The fate of the 2022 Lebanon-Israel maritime deal

After 4 years, Israel is officially reconsidering withdrawing from the 2022 Lebanon-Israel maritime deal. Indeed, the latter has recently been drawn back into controversy after Israeli Minister of Energy Eli Cohen declared: “The gas agreement in Lebanon was born in sin on the eve of elections. It is a bad and illegitimate agreement and action must be taken to cancel it.”

The maritime boundary agreement signed between Lebanon and Israel on 27 October 2022 marked a rare diplomatic breakthrough between 2 parties that have technically remained at war since 1948. Brokered by the United States (US) after months of indirect negotiations, the deal established a maritime boundary in the eastern Mediterranean and opened the door for offshore gas exploration in one of the world’s most promising energy basins.

In an exclusive interview with The Beiruter, Professor Antonios Abou Kasm, counsel pleading before international courts and professor of international law at the Lebanese University (LU), examined whether Israel could legally abandon the agreement, what the consequences would be for Lebanon, and what steps Beirut should take to protect its interests.

Can Israel unilaterally withdraw from the agreement under international law?

According to Professor Abou Kasm, the 2022 agreement possesses strong legal foundations that make unilateral withdrawal extremely difficult.

The accord has been formally registered with the United Nations (UN) Secretariat under Article 102 of the 1945 UN Charter, giving it the status of an international agreement. Once registered, Abou Kasm adds, such agreements are generally treated as binding commitments under international law, rendering withdrawal extremely difficult.

Furthermore, Abou Kasm notes that international jurisprudence considers boundary agreements, whether on land or at sea, to have a “vocation of permanence.” The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently upheld the principle that borders must remain stable in order to prevent disputes and armed conflict.

This principle is reinforced by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which reflects customary international law. Article 62 of the Convention prohibits states from invoking a “fundamental change of circumstances,” known as rebus sic stantibus, to terminate treaties that establish boundaries. The rule was specifically designed to preserve territorial stability and prevent states from reopening settled disputes.

The 2022 agreement itself also reinforces this permanence. Its text explicitly states that it provides a “permanent and equitable resolution” to the maritime dispute. By accepting this language, both parties effectively waived the right to unilaterally reopen the boundary question.

 Map depicting Lebanon and Israel’s overlapping maritime border claims (Lines 29 and 1, respectively), the US Ambassador Frederic C. Hof’s proposed line, and the ultimately agreed-upon Line 23 under the 2022 maritime agreement.

What are the consequences of a potential Israeli withdrawal?

If Israel were to withdraw from the agreement, Abou Kasm warned that the consequences could be significant.

One immediate result would be the return of the area to “disputed waters” status. International energy companies (such as TotalEnergies, Eni, and Qatar Energy) generally refuse to operate and drill in contested zones due to high legal and insurance risks. As a result, Lebanon’s offshore energy sector, including exploration activities in the offshore Block 9 (the Qana field), could be effectively frozen.

Moreover, Section 2 (paragraph E) of the agreement also includes a financial mechanism, Final Investment Decision (FID), through which Israel receives royalties from the Qana field via its operator, TotalEnergies, since part of the field extends south of the maritime boundary. Should the deal collapse, this mechanism would disappear, potentially leading to legal battles between Israel and the companies involved.

On another note, Professor Abou Kasm believes that threats to unilaterally withdraw may also serve as a negotiating tactic. Israel could use the possibility of cancellation as leverage in broader negotiations with Lebanon, potentially linking maritime issues with unresolved land border disputes. In such circumstances, Abou Kasm views the danger lying in Israel’s possible attempt to push for adjustments to the maritime boundary north of Line 23 under the pretext of expanding its territory to create a “buffer zone” similar to the land-based security zone it seeks to control and eventually annex in southern Lebanon.

Abou Kasm asserts that Israel employs a strategy of “negotiating under fire,” attempting to dictate illegal demands through military force as a prerequisite for any ceasefire agreement. Beyond the immediate economic impact, such a move would also undermine the “precedent of indirect diplomacy” between 2 parties that have no official relations.

Furthermore, a collapse of the agreement could also revive debate over Lebanon’s maritime claims. During the previous negotiations, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) advocated for a more expansive boundary, known as Line 29, which would have increased Lebanon’s claim by approximately 1,430 square kilometers; thereby granting Beirut all of the Qana field as well as a significant portion of the Karish field. Although Lebanon ultimately accepted Line 23 to secure the agreement, the theoretical possibility of reviving the Line 29 claim before the UN would re-emerge if the deal were legally dissolved.

However, Professor Abou Kasm believes this scenario is unlikely. Israel has already installed infrastructure and begun gas production at the Karish field, which lies south of Line 23 and is not contested under the current agreement. Because Israel is already benefiting from operational gas production while Lebanon’s resources remain largely unexploited, the collapse of the deal would likely harm Lebanon more than Israel.

How can Lebanon safeguard the agreement?

According to Professor Abou Kasm, to protect the 2022 maritime deal, Lebanon must rely on both diplomacy and international law.

Firstly, Section B (paragraph A) of the agreement specifies that any differences concerning the interpretation and implementation of the agreement should be resolved through discussions facilitated by the United States, which served as the mediator and the sole guarantor of the arrangement. Lebanon should therefore formally register its opposition to any unilateral Israeli withdrawal before the US administration and maintain active diplomatic engagement with the US Department of State (DOS) to ensure that any shift in Israeli policy is met with the required American pressure to uphold all existing commitments.

Secondly, Beirut may file a formal complaint with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), stressing the “permanence” clause of the agreement. It should be underscored that such a breach of the accord is inconsistent with UNSC Resolution 1701 (specifically paragraph 10), could threaten international peace and security, and risks disrupting the delimitation of land borders between Lebanon and Israel.

In the long term, however, the most effective safeguard may be economic. From a theoretical and technical standpoint, Professor Abou Kasm argues that once Lebanon begins actual gas extraction and production and integrates its exports into international markets (Europe or Asia), the agreement will become far more difficult to overturn without facing massive international litigation. Major multinational companies and energy-importing states, such as France and Qatar, would have strong incentives to protect the stability of the arrangement.

In conclusion, the 2022 maritime agreement between Lebanon and Israel stands as a rare example of pragmatic compromise between 2 long-standing adversaries. Yet the deal now faces renewed political pressure from Tel Aviv, highlighting how domestic and geopolitical considerations can challenge even carefully negotiated international arrangements.

As Professor Antonios Abou Kasm explains, international law strongly favors the permanence of boundary agreements, making unilateral withdrawal legally problematic. Nevertheless, the agreement’s future will ultimately depend not only on legal principles but also on geopolitical realities and economic incentives.