The collapse of the “resistance and liberation” narrative

For many years, 25 May was commemorated in Lebanon as “Resistance and Liberation Day,” marking the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 after an 18-year military occupation. The date was elevated by Hezbollah and its allies into a foundational political and ideological symbol: proof that armed “resistance” had succeeded where diplomacy and the Lebanese state supposedly could not. Yet 26 years later, the meaning of that anniversary has become deeply contested.

In 2026, after a new war triggered by Hezbollah’s military escalation against Israel in support of Iran and regional confrontations, Israel once again occupies more than 50 villages and positions in southern Lebanon. The irony is unavoidable: a day once celebrated as the triumph of liberation is now observed while Lebanese territory is again under Israeli occupation. What was presented as a permanent victory in 2000 ultimately failed to produce either sovereignty or stability. Instead, Lebanon became trapped in a recurring cycle in which non-state military decisions repeatedly dragged the country into devastating wars.

The 2000 withdrawal: A political decision more than a military defeat

Contrary to the mythology later constructed around it, Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 was not the result of a decisive military defeat imposed by Hezbollah. Israel still possessed overwhelming military superiority and retained the capacity to remain in the “security zone” it had established along the border since 1985. Hezbollah’s attacks had become increasingly costly and politically painful for Israel, but they had not rendered continued occupation militarily impossible.

The Israeli presence in Lebanon originated in the aftermath of the 1982 invasion, initially conceived as a short operation aimed at expelling the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from southern Lebanon. However, Israel gradually became entangled in a prolonged occupation. By the late 1990s, the conflict had evolved into a low-intensity but constant war of attrition. Hezbollah carried out regular attacks against Israeli forces and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), while Israel responded with military operations and bombardments.

Inside Israel, public fatigue steadily mounted. The deaths of Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon, particularly after the 1997 helicopter disaster that killed 73 Israeli servicemen, transformed the Lebanese front into a politically toxic issue. Grassroots protest movements demanding withdrawal gained momentum, and public opinion increasingly viewed the occupation as a futile and endless bloodletting.

It was in this domestic political context that Israeli Prime Minister (PM) Ehud Barak campaigned on a promise to withdraw from Lebanon. His decision reflected changing Israeli strategic thinking rather than battlefield collapse. Even the Israeli defense establishment largely opposed a unilateral withdrawal, warning that it would embolden Hezbollah and damage Israeli deterrence. Israeli military simulations predicted that Hezbollah would portray the withdrawal as a victory and intensify future confrontations.

Nevertheless, Barak proceeded. After negotiations with Syria failed in March 2000, Israel opted for unilateral withdrawal to the internationally recognized border under the framework of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 425 (1978). Barak hoped that international legitimacy would deprive Hezbollah of any justification for continuing attacks and would eventually force the movement to transform into a purely political actor.

The collapse of the “liberation” narrative

The aftermath of the withdrawal quickly exposed the fragility of these assumptions. Hezbollah immediately presented the Israeli departure as the first Arab military victory over Israel, using it to legitimize the indefinite retention of its weapons. Rather than integrating fully into the Lebanese state, the group emerged stronger politically, militarily, and symbolically.

The issue of the Shebaa Farms became central to this strategy. Although the United Nations (UN) considered Israel’s withdrawal complete, Hezbollah and its Syrian and Iranian backers insisted that the Shebaa Farms remained occupied Lebanese territory. This dispute provided the justification for preserving Hezbollah’s armed status even after the end of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.

The result was that Lebanon never truly regained sovereign control over war and peace. Instead, the country entered a new phase in which Hezbollah maintained an autonomous military structure tied strategically to Iran and regionally connected to Iranian geopolitical priorities. The Lebanese state remained largely absent from decisions concerning conflict with Israel.

This pattern repeated itself in the 2006 war, when Hezbollah’s cross-border operation triggered a major Israeli military response that devastated large parts of Lebanon. Yet even after UNSC Resolution 1701 (2006) called for the extension of state authority and the disarmament of militias south of the Litani River, the underlying problem remained unresolved: the existence of an armed group operating independently from the state.

From “resistance and liberation” to renewed occupation in 2026

The events of 2026 represent the culmination of this trajectory. Hezbollah’s decision to open a new front against Israel in the context of wider regional escalation once again transformed Lebanon into the arena of a conflict driven by calculations beyond the Lebanese state itself. Israel responded with extensive military operations and reoccupied strategic positions and villages in southern Lebanon.

The symbolism is devastating. The same movement that built its legitimacy around “liberating” the south has now presided over the return of Israeli occupation to Lebanese territory. The comparison with the experience of the Palestinian armed factions in the 1970s is striking. Just as the militarization of southern Lebanon by Palestinian organizations contributed to the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982, Hezbollah’s monopolization of military decision-making has once again exposed Lebanon to occupation and destruction.

The central issue, therefore, is no longer simply territorial. It concerns sovereignty itself. Throughout Lebanon’s modern history, every major foreign intervention (Syrian, Israeli, Palestinian, or Iranian) became possible when the authority of the Lebanese state was weakened or bypassed. Conversely, Lebanon remained relatively protected from large-scale war during periods when the state alone controlled national security decisions, particularly under the framework established by the 1949 General Armistice Agreement with Israel.

Therefore, 25 May can no longer be understood solely as a celebration of liberation. In light of the renewed Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 2026, it has become equally a day of political reckoning. The events of the past quarter-century demonstrate that military “victories” disconnected from state sovereignty ultimately produce unstable and self-defeating outcomes.

Hence, a country once celebrating liberation now finds itself confronting occupation again. The lesson is increasingly difficult to ignore: the true liberation of Lebanon cannot be achieved solely through armed confrontation with Israel, but through restoring the exclusive authority of the Lebanese state over decisions of war, peace, and national sovereignty.