Ports, not warships, will decide the Red Sea’s next balance of power

In recent years, the Red Sea has been characterized primarily by missiles, proxy actions, and Western naval task forces. However, the decisive struggle is not currently unfolding only on radar screens. The real struggle is being waged in port concessions, reconstruction deals, and logistics corridors, which directly influence regional stability and power balances. This is also increasingly linked to the quiet alignment of coastal states and hinterland powers. While the region’s military theatre is real, its commercial infrastructure is the strategic center of gravity and the main target at present. In the Red Sea arena, the real decisive power lies with whoever controls the quays, cranes, customs regimes, and onward corridors. This will be more durable than whoever sails the biggest frigate.

In recent months, this argument, once seen as provocative, has shifted as the geo-economic contest is now intersecting with the Sudan war and the Horn of Africa’s scramble for Red Sea access. The whole maritime role of the Red Sea is no longer simply that of a corridor. It has become a major platform for coalition-building, punishment, and proxy competition. This reconfiguration impacts regional stability, making the audience consider the broader consequences of these shifts. In recent weeks, it has also become clear that this reconfiguration is accelerating, as the Saudi-UAE rivalry widens, while Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are seen to be inching toward pragmatic coordination. The latter is sometimes in the open, but mostly through “technical” cooperation, which is anything but technical.

Let's start with the “perceived” axis of friction: Saudi Arabia versus the UAE.

For years, potential frictions between the two Gulf powers have been framed as a family dispute, particularly regarding Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed.

Most of this was managed behind closed doors and clearly diluted by shared interests. This has now changed, as it has become structural, particularly in ports and logistics. Riyadh, as presented in Vision 2030, clearly seeks to internalize value chains while reconfiguring Gulf trade flows. As indicated in Vision 2030, the Kingdom’s logistics strategy focuses on Jeddah’s expansion, Red Sea industrial zones, and measures designed to attract cargo, capital, and headquarters away from Dubai’s ecosystem and Abu Dhabi’s influence. Abu Dhabi and Dubai are currently not only supporting but also defending a decades-old model linked to DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports. These two have established global terminal networks, used sovereign capital, and currently play the role of “indispensable middleman” across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. This situation, or strategy, is no longer complementary, as the Kingdom and the Emirates are facing competitive overlap that is increasingly spilling into regional alignments.

The most critical arena for this competition or strategic divergence is seen in Sudan, which has become the sharp edge of this rivalry. This conflict is largely because the ports there are not merely assets; they have become strategic veto points over access to the Red Sea. The powers in Khartoum have been pulled into the Gulf contest. Sudanese leaders have already stated publicly that Saudi companies have priority in reconstruction and investment. This move by Khartoum positions Riyadh as a preferred partner, which is of importance in the power shift. It should be assessed because this comes at a time when Sudan accuses the UAE of backing the RSF. For Sudan, it is no longer about money; it is about choosing another anchor patron for the post-war state. For the Red Sea power constellation, this choice also means Khartoum is choosing who gets to shape the Red Sea’s western shoreline. Ethiopia's role as a key regional player seeking Red Sea access further underscores the strategic stakes for the audience to consider.

Port Sudan with cargo ships and cranes

Sudan’s war has also shifted the overall position and meaning of ports. Port Sudan is no longer a commercial outlet, but at present, Khartoum’s regime’s lifeline. The port has become a strategic logistics node, while offering potential leverage for external backers. At the same time, the war’s drone dimension has introduced another point. Modern conflict is no longer built on naval supremacy to destabilize maritime trade. The Sudan situation shows that only sufficient disruption inland is needed to render a coastal node politically fragile and vulnerable to coercion.  

