The Kharg Island play

CENTCOM has confirmed it: the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group has entered its area of responsibility. With it comes 3,500 sailors and Marines to the region, along with F-35B strike fighters, attack and transport helicopters, as well as amphibious landing craft capable of deploying troops, armored vehicles, and heavy equipment directly ashore. This deployment opens the door to a broader and faster range of U.S. military options against Iran, thanks to the amphibious group’s ability to operate independently of bases in the region. Yet the central question remains: what mission will this force ultimately be tasked with?

Kharg: A risky prizes

One potential answer has drawn particular attention: Kharg Island. Handling around 90% of Iran’s oil exports, Kharg sits at the core of the country’s economic lifeline, making it one of the most strategically sensitive targets in the region. As such, Donald Trump has repeatedly raised the possibility of targeting or even seizing the island. That scenario has since dominated media coverage, with many reports pointing to it as a potential objective for such a force.

Yet such an operation would be fraught with dangers. From an operational standpoint, any move against Kharg Island would unfold in one of the most constrained maritime environments in the world. The American formation would first need to transit through the Strait of Hormuz before sailing upward of 400 nautical miles inside the Gulf, largely parallel to Iran’s coastline. This extended transit would expose vessels for prolonged periods to coastal missile systems, drones, and other defensive assets, significantly increasing the risk of detection, engagement, and potential casualties.

Moreover, the possibility that Iran may have laid naval mines in the Strait further complicates such an operation. Without a prior mine-clearing effort, any force transiting the area would be forced to advance at a significantly reduced pace to detect and avoid potential threats, increasing its exposure to Iranian attacks. While a mine strike would not necessarily derail the operation, it could degrade the amphibious group’s capabilities just enough to increase the number of U.S. casualties.

Visibility adds another layer of complexity. The longer a potential operation is discussed in public, the more time it gives the defending side to prepare. In this case, Kharg Island has been the subject of sustained speculation for days, if not longer, across political statements and media reporting. That level of attention is unlikely to have gone unnoticed in Tehran. In fact, American intelligence reporting indicates that Iran has already begun reinforcing the island, deploying additional troops, air defense systems, and defensive measures in anticipation of a potential strike.

Deception at work

None of these challenges are likely to deter what remains, for all intents and purposes, the most capable military force on earth. The United States retains the ability to carry out such an operation if it chooses to do so. Yet this raises a critical question: why openly discuss a potential target, effectively increasing the risks to U.S. forces by giving the adversary time to prepare? Unless, of course, the focus on Kharg Island is part of a deliberate deception…

It would not be the first time Washington has relied on such methods. In the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel, the United States demonstrated a masterful display of operational deception. While Washington helped draw global attention to a formation of fully armed and loaded B-2 bombers visibly deploying toward Diego Garcia, widely interpreted as the strike package heading to bomb Iran, another element was already executing the real mission. A separate B-2 formation, operating with minimal visibility, carried out a flawless strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, catching defenses completely off guard. By the time anyone realized what had happened, the B-2s were already turning for home, with medals and promotions practically waiting on the runway.

Targeting uranium

Should Iranian attention remain fixed on Kharg Island, it could provide the United States with a decisive element of surprise to strike elsewhere. Among the potential alternatives, Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium stands out as another strategically significant target.

The Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group would be particularly well-suited for such an operation, given that the USS Tripoli is part of a class of ships specifically designed for rapid, precise insertion operations. With transport helicopters, it could support a mission involving Marines or special forces deployed directly to sensitive sites to seize enriched uranium, operating under air cover from onboard F-35Bs and attack helicopters, further reinforced by broader U.S. airpower already deployed across the region.

But such a scenario faces major constraints.

Much of the material is stored in underground facilities, where the previously mentioned American strikes may have obstructed or buried key access points. While not fully sealed, these sites are now harder to reach, potentially forcing assault teams into narrow entryways that act as chokepoints and defensive positions. This would slow the operation, extend exposure on the ground, and significantly complicate any attempt to retrieve the material, especially if heavy machinery is required to clear access or reach deeper sections.

Also, like Kharg Island, this is not an entirely covert objective. Iran is well aware of the strategic value of its enriched uranium stockpile, and the possibility of a U.S. operation targeting it has been widely discussed. As a result, these sites are also likely defended, monitored, and prepared for such a scenario.

The island play

Another set of potential objectives that have received far less attention and largely escaped the focus of headlines are the Iranian islands of Abu Moussa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Located at the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, they sit directly along the shipping corridor used by merchant vessels entering and exiting the Gulf.

Gaining control of these islands would deal a direct strategic blow to Iran, while operationally, it would also be one of the least demanding options.

Unlike a deep-Gulf objective, like Kharg Island, such a mission would not require a prolonged transit. Abu Moussa, for instance, lies closer to the UAE coast than to Iran’s mainland, significantly shortening the approach. It also opens the possibility of operating from the southern side of the Gulf, reducing or potentially eliminating altogether the need for a full naval transit through the Strait.

Furthermore, Abu Moussa’s position allows for direct observation of vessels entering and exiting the Strait, enabling both the monitoring and protection of maritime traffic. It would also place U.S. forces in a position to interdict Iranian oil exports at their point of exit, effectively neutralizing Kharg Island’s role without striking it directly, while also enforcing sanctions on vessels heading toward Iran.

The operational environment also differs. Thanks to its proximity to the southern Gulf, fighter aircraft can reach the area faster, stay longer, and provide more continuous air cover to the troops on the islands. Nearby American bases would also serve as key logistical hubs, enabling sustained resupply and allowing forces on Abu Moussa to maintain a prolonged presence, even in an active combat zone.

While Abu Moussa offers the most immediate operational advantages due to its proximity, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs present similar strategic value. Located slightly farther north, they could be secured in sequence, effectively extending control across the Strait once Abu Moussa is no longer under Iranian control.

Finally, these islands come with an added political dimension. Unlike Kharg Island or Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Abu Moussa and the Tunbs are part of a longstanding territorial dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Any operation involving them would therefore unfold in a different strategic context, one that blends military positioning with legal and diplomatic ambiguity, giving Washington greater room to justify or calibrate its actions internationally.

No clear endgame

What comes next, however, remains uncertain. The Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group is ultimately a tool in the hands of Donald Trump, one that can be positioned wherever it applies the greatest pressure. While its arrival alone may not be enough to shift Iran’s position, the successful execution of any such operation, whether the seizure of key terrain or the neutralization of critical assets, could shift the balance of ongoing negotiations decisively in Washington’s favor. In doing so, the group could become the missing piece Donald Trump needs to bring this conflict to a close.