Syria unwilling to intervene in Lebanon ... for now

Syria is standing back from the unfolding situation in Lebanon.Damascus has opted to pursue a policy of non-intervention and supports disarming Hezbollah. But will this last?

Following Hezbollah attacks on Israel, Syria has responded by mobilising thousands of troops to the Lebanese border, but right now this is unlikely to signal an imminent invasion. Instead, the priority in Damascus is to stop Hezbollah, and other groups, infiltrating Syria as well as stamping out any cross-border arms and drugs smuggling. President Ahmed al-Sharaa is determined to draw a line under the past, signalling to Beirut that his approach differs from the Assad regime, overthrown in 2024.

There are grounds for some optimism, even if for very sectarian reasons. In the Assad era, the Alawite-Shia rulers of Syria supported Hezbollah, which returned the favour by helping the Assads to crush Syrian opposition forces that rose up after the Arab Spring. However, part of that opposition now controls Damascus. The new regime is dominated by Sunni Muslims who have a bitter history with Hezbollah.

President Al-Sharaa previously led the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, which broke with al-Qaeda in 2016 but retained a salafi-jihadist ideology. During the civil war in Syria where the Assads fought hard to retain control, HTS found itself under attack from the combined forces of the Syrian army and Hezbollah auxiliaries. In 2017, the two sides clashed bitterly in Juroud Arsal.

The Assad regime was eventually toppled in December 2024. Since then, Al-Sharaa has been keen to show the outside world that he has transitioned from his old jihadi self to a legitimate head of state. However, memories are long in the Middle East and there is no love lost with Hezbollah.

Pragmatism over confrontation

Can Al-Sharaa ignore Israel’s current action in Lebanon? Astonishingly, it seems that pragmatism is winning out. At this stage, neutralising the threat from Hezbollah and stabilising his government internally overrides all other considerations. Syria is still recovering from the war against Assad and Al-Sharaa has studiously avoided any flare ups with Israel.

In recent weeks, Damascus has collaborated with other countries in the region to disrupt Hezbollah and Iranian operations, which represents a total break from the Assad regime’s de facto alliance with Tehran’s crescent of influence across the Levant. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Al-Sharaa sees an opportunity to draw closer to his Arab neighbours during this conflict, pushing Iran and its proxies away.

That doesn’t mean that condemnations of Israel will not emanate from Damascus but beyond the rhetoric and hand wringing, Syrian national interest is coming first. Diplomacy is taking the place of military engagement.

A long and complicated history with Lebanon

This is a far cry from Syria’s stance towards Lebanon in the past. Many Lebanese will recall the full-scale Syrian invasion in June 1976 where the Assad regime intervened to restore stability but ended up imposing a 30-year occupation. Between 1976 and 2005, Damascus maintained a military force of between 15,000 to 40,000 troops inside Lebanon controlling the political scene through its intelligence services.

The 1980s was an era of chaos for Lebanon with intense urban combat and shifting alliances between different groups including the Syrians who backed and then turned against militias. This was further exacerbated in 1982 when the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) invaded the country in June that year. Their target was the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), based in Beirut.

Syria then found itself fighting both local militias and the Israelis as it struggled to maintain control of the Beqaa Valley and areas around Beirut. In 1989, Lebanon’s government briefly declared war on the Syrian regime, which responded by shelling the presidential palace, then occupied by Michel Aoun. His “war of liberation” failed and the Syrian presence continued into the 21st century.

Under Syria’s leader Hafez al-Assad, and his son and successor Bashar al-Assad, there were numerous war crimes including massacres and human rights abuses. Only as international pressure was applied to Assad, especially after the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, did the Syrians turn their tanks around and leave.

In the years leading up to the overthrow of Assad in 2024, Hezbollah swaggered through Syria, behaving like a second army, sanctioned by the state. Today, it’s been reduced to a small group of terrorists operating undercover around Damascus, struggling to get their hands on drones and Katyusha rockets. The inability to rove across Syria unimpeded is a major blow to Hezbollah’s operations.

Yet Damascus is dismayed by the failure of the government in Beirut to disarm Hezbollah under the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Nobody doubts that Lebanon’s armed forces are under-resourced and logistically unable to completely dismantle Hezbollah. But Syria – along with the United States, European Union, and Arab neighbours – will want to see more progress.

Those with longer memories in Damascus will wonder how Beirut summoned up the resolve 20 years ago to push Syria out of Lebanon and yet the same resolve cannot be applied to Hezbollah. This political paralysis will be overlooked for now, but if it continues, the Syrians may have to consider their options.