The final stage of state capture

The system that took shape in Lebanon after 1992 was never designed to restore full sovereignty. It was built to stabilize a fragmented reality under external supervision. What followed after 2005 was not the dismantling of that system, but its transformation. With the withdrawal of Syria, the structure that had governed Lebanon did not disappear. It adapted. The external regulator was removed, but the logic of control remained intact. Over time, that logic shifted from Syrian management to an internally anchored system centered around Hezbollah.

This transformation cannot be understood without returning to the structural foundations established in the previous phases. The post-Taif order had already normalized a hybrid model of governance: a constitutional state coexisting with armed actors operating beyond its full authority. Hezbollah’s integration into Parliament in 1992 without disarmament was not an exception; it was the beginning of a new equilibrium. That equilibrium was sustained in the 1990s by Syrian oversight, which regulated internal balances while allowing Hezbollah to maintain its military function within a controlled framework.

However, Hezbollah was never merely a domestic actor. Its formation in the early 1980s was the result of direct cooperation between Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Assad’s Syrian authority and Lebanese Shiite clergies, embedding it within a broader regional project from the outset. Its military structure, ideological orientation, and operational logic developed independently of the Lebanese state. Even during the Syrian period, its deployment areas, training camps, and logistical routes were closely tied to Syrian-controlled territory, ensuring alignment with the broader regional axis. This dual dependency - ideological and logistical - positioned Hezbollah not as a participant in the Lebanese system, but as a parallel structure operating within it.

The turning point came in 2005. The withdrawal of Syrian forces removed the external framework that had contained internal contradictions. Yet the system itself remained unchanged. State institutions were not restructured to reclaim sovereignty, and the asymmetry in the control of force persisted. In this context, Hezbollah’s position evolved from that of a protected actor within a Syrian-managed system to that of a central actor capable of shaping the system itself.

This shift unfolded gradually. Hezbollah maintained its military capacity while expanding its political presence. It deepened its role in government formation, parliamentary dynamics, and executive decision-making. At the same time, its autonomous military structure remained outside the authority of the state. This dual role - institutional participation combined with independent coercive power - redefined the balance within the Lebanese system.

The implications of this transformation are structural. Sovereignty, in its classical sense, requires a single authority capable of exercising ultimate control over decisions of war, peace, and security. In Lebanon’s current configuration, this authority is no longer unified. The state continues to function institutionally, but it does not possess exclusive control over strategic decisions. Instead, authority is distributed across actors with unequal capacities, creating a system in which formal legitimacy and effective power are no longer aligned.

This misalignment is not incidental. It is the result of a gradual process in which the logic of the militia-state hybrid has been normalized and expanded. What was once tolerated as an exception has become embedded as a principle. The presence of an armed actor outside state control is no longer treated as a temporary condition, but as a permanent feature of the political order.

Within this context emerges the contemporary push for tripartite power-sharing. Presented as a reform of the confessional system, this proposal seeks to redistribute political authority among three major communities. Yet its significance lies not in its formal structure, but in its underlying function. It represents an attempt to translate existing power asymmetries into constitutional arrangements.

The logic is consistent with the trajectory that began in 1984 and was consolidated in 1992. When power is acquired outside the state, the next stage is to legitimize it within the state. Constitutional reform becomes the mechanism through which de facto realities are transformed into de jure structures. In this sense, tripartite power-sharing is not a neutral adjustment of the system. It is the political codification of a new balance of power.

This is why it can be understood as the final stage of state capture. The earlier phases dismantled the state’s authority and reorganized it under external supervision. The current phase seeks to redefine the system itself in a way that incorporates and legitimizes the outcomes of that process. What was once external becomes internalized. What was once informal becomes institutional.

The risks of such a transformation are significant. The Lebanese system, despite its fragility, was historically based on a delicate equilibrium that prevented any single actor from achieving structural dominance. Tripartite power-sharing, by contrast, risks formalizing imbalance under the appearance of redistribution. It shifts the system from one of negotiated coexistence to one of structured hierarchy, where power is no longer mediated solely through institutions but anchored in asymmetrical capacities.

Moreover, this transformation would further entrench the separation between the state and society. The legitimacy crisis already visible in 1992 would deepen, as representation becomes increasingly detached from electoral realities and more closely tied to power structures operating beyond institutional frameworks. The result would not be a more stable system, but a more rigid one, less capable of adaptation and more prone to long-term instability.

The trajectory from 1992 to today reveals a coherent pattern. The post-war order did not resolve the contradictions of the Lebanese system. It reorganized them. The withdrawal of Syrian forces did not dismantle this order. It shifted its center of gravity. Hezbollah’s rise did not introduce a new anomaly. It expanded an existing model to its logical conclusion.

What is being proposed today is not a break with the past, but its continuation in a more explicit form. The system that once operated under external supervision is now moving toward internal consolidation. The mechanisms of control are no longer mediated by a foreign actor. They are embedded within the structure of the state itself.

This is the point at which the question of sovereignty can no longer be deferred. The issue is not whether Lebanon can return to a previous model. It is whether the current trajectory will lead to the permanent redefinition of the state. The debate over tripartite power-sharing is therefore not simply a constitutional discussion. It is a decision about the nature of the political system itself.

The path from 1984 to 1992 to today is not a sequence of disconnected events. It is a continuous process in which the state was first weakened, then reorganized, and is now being redefined. The final stage is not the disappearance of the state, but its transformation into something fundamentally different - a structure where sovereignty is no longer the organizing principle, but one variable among others in a system shaped by power, alignment, and the legacy of its own fragmentation.