Rising Sudan-Ethiopia tensions alarm the Horn of Africa

Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia have entered one of their most volatile phases in decades, amid escalating political accusations, military deployments along their shared frontier, and growing fears that the conflict could evolve into a broader regional confrontation in the Horn of Africa. What began as mutual allegations of support for rival armed factions has rapidly expanded into a crisis involving accusations of drone warfare, cross-border interference, and the possible emergence of proxy conflicts stretching across one of Africa’s most fragile regions.

The latest tensions come at a particularly dangerous moment for Sudan, which remains engulfed in a devastating civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Ethiopia continues to grapple with internal unrest in several regions, including Amhara and Tigray.

Accusations over drone attacks

The current crisis intensified after the Sudanese government accused Ethiopia of allowing its territory to be used as a launch platform for drones operated by the RSF. Sudanese military officials alleged that attacks targeting Khartoum airport and other strategic sites originated from Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar airport, claiming to possess evidence tracing the drone flights back to Ethiopian territory.

Khartoum also accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of supplying the drones used in the attacks, further internationalizing the dispute. Ethiopia firmly rejected the accusations, describing them as baseless and politically motivated.

The accusations triggered a sharp diplomatic response. Sudan recalled its ambassador to Addis Ababa for consultations and warned that it reserved the right to respond “in kind” to any external aggression. Although Sudan has not officially severed diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, the recall of the ambassador marked one of the strongest signals of deteriorating bilateral relations in years.

The dispute gained further international attention after comments by former United States (U.S.) diplomat and Horn of Africa expert Cameron Hudson, who warned that Sudan was deploying additional forces near the Ethiopian border and that the diplomatic relationship between the two countries was rapidly deteriorating.

Ethiopia’s counteraccusations

Addis Ababa responded with accusations of its own, claiming that Sudan was supporting hostile armed groups operating inside Ethiopia, particularly elements associated with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Ethiopia alleged that Sudan had provided financial and logistical support to anti-government forces and facilitated cross-border operations targeting Ethiopian territory.

The TPLF denied the allegations, calling them irresponsible and warning that escalating rhetoric risked worsening instability across the region. Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s claims reflected growing mistrust between the two governments and reinforced fears that both countries may increasingly rely on proxy actors rather than direct confrontation.

The exchange of accusations has transformed the Sudan-Ethiopia dispute from a traditional border disagreement into a broader geopolitical contest involving armed groups, regional alliances, and competing security interests.

Military buildup along the border

The current crisis has already produced visible military consequences. Sudanese army units and allied armed groups have reportedly increased readiness levels in eastern Sudan, particularly in Gedaref, Blue Nile, Kassala, and Sennar states bordering Ethiopia.

Sudanese military commanders conducted field inspections near the frontier, while allied formations announced heightened alert status and redeployments. Statements from Sudanese divisions emphasized preparedness for “potential threats” and the protection of national sovereignty.

Observers fear that these troop movements, even if intended primarily as deterrence, increase the likelihood of unintended clashes or limited border skirmishes.

At the same time, the RSF continues to intensify drone warfare inside Sudan. RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, recently declared that his forces were prepared to continue fighting for years if necessary, underscoring the entrenched nature of Sudan’s internal war.

A long history of rivalry and suspicion

Although the latest escalation appears sudden, tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia are rooted in decades of rivalry, intervention, and unresolved disputes.

Historically, both countries have supported opposition groups operating against one another. Ethiopia played influential mediation roles during Sudan’s civil wars and hosted Sudanese opposition factions at different stages, including groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang.

Sudan, meanwhile, also intervened in Ethiopian affairs during periods of instability. Former Sudanese officials have openly acknowledged supporting Ethiopian rebel movements during the collapse of the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in the early 1990s.

Relations deteriorated sharply following the 1995 assassination attempt against former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa during an Organization of African Unity summit. Ethiopia and Egypt accused the Sudanese government under Omar al-Bashir of involvement, allegations Khartoum denied.

More recently, the disputed border region of al-Fashqa has remained a major source of friction. The fertile agricultural area became a flashpoint in 2020 after Sudanese forces redeployed there and reclaimed territory long occupied by Ethiopian militias and farmers. Ethiopia viewed the move as an opportunistic attempt to exploit Addis Ababa’s preoccupation with the Tigray conflict.

Proxy war fears in the Horn of Africa

Many analysts believe the greatest danger lies not in a conventional war between Sudan and Ethiopia, but in the gradual emergence of overlapping proxy conflicts. Indeed, the long and porous border could become a battleground for militias, insurgent factions, and regional actors seeking influence.

The involvement of armed groups in Blue Nile, Tigray, Amhara, and Benishangul-Gumuz highlights the interconnected nature of security crises across the Horn of Africa. The possibility that rival governments may support insurgencies against one another threatens to deepen instability throughout the region.

The crisis also intersects with broader geopolitical competition involving Red Sea security, regional trade corridors, and the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which has already strained Ethiopia’s relations with Sudan and Egypt.

Despite the increasingly hostile rhetoric and military signaling, it is widely believed that a full-scale war between Sudan and Ethiopia remains unlikely in the immediate future. Both countries are already burdened by severe internal crises, economic pressures, and ongoing armed conflicts that make a direct interstate war extraordinarily costly.

Yet the danger should not be underestimated. Diplomatic breakdowns, proxy warfare, border skirmishes, and miscalculations could gradually pull both countries into a wider confrontation neither side initially intended. In a region already marked by fragile institutions, ethnic conflicts, and international competition, even limited escalation between Sudan and Ethiopia could have devastating consequences for the entire Horn of Africa.