The lost belonging

In an era where identities overlap and the lines between loyalty and belonging blur, the debate over national identity in Lebanon resurfaces not as an abstract intellectual discussion, but as a question of political existence. Lebanon, founded on the notion of diversity and equilibrium, now faces a profound crisis of self-definition: is it a unifying homeland or a battleground of competing identities?

Deconstructing the concept of belonging thus becomes essential to understanding the nature of Lebanon’s current crisis particularly when sectarian or ideological allegiance takes precedence over allegiance to the state. Within this context, Hezbollah emerges as a pivotal factor in the equation of statehood and identity, rooted in its ideological origins and its intricate relationship with Iran. In contrast stands the notion of “belonging to the state” championed by the Lebanese Front. Between belonging to the nation and belonging to a transnational project, the portrait of contemporary Lebanon comes into focus: a country that tests, daily, the limits of its sovereignty and identity, constantly searching for a definition of belonging measured not by arms, but by citizenship and the public good.

Lucien Chehwan to The Beiruter: The illusion of Comparing Hezbollah to other Lebanese Political Parties

In an interview with political researcher Lucian Chehwan, he asserts that comparing Hezbollah to Lebanese Front parties is fundamentally flawed, as their origins, purposes, and historical contexts are entirely different.

"Hezbollah was not born as a movement carrying the project of a Lebanese state,” Chehwan explains.

It emerged as an extension of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within Lebanon. The founders of its early combat units were IRGC officers who established training camps in the Beqaa Valley and trained local Shiite recruits, before the organization evolved into what we now know as Hezbollah.

From this perspective, the party’s project was never Lebanese in the national sense, but rather part of a broader regional enterprise linking Lebanon to Iran’s strategic vision.

Founding Document and Ideological Reference

Chehwan points to Hezbollah’s 1985 Founding Charter, which makes this connection explicit, declaring allegiance to the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih (the Guardianship of the Jurist) and omitting any reference to Lebanon’s interests or to the Lebanese state itself. He continues:

This ideological foundation has remained unchanged, even after 2009 when the party renewed its manifesto. Its leaders were clear that they had not touched the doctrinal component, as it constitutes the very essence of their existence and political identity.

Chehwan traces the party’s evolution from its early militant operations, including the bombings of the US Marines and French paratrooper barracks in Beirut, to its emergence as a complex regional force engaged in both external wars and internal conflicts, most notably the so-called ‘War of the brothers’ with the Amal Movement. He considers this conflict a reflection of the Iranian Syrian rivalry within Lebanon’s Shiite arena: Hezbollah fully embraced the Iranian line, while Amal remained aligned with Damascus.

The Monopoly of “Resistance” and the Exclusion of Others

According to Chehwan, Hezbollah monopolized the concept of resistance and used it as both a linguistic and political weapon to legitimize its dominance, marginalizing leftist, communist, and nationalist figures who had independently resisted Israel.

"Through this narrative, the party left no room for pluralism of vision,” he says.

It constructed its own exclusive version of resistance as an extension of the Iranian project rather than a defense of Lebanese interests.

By contrast, Chehwan explains, the Lebanese Front emerged from the imperative of defending the state and reclaiming its sovereignty. It took up arms only when the state failed to counter Palestinian militarization and later relinquished them with the restoration of legitimacy under the Taif Accord. Yet, as he notes, “Syrian President Hafez al-Assad exploited the agreement to serve his own interests in managing relations with Israel, stripping it of its sovereign essence.”

Hezbollah did not participate in Lebanon’s state institutions until 1992, when it contested parliamentary elections for the first time, gradually integrating into the political system. Despite becoming part of government after 2005, it remained bound to its ideological allegiance to Wilayat al-Faqih, thus operating as a domestic actor with a foreign agenda.

The State as the Core of Belonging

Chehwan maintains that Hezbollah’s weapons constitute the backbone of the party and the vital link connecting it to Iran. Once this military capability is dismantled, Tehran’s influence would naturally decline, as its foundation armed power and logistical support would dissipate.

Resolving the weapons issue would, in effect, mark the end of Hezbollah as we know it.

Chehwan adds that the solution to many of Lebanon’s dilemmas lies in expanded decentralization, which strengthens pluralism and renews the national partnership.

Hezbollah, like all other militias, should have disarmed following the Taif Agreement; however, its continued possession of weapons undermines both the spirit of the accord and the state itself.

“Experience has shown that weapons have not protected the Shiite community but have instead brought it immense losses. The only safeguard is the state through political and parliamentary participation, not military force.”

Only then, Chehwan concludes, can Lebanon shift from belonging to a transnational project to belonging to a single, unified homeland.

Lebanon’s real battle is not between parties or sects, but between the project of the state and a rival project rooted in loyalties beyond its borders. The moment weapons are stripped of their political function, and the state is once again recognized as the sole source of legitimacy, the Lebanese will rediscover the true meaning of belonging to a nation rather than a regional axis, to a living society rather than a militarised front, and to a collective identity rather than a fractured one.

That is the kind of belonging that can restore Lebanon’s spirit and offer it a new birth from the ashes of division.