At the same time, we must include Ethiopia, which is the Horn’s largest demographic and military weight, and the most relentless seeker of Red Sea access. The Ethiopian regime’s ambitions are currently not only colliding with Somalia/Somaliland tensions, Eritrea’s sensitivities, but increasingly with the Gulf’s competitive courtship. In recent days, numerous reports have been published about Saudi overtures to Ethiopia, which are assessed as part of a broader Gulf rivalry. If successful, Riyadh could be pulling Addis closer to blunt rivals’ influence. The Kingdom could also stabilize (or shape) the Horn’s coastal politics at the same time. While the Saudi moves are important, it should be noted that media reports indicate that Ethiopia is hosting training for Sudan’s RSF at a camp near the Sudanese border. The Horn is not only a theatre adjacent to the Red Sea but also has been operationalized as a rear area for Gulf-linked proxy logistics.

The pivotal center of this reconfiguration is ports and corridors, which have become the currency of alignment. The Kingdom is currently positioning itself as the “order builder” around the Red Sea. Riyadh’s strategy is to use maritime security language on top and reconstruction finance underneath. Ports and logistics are central to this strategy, shaping regional influence and security. At present, the UAE is being pushed into a defensive posture, primarily by reframing its port footprint as a geopolitical intrusion rather than as a measure of commercial efficiency. Egypt, the region's principal military power, is seen as exploiting this moment. Cairo is not doing this by competing dollar-for-dollar, but by weaponizing geography: Suez, the Sinai gateway, and its strategic and military capacity to shape the terms of access among the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the African hinterland.

Aerial image of the Suez Canal with container ships transiting

Now this is where the Egypt–Turkey–Saudi dynamic matters. It should not be assessed as a neat alliance, but as a converging set of practical interests. Cairo and Ankara, for years clear antagonists across the Eastern Mediterranean, are now establishing transactional cooperation. The overall logic behind this is clear and simple. Ankara’s strategy is based on the accessibility of routes and markets, as well as leverage. Cairo is considering investment, industrial participation, and diversification of external backers. Egypt, also, which should never be forgotten, wants to keep the Suez/Sinai strategic monopoly intact. For all these factors and interests, the Red Sea is the meeting ground. It is the arena where logistics meets security. It is also the place where infrastructure investments can be packaged as “stability.” It should also be understood that technical port-sector coordination can be read as strategic signaling. Look at the recent publicized engagement between the Saudi Ports Authority (Mawani) and the Suez Canal Authority on enhancing maritime connectivity. This has been framed as integration, but it signals that Riyadh and Cairo are tightening the institutional architecture of the Red Sea trade system.

To be clear, when port authorities coordinate, they are not merely sharing best practices. The main targets will be to shape routing preferences, investment pipelines, and the political economy of transit. For all parties in and around the Red Sea corridor, where risk premiums can double on a headline, actors able to promise smooth clearance, hinterland links, and political backing are the ones that will receive flows and leverage.  This leverage is precisely what Riyadh seeks as it seeks to reduce dependence on UAE hubs. Egypt, at the same time, wants it as well, as it reinforces its position as the region’s gatekeeper.

For another party in the Red Sea arena, Israel, all this port-centric reconfiguration is not benign.

The country is already facing a narrow and strategically exposed Red Sea access. It could now face a Red Sea governance model that is an “Arab coastal state” arrangement.

If that is becoming reality, Israel’s room for unilateral corridor leverage tightens. The Cairo-Riyadh-Ankara convergence reduces Israel’s optionality by consolidating decision-making around transit, port preferences, and security narratives. This is strategically a threat, as Israel will no longer be in control.

For European shipping and Brussels, the changes will have a significant impact. It will need to assess that the choice of port also becomes political. As Saudi-UAE rivalry could harden, and Sudan’s reconstruction politics become a battleground, shipping and terminal operators will be nudged to align.

At the same time, there could also be fallout from all of this in the Eastern Mediterranean. Increased competition among the above players will affect East Med offshore cooperation, security arrangements, and port investments. Greece, Cyprus, and Lebanon (or even Syria) could face new security and investment instability in the coming months and years. Red Sea conflicts could also spread to the Levant and Southern Europe. The Red Sea rivalry should be seen as a contest over who sets the rules of regional trade and volumes.

The next balance of power will be decided by who owns the quays, controls the corridors, and writes the operating system of trade from Suez to the Horn. In the Red Sea arena, ports are not background infrastructure; they have become instruments of statecraft.