Supreme Shiite Council: confiscated election or disguised appointment

Source: Nida Al Watan

In examining the electoral process of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, it becomes clear that the issue is no longer limited to technical delays or administrative disputes; it now reflects a structural shift in how the institution is perceived, its role, and its representative function for which it was originally established. The law that created the Council in 1967 was fundamentally based on the principle of representation and elections within the Shiite community, granting the Council religious and social legitimacy rooted in the Shiite base itself, as envisioned by Imam Musa al-Sadr, rather than imposed from above.

However, subsequent practice, particularly over recent decades, gradually emptied this principle of its substance through the suspension of elections, broadening interpretations, and repeated extensions of existing bodies; turning the exception into the rule and placing the Council in a permanent state of democratic stagnation.

In this context, the pivotal role of the “Amal” Movement and “Hezbollah” emerges, as the 2 forces effectively controlling political and representative decision-making within the community. The ongoing delay in holding elections cannot be separated from the internal balance of power, as the Council is not seen as an open representative body but as part of a broader political-organizational system meant to remain disciplined and tightly controlled. The suspension of the electoral process, therefore, does not result from legislative vacuum or logistical difficulties but from a calculated political choice favoring the maintenance of a predetermined reality over risking an election that could introduce pluralism, independent voices, or internal objections.

The most concerning development involves reports of organized moves within Parliament, led by members of the 2 “Amal-Hezbollah” parliamentary blocs, to pass amendments to the existing law governing the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council. These amendments would radically limit voting rights; either by narrowing the electorate, restricting it to selected religious and administrative elites, or imposing conditions that make popular participation nearly impossible. If enacted, such measures would constitute a complete overturning of the original law’s philosophy, transforming elections from an inclusive internal democratic process into a mechanism resembling a disguised appointment, with outcomes predetermined within decision-making circles and later given a legal veneer.

This trajectory raises profound legitimacy concerns. A council intended to represent the Shiite community in all its diversity becomes, in practice, a reflection of a specific political power balance rather than the general will. Concentrating decision-making within a narrow circle of dominant forces weakens the Council’s role as a unifying institution, turning it into an additional tool for managing political and religious influence rather than an independent organizational space representing the community’s needs and religious-social affairs. It also significantly undermines the independence of the Council’s presidency and its role within the Shiite community, as well as its national role for which Imam al-Sadr fought. In this context, the primary beneficiaries of any law restricting voting rights are clearly the forces currently controlling the Council, as such laws ensure continued dominance, prevent potential breaches, and confine decisions within a system of political and organizational loyalty.

The implications extend beyond internal Shiite dynamics to affect the image of the Lebanese state itself. Transforming a legally recognized official institution into a semi-appointed body contradicts fundamental principles of governance and representation, perpetuates sectarian exceptionalism, and undermines confidence in any genuine institutional reform. It also widens the gap between the Shiite social base and its representative institutions, fueling further silent discontent, where participation rights are curtailed under the guise of “stability” and “specificity,” while public affairs are managed through control rather than partnership. Consequently, the electoral battle for the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council has ceased to be an internal matter, becoming a crucial test of the relationship between authority and community, law and domination, and between elections as a right and appointments as a disguised reality under legislative texts.