict legislative and institutional safeguards, to generate revenues that contribute to fulfilling Banque du Liban's obligations toward depositors. As for linking this amendment to the allocation of $15 billion for reconstruction, this would effectively turn the deposit crisis into an opportunity to impose political conditions on the state, placing depositors before an unjust equation: either accept the trade-off or continue to be deprived of their rights.
The reconstruction of the South is a national duty once the war ends and the state implements its decision to establish the exclusive possession of weapons. However, gold, which represents one of the most important remaining forms of national wealth, must not be turned into political spoils distributed according to the balance of power. Depositors' rights are not a bargaining chip, and gold is not the property of a party or sect to be divided and distributed among political and sectarian strongholds as though it were the spoils of war.
