The emergence of a Mesopotamia-Levant axis?

As traditional alliances come under increasing strain, especially following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria on 8 December 2024, and regional actors reassess their security priorities, new political configurations are beginning to emerge. Among the most consequential is the possibility of closer strategic coordination between Turkey and Iran, potentially extending to what Ahmet Davutoğlu, leader of Turkey’s Future Party and former prime minister, described as a new “Mesopotamia-Levant axis.”

Indeed, this issue gained attention following remarks by Davutoğlu, who publicly urged Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to reject foreign tutelage, confront Israeli influence, and pursue regional partnerships involving Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. While Davutoğlu does not represent the Turkish government, his comments reflect a broader strategic discussion within Turkey regarding the country’s future regional role following the Iran war and Israel’s expanding influence and regional aspiration.

Davutoğlu’s vision of a Mesopotamia-Levant axis

Ahmet Davutoğlu’s proposal represents an ambitious Turkish geopolitical vision. Addressing President Ahmad al-Sharaa, he rejected suggestions that Syria should assume a regional role defined by Washington (particularly with regards to engaging militarily in Lebanon against Hezbollah) and instead urged Damascus to pursue an independent foreign policy rooted in regional cooperation.

“The lands of Damascus are the lands of Saladin… Stand up to Israel, and if necessary, to the United States and to France. The Turkish people stand with you.”

His proposal calls for the establishment of a partnership linking Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran to reduce regional rivalries while collectively resisting external intervention. Such an arrangement would seek to create a regional security architecture managed primarily by Middle Eastern states themselves rather than outside powers.

“Without delay, we must establish new partnerships among Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran in a way that will eliminate hostility in the region. We must build the Mesopotamia-Levant axis ourselves.”

The feasibility of a Mesopotamia-Levant axis

In an interview with The Beiruter, Turkish journalist, political scientist, and publicist, Musa Özuğurlu, believed that despite its conceptual appeal, the proposed axis appears highly unrealistic under current geopolitical conditions. Indeed, he said that the collapse of the Assad regime and the emergence of a new political order in Damascus under Ahmad al-Sharaa have fundamentally reshaped Syria’s foreign policy orientation.

Özuğurlu noted that the new Syrian leadership is widely assessed as strongly anti-Iranian, with a clear strategic objective of dismantling the military and logistical infrastructure that Iran and its allied networks, particularly Hezbollah, had established in Syria during the Assad era. Iran’s previous position in Syria as a central regional power broker has therefore been significantly weakened, if not structurally dismantled.

In this context, Özuğurlu viewed that any regional framework that includes both Iran and the new Syrian authorities faces deep ideological and strategic incompatibilities. Syria’s current trajectory is oriented toward improving relations with Western and Gulf actors.

As a result, while the idea of regional cooperation may exist in abstract form, Özuğurlu stated that a structured Mesopotamia-Levant axis that meaningfully integrates both Iran and post-Assad Syria within a unified regional axis remains, under present conditions, almost entirely a theoretical and aspirational scenario.

Davutoğlu’s vision within Turkish strategic thinking

Özuğurlu asserted that Davutoğlu’s remarks should also be understood within the broader context of Turkish political discourse rather than as a reflection of official state policy. His position is largely consistent with his long-standing intellectual framework, which highlights regional autonomy, historical continuity, and the strategic reintegration of former Ottoman geopolitical spaces.

In practice, Özuğurlu noted that Turkey’s current priorities are closely tied to consolidating influence in Syria under the emerging Damascus leadership, stabilizing border regions, and managing security threats. In this regard, Ankara’s immediate interests align more with supporting the current Syrian political transition than with constructing an inclusive regional bloc involving Iran.

Moreover, Özuğurlu mentioned that long-term structural constraints limit the possibility of deep Turkey-Iran cooperation. As long as Iran is perceived by Western and Israeli strategic frameworks as a principal regional adversary, and as long as Turkey remains embedded within Western institutional and security structures, relations between Ankara and Tehran are likely to remain bounded.

“Close cooperation with Iran and the Shiites is not possible for Turkey as long as it is viewed as a ‘mortal sin’ by Israel and the West.”

Turkey-Iran relations and regional competition

In another note, Özuğurlu stated that Turkey’s regional strategy is increasingly defined by a balancing approach among competing regional powers, including Iran, Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Egypt. Within this context, Israel’s expanding regional influence, supported by the United States, (U.S.), has introduced a new layer of strategic complexity.

While Turkish policymakers are clearly attentive to Israel’s growing reach in the region, particularly in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, Özuğurlu affirmed that this does not automatically translate into a strategic realignment with Iran. On the contrary, Turkey’s foreign policy has historically combined competition and pragmatic engagement with Israel, often maintaining functional ties even during periods of political tension.

“The day one of the governments that disturbs the other in Israel or Turkey changes, relations will return to normal.”

At a deeper structural level, Turkey’s relationships are shaped by its long-standing Western orientation. Israel, in this sense, is not viewed as an isolated regional actor but as an extension of Western strategic architecture. This, according to Özuğurlu, reinforces the idea that Turkey’s relationship with Iran is inherently limited to tactical, issue-based cooperation rather than sustained strategic alignment, in response to shared concerns; such as Kurdish militancy, border security, or regional instability.

At the same time, Özuğurlu added that significant zones of competition persist, particularly in Syria and Iraq. Turkey seeks to consolidate influence in areas adjacent to its border, while Iran historically aimed to preserve a corridor of strategic depth extending to Lebanon.

Prospects of a broader regional integration framework

Before the Arab Spring, discussions periodically emerged about a broader regional integration framework involving Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. This vision, Özuğurlu noted, was at times informally described by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “Schamgen,” reflecting an ambition to create a Schengen-like zone of economic and political cooperation in the Middle East.

At its peak, Özuğurlu revealed that this concept reflected genuine regional optimism, particularly in the late 2000s, when Turkey pursued an active policy of zero problems with neighbors and regional economic interdependence appeared increasingly plausible.

“This actually held serious potential. If something similar happens, it could be a cooperation that will develop the entire region.”

However, subsequent regional upheavals (including the Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War, and the fragmentation of state authority across the Levant) fundamentally disrupted these trajectories. The emergence of competing regional blocs, proxy conflicts, and deep ideological divisions has significantly reduced the feasibility of such an arrangement.

Today, while limited forms of economic coordination and bilateral cooperation remain possible, Özuğurlu believed that a comprehensive regional integration framework would require a level of political convergence that currently does not exist.

Nonetheless, the idea cannot be entirely dismissed in the long term, according to Özuğurlu. Turkey and Iran, despite their rivalry, have historically demonstrated an ability to manage competition pragmatically. In periods of reduced tension, cooperation on trade, energy transit, and border security has expanded.

“Turkey does not approach the ‘Axis of Resistance’ as harshly as it used to.”

As a result, Özuğurlu concluded that any revival of a “Mesopotamia-Levant” or “Schamgen-like” framework would depend heavily on shifts in regional power balances rather than on ideological convergence, producing overlapping spheres of influence and temporary tactical alignments rather than durable axes of cooperation